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INTRODUCTION
In the nearly thirty years since the Constitution of the Republic of
Palau went into effect, the constitutional jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court of Palau has grown to such a quantum that it now primarily refers to
its own case law without the need to look to other jurisdictions for
guidance. Collection and analysis of these cases is therefore appropriate,
if not overdue. This article collects and reviews cases interpreting and
applying the Palau Constitution through the sixteenth anniversary of
Palau‘s independence (October 1, 2010). It focuses on the provisions of
the Constitution that most directly affect the people: citizenship, suffrage,
right to due process, equal protection of the laws, criminal procedure
rights, and the like. Some higher-level issues (such as the designation of
territory and states and the roles granted to traditional leaders) are
included as well, but the focus of this paper is on individual rights and
liberties.
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Although by no means a history text, a small dose of history and
geography is helpful to place the following analysis in context. The
Republic of Palau, an independent country, comprises an archipelago of
nearly 300 islands at the western end of Micronesia, approximately
situated between Guam and the Philippines. After a history of relative
isolation, Palau entered the colonial era in 1886 under Spanish (and then
German) control before emerging from World War I as a Japanese
possession. After its liberation (or, to some, capture) by Allied forces, the
United Nations took control of Palau in the wake of World War II.
In 1947, the United Nations and the United States signed the
Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands. This
agreement assigned to the United States the administering authority over
Palau and the other Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands. While still a
Trust Territory, Palau‘s Constitution went into effect on January 1, 1981.
After Palau and the United States agreed on a Compact of Free
Association, Palau gained its full independence on October 1, 1994 when
the United Nations terminated its trusteeship.
Even a cursory review of the Palau Constitution reveals that it was
modeled—with some noteworthy departures—on the United States
Constitution. The Palau Constitution splits the government into three
branches and enumerates rights and liberties of the people of Palau. Since
its enactment in 1981 it has been altered by twenty-seven amendments.
Aside from the text of the Constitution, the constitutional decisions of the
Supreme Court of Palau are the most significant guideposts setting forth
the meaning of the Constitution. This article analyzes the Supreme Court
of Palau‘s case law interpreting the Constitution to discern the extent—and
limitations—of the rights and liberties granted by the Constitution.
I.

SUPREMACY AND AUTHORITY OF THE PALAU CONSTITUTION
A. Supremacy of the National Constitution

As stated by its own text: ―This Constitution is the supreme law of
the land.‖1 Or, in the words of Associate Justice (now Chief Justice)
Ngiraklsong, ―I see the Constitution as perhaps the best living expression
of what the people of Palau want.‖2 Before Palau‘s independence in 1994,
1

ROP CONST. Art. II, § 1. The Constitution is published in both Palauan and in
English. Although both are ―equally authoritative[,] in case of conflict, the Palauan
version shall prevail.‖ ROP CONST. Art. XIII, § 2 & amend. 25. Prior to the enactment
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in 2008, this section directed that in cases of conflict the
English version of the Constitution prevailed.
2

ROP v. Ngiraboi, 2 ROP Intrm. 257, 275 (1991) (Ngiraklsong, J., concurring)
(writing separately to emphasize that the Palau Constitution sets forth the supreme law of
the land). Citations to the opinions of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of
Palau are styled ―__ ROP __ (year)‖ or ―__ ROP Intrm. __ (year),‖ while citations to the
Trial Division of the same court will include the designation ―Trial Div.‖ within the
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it was a Trust Territory of the United Nations administered by the United
States. As such, a Trusteeship Agreement between the United Nations and
the United States governed its administration. However, the Palau
Constitution went into effect in 1981, creating a period of overlap between
the Constitution and the Trusteeship Agreement. Justice Ngiraklsong
stated that no conflict could be found between the Constitution and the
Trusteeship Agreement because the primary purpose of the Trusteeship
Agreement was to provide self-governance to the people of Palau and the
Constitution is the best expression of the Palauan people‘s selfgovernance.3 Justice Ngiraklsong confirmed that the Constitution‘s selfdeclared ―supremacy‖ in Article II, Section 1 was to be respected by the
courts even in cases of conflict with the Trusteeship Agreement.4
Although Article II, Section 1 clearly sets forth the ―supremacy‖ of
the national Constitution, Section 2 of that article spells out some of the
Constitution‘s subordinates: ―Any law, act of government, or agreement
to which a government of Palau is a party, shall not conflict with this
Constitution and shall be invalid to the extent of such conflict.‖5 Statutes,
treaties, or state constitutions that conflict with the Constitution may be
found void to the extent of the conflict under either Section 1 or Section 2
of Article II.6
Conflicts between legislation and the Constitution must be
resolved in favor of the Constitution.7 Justice Hefner found national
legislation void for unconstitutionality because it capped the residency
parenthetical as well as a parenthetical identifying the Justice who issued the opinion.
Citations to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court are to the Supreme Court
Reporter, as it is the only such reporter available in Palau.
3

See id.

4

Id. at 276 (―I accept and recognize, as I believe we must, the supremacy of the
Palau Constitution.‖).
5

ROP CONST. Art. II, § 2.

6

Although Article II is entitled ―Sovereignty and Supremacy,‖ none of the
sections of Article II grants sovereignty to Palau. Sovereignty is granted to the Republic
in the amended Article I, Section 1 (―The Republic of Palau shall have jurisdiction and
sovereignty over its territory . . . ‖) as it was in the original form of that section. For
more discussion of this constitutional provision, see Section II.A, infra.
A criminal defendant picked up on the lack of discussion of sovereignty in
Article II and argued that Article II forbids sovereign immunity (as codified in 14 PNC §
502(e)) because the text of the Article fails to mention it. See Tell v. Rengiil, 4 ROP
Intrm. 224, 227 (1994). The Court was nonplussed, stating that the failure to mention
sovereign immunity in Article II (or elsewhere in the Constitution) does not diminish the
existence of sovereign immunity, a privilege inherent to sovereign governments. See id.
7

See Mechol v. Soalablai, 1 ROP Intrm. 62, 63 (Trial Div. 1982) (Hefner, J.) (―It
is further not subject to argument that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land and
prevails over any statutes passed by the Olbiil Era Kelulau.‖), (citing ROP CONST. Art. II,
§ 1).
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requirement that a state could impose for voting in a state election at fifty
days, whereas Article VII of the Constitution grants states full autonomy
to set length of residency requirements for voting in state elections.8
Similarly, the Constitution trumps municipal ordinances, as
explained by Chief Justice Nakamura in Silmai v. Magistrate of Ngardmau
Municipality.9 The ordinance at issue in Silmai granted a seat on the
Municipal Council of Ngardmau State to the representative(s) of
Ngardmau to the Olbiil Era Kelulau.10 That portion of the ordinance was
voided for its conflict with Article IX, Section 10 of the Constitution,
which prohibits members of the Olbiil Era Kelulau from holding other
public offices or otherwise engaging in public employment during their
tenure in the national legislature.11 Chief Justice Nakamura further found
that the Presiding Judge of the Community Court could not be seated on
the Municipal Council of Ngardmau State (as was provided for by
ordinance) because the establishment of the constitutional courts pursuant
to Article X of the Constitution did not provide for community courts.12
Therefore, community courts were repealed by implication on December
23, 1981 (the date of the establishment of the constitutional court system)
pursuant to Article XV, Section 3(a) of the Constitution.13
A conflict between the national Constitution and a state law is also
decided in favor of the national Constitution. Chief Justice Ngiraklsong
found that an Airai State law prohibiting the use of eminent domain power
only when the expropriated land is used ―for the sole benefit of a foreign
entity‖ (emphasis added) was invalid to the extent that it attempted to
grant a broader eminent domain power to the state than was provided for
in Article XIII, Section 7 of the Constitution (which provides that the
eminent domain power ―shall not be used for the benefit of a foreign
entity‖).14
B. Delegation of Governmental Powers Including Authority Over
Harmful Substances
Article II, Section 3 permits the Republic to delegate ―major
governmental powers‖ to another sovereign nation or international
organization. Such ―major governmental powers‖ include national
8

See id.

9

See Silmai v. Magistrate of Ngardmau Municipality, 1 ROP Intrm. 47, 51 (Trial
Div. 1982) (Nakamura, C.J.).
10

See id. The Olbiil Era Kelulau is the national legislature of Palau.

11

See id.

12

See id. at 51-52.

13

See id. at 52.

14

See Airai State Gov’t v. Ngkekiil Clan, 11 ROP 261, 262 n.1 (Trial Div. 2004)
(Ngiraklsong, C.J.).
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security and foreign affairs. Delegation of major governmental powers
requires the approval of a two-thirds majority of the legislature and a
simple majority of the citizens in a nation-wide referendum. The wrinkle
in Section 3 is that a super-majority vote of three-fourths of the citizens
voting in a nation-wide referendum is required to approve any such
agreement ―which authorizes use, testing, storage, or disposal or nuclear,
toxic chemical, gas or biological weapons intended for use in warfare.‖15
As the capstone to what Justice Hefner referred to as the ―long
road the Palauan people have taken to determine their future political
destiny,‖ Palau and the United States entered into a Compact of Free
Association on August 26, 1982.16 Part of the Compact of Free
Association would permit the United States to store nuclear, chemical, or
biological materials within Palau‘s territory, thus requiring approval by
75% of the popular votes.
The proposed wording on the referendum ballot sought a ―yes‖ or
―no‖ response to the question: ―Do you approve the agreement under
Section 314 of the Compact which places restrictions and conditions on
the United States with respect to radioactive, chemical and biological
materials?‖17 Justice Hefner found this language to be misleading, as it
could be understood to mean that a ―yes‖ vote would place greater
restrictions on the storage of such prohibited materials while in reality a
―no‖ vote would maintain the Constitution‘s total prohibition.18 The Court
ordered that the ballots be re-worded to more clearly set forth the issues
for the voting public.19
The issue persisted before Justice Hefner in Gibbons v. Remeliik.20
The result of the referendum was a 53% ―yes‖ vote to the question, ―Do
you approve of the Agreement concerning radioactive, chemical and
biological materials pursuant to Section 314 of the Compact of Free
Association?‖21 The vote fell short of the 75% affirmative vote required
15

Similarly, Article XIII, Section 6 provides:

Harmful substances such as nuclear, chemical, gas or biological
weapons intended for use in warfare, nuclear power plants, and waste
materials therefrom, shall not be used, tested, stored, or disposed of
within the territorial jurisdiction of Palau without the express approval
of not less than three-fourths (3/4) of the votes cast in a referendum
submitted on this specific question.
ROP CONST. Art. XIII, § 6.
16

See Koshiba v. Remeliik, 1 ROP Intrm. 65, 65 (Trial Div. 1983) (Hefner, J.).

17

Id. at 67.

18

See id.

19

See id. at 75-76.

20

Gibbons v. Remeliik, 1 ROP Intrm. 80 (Trial Div. 1983) (Hefner, J.).

21

See id. at 80-81.
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by Article II, Section 3. The specific issue before the Court in Gibbons
was whether the ―harmful substances‖ provision was severable from the
greater Compact, and therefore whether the Compact had been passed
minus that provision.22 Justice Hefner ruled that the referendum had been
split into two questions (one regarding the Compact as a whole and one
regarding the harmful substances provision specifically) only to comply
with the requirement in Article XIII, Section 6 of the Constitution,
requiring that a referendum be held on the ―specific question‖ of harmful
substances.23 Therefore, the rejection of the harmful substances provision
meant that the larger Compact of Free Association had been rejected as
well.24
Approval of the Compact again came to the Court after the third
referendum failed to garner 75% voter approval.25 The second referendum
garnered a 67% approval vote and the third a 72.19% approval vote.26
After the third referendum, the Compact was sent to the United States
Congress for consideration (despite its failure to muster the requisite votes
in Palau).27 The Gibbons v. Salii plaintiff sued for declaratory judgment
and injunctive relief, alleging that the Compact conflicted with Article II,
Section 3 and Article XIII, Section 6 of the Constitution by permitting the
United States (or its designees) to bring nuclear substances (including
nuclear weapons and nuclear-propelled ships and aircraft) into Palau‘s
territory without first obtaining the constitutionally-required 75% voter
approval.28 The plaintiff also complained that the Compact defined
Palau‘s territory as smaller than the constitutionally-defined territory, thus
permitting unchecked nuclear activity by the United States in the area not
included in the Compact.29
The Appellate Division, per Chief Justice Nakamura, traced the
history of the constitutional prohibitions against nuclear materials in
Palau.30 The enacted Constitution was the result of the third constitutional
plebiscite, after the second constitutional plebiscite only garnered 31%
support for the proposed constitution.31 That second proposed constitution
22

See id. at 81.

23

See id.

24

See id. at 82.

25

See Gibbons v. Salii, 1 ROP Intrm. 333 (1986).

26

See id. at 334 and n.1.

27

See id. at 335.

28

See id.

29

See id.

30

See id. at 339-44.

31

See id. at 343-44.
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included language permitting an exception for the ―transit and port visits
of ships, and transit and overflight of aircraft‖ from the nuclear-materials
ban.32 The third draft constitution deleted this exception for nuclear craft
in transit, but was otherwise substantially similar to the second draft
constitution. It was that third draft constitution that was approved by 78%
of the voters on July 9, 1980 and went into effect as the Constitution on
January 1, 1981.33
Drawing reasonable inferences from this
constitutional-drafting history, the Court found that ―use‖ and ―store‖ in
Article II, Section 3 included the operation of nuclear vessels as
contemplated by the Compact.34 Going further, the Court stated, ―[W]e
hold that the four verbs, ‗use, test, store or dispose of,‘ in the nuclear
control provisions were meant to be a brief summation of all that could
possibly be done with nuclear substances—in short, a general prohibition
against the introduction of nuclear substances in Palau.‖35 Because the
third Compact referendum only received 72.19% of the vote, the Compact,
with its provisions permitting the United States to operate nuclear-capable
vessels within Palau‘s territory, was not effective.36
The Court‘s interpretation in Gibbons v. Salii that the prohibition
against ―use, testing, storage, or disposal of‖ harmful substances in the
nuclear-control provisions of the Constitution is, in actuality, a prohibition
against anything that could possibly be done with those substances. While
expansive, this interpretation seems to comport with the rationale behind
the nuclear-control provisions. And, given the amount of litigation
surrounding the issue, it was likely an attempt by the Court to cut off even
more protracted litigation and settle the issue at once, rather than reach the
same conclusion on an ad hoc basis.
The issue again came before the Appellate Division after a
referendum to amend the Constitution to suspend the nuclear-control
provisions (Article II, Section 3 and Article XIII, Section 6) of the
Constitution insofar as they applied to the Compact. 37 The Court found
that, because the negotiated Compact was inconsistent with the nuclearcontrol provisions, amendment of the Constitution was possible through

32

See id. at 343, n.8.

33

See id. at 344.

34

See id. at 348.

35

Id. at 348.

36

See id. at 351. The Court did not find a constitutional problem with the
Compact‘s diminutive territorial definition of Palau because the Compact did not define
the area to which it applied; therefore, the Court found that the Compact limitations
applied no matter where the United States attempted to exercise its authority. See id. at
350-51.
37

See Fritz v. Salii, 1 ROP Intrm. 521, 522 (1988).
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the mechanism laid out in Article XV, Section 11.38 Article XV, Section 11
permits amendment of the Constitution to avoid conflict with the Compact
by a simple majority of voters in at least three-fourths of the states.39 The
First Amendment to the Constitution was written and enacted specifically
to avoid inconsistencies between the Compact and the nuclear-control
provisions of Article II, Section 3 and Article XIII, Section 6.
The Court again reviewed the constitutionality of the Compact in
Wong v. Nakamura.40 The challenge in Wong was that the national
legislature needed to vote again (and reach a two-thirds majority approval
under Article II, Section 3) before Palau could enter into the Compact.41
The appellants argued that the Compact had been altered since the
legislature had approved it in 1986, but the Court found that the legislature
had approved the Compact again in 1993 after the alterations.42
Although permitting approval of the Compact with its nuclear
provisions with less than three-fourths popular approval seems an endround around Article II, Section 3 and Article XIII, Section 6, the
Constitution does permit such amendment, either by the Compact-specific
amendment provision in Article XV, Section 11 or the general amendment
provision in Article XIV.43 Whenever a constitutional amendment can be
effected by a lesser majority than a different limitation in the constitution,
that limitation is effectively reduced to only requiring the majority needed
for amendment.44 Although the result may have been an oversight in
38

See id. at 534.

39

Article XV, Section 11 states:

Any amendment to this Constitution proposed for the purpose of
avoiding inconsistency with the Compact of Free Association shall
require approval by a majority of the votes cast on that amendment and
in not less than three-fourths (3/4) of the states. Such amendment shall
remain in effect only as long as the inconsistency continues.
ROP CONST. Art. XV, § 11.
40

Wong v. Nakamura, 4 ROP Intrm. 243 (1994).

41

Id. at 244-45.

42

See id. at 245.

43

Article XIV, Sections 2 and 3 (as amended by the 15th Amendment in 2008)
provide the general mechanism for amendments to the Constitution: a majority vote
(including a majority in at least three-fourths of the states) is necessary to approve a
proposed amendment, but a special election on a proposed amendment cannot be held
either six months before or after a general election. The pre-amendment text of Article
XIV, Section 2 required the vote on the proposed amendment to take place only on the
next regularly-scheduled general election.
44

For instance, consider a constitution that requires three-fourths popular
approval to levy a certain tax, but only requires one-half popular approval to amend the
constitution. The tax could be levied by a simple majority, because a simple majority
could amend the constitution and nullify the three-fourths approval provision.
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constitutional drafting (or perhaps not), the Court was bound to apply the
Constitution as written. The First Amendment therefore effectively
removed the three-fourths popular vote requirement on the harmful
substances provision of the Compact and paved the way for its approval.

12

Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal

[Vol. 12:2

II. TERRITORY AND LANGUAGE
A. Territory of Palau
The Constitution begins, in Section 1 of Article 1, with a definition
of Palau‘s territorial boundaries and the declaration that Palau shall have
―jurisdiction and sovereignty‖ over its territory.45 Palau‘s territorial
boundaries, as described in Section 1, were changed by the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment in 2008. This amendment split Section 1 into two sections
and redefined the archipelagic baselines that dictate the boundaries of
Palau‘s maritime zones.46
Section 2(a) of Article I (added by the Twenty-Sixth Amendment)
grants the Republic the exclusive ownership of all living and non-living
resources within its exclusive economic zone and mandates that the
Republic shall exercise its sovereign rights ―to conserve, develop, exploit,
and manage at a sustainable manner‖ those resources in accordance with
its treaties, international law, and practices.47 When read literally, this
clause destroys private property rights in Palau, instead deeding all
―resources‖ to the national government. The more realistic meaning of
this clause is that Palau—and no other foreign nation—lays claim to the
resources within its territorial boundaries to the extent that those resources
are not otherwise owned by private parties.
Palau is divided into sixteen states. Article I, Section 2(b) provides
that each state has ―exclusive ownership of all living and non-living
resources, except highly migratory fish, within the twelve (12) nautical
mile territorial sea, provided, however, that traditional fishing rights and
practices shall not be impaired.‖48 Justice Beattie applied the preamendment version of this section49 to find that Koror State was the owner
45

ROP CONST. Art. I, § 1.

46

In the only reported case to analyze section 1, a criminal defendant argued
that, given the territorial definition in (pre-amendment) Article I, Section 1, the Airai
International Airport (which does not physically lie on Palau‘s ―border‖) is not a ―border‖
for purposes of the ―border search‖ exception to the warrant requirement. See Republic
of Palau v. Techur, 6 ROP Intrm. 340, 342 (Trial Div. 1997) (Michelsen, J.). Citing
American precedent, Justice Michelsen found that, for purposes the border search
exception, the site of embarkation or disembarkation of passengers is the ―functional
equivalent‖ of the border. See id. This finding seems sensible because, although the
Constitution defines Palau‘s territory, the international airport is the functional ―border‖
for the majority of travelers to and from Palau (and the ―border search exception‖
could—and perhaps should—just as easily be called the ―functional border search
exception‖). For a constitutional criminal procedure analysis of Techur, see section
VIII.B, infra.
47

ROP CONST. Art. I, § 2(a).

48

ROP CONST. Art. I, § 2(b).

49

Before the 2008 amendment, Article I, Section 2 granted each state exclusive
ownership of all living and non-living resources (except highly migratory fish) ―from the
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of a World War II Japanese Zero fighter plane (a ―non-living resource‖)
sunk in the Palau Lagoon in Toribiong v. Gibbons.50 Koror State‘s
contention was that, as the owner of the Zero, it could ―do what [it]
please[d]‖ with the aircraft and therefore it did not have to comply with
the provisions of the national Lagoon Monument Act (19 PNC § 301, et
seq.) prohibiting interference with Japanese aircraft sunk in the Palau
Lagoon without a permit from the President.51 The Court found that
Koror State‘s ownership rights over the Zero were subject, to some extent,
to the legislature‘s constitutional power, under Article IX, Section 5(12), to
regulate the ownership, exploration, and exploitation of natural
resources.52 The focus of the Court‘s inquiry, therefore, became to what
extent the Olbiil Era Kelulau could regulate Koror State‘s use of its Zero
before the regulation became a ―taking‖ requiring compensation pursuant
to Article XIII, Section 7 of the Constitution.53 But, because Koror State
had not been denied a permit by the President (or even applied for one),
the Court put off deciding such a ―hypothetical question‖ for another
day.54
The Toribiong opinion dodged the greater tension: Article I,
Section 2 grants exclusive ownership rights to the states for all living and
non-living resources within certain boundaries, but Article IX, Section
5(12) grants the national legislature the power to regulate the ―ownership‖
of natural resources. The former grant of ownership is in direct conflict
with the latter grant of power over regulation of ownership. Ownership
power over natural resources should be granted either to the states or the
national legislature, and the Constitution‘s contradictory grant to both
creates an uneasy strain.55
Section 3 of Article I grants to the national government the power
―to add territory and to extend jurisdiction.‖56 Although this power is
likely inherent in Article I, Section 1‘s grant of ―sovereignty and
land to twelve (12) nautical miles seaward from the traditional baselines.‖
50

Toribiong v. Gibbons, 3 ROP Intrm. 419, 421 (Trial Div. 1993) (Beattie, J.).

51

See id. at 420.

52

See id. at 421.

53

See id. at 422.

54

See id. at 423-25.

55

This tension has been magnified by the 2008 addition of Article I, section 2(a)
providing ―exclusive ownership‖ to the Republic over all resources within its exclusive
economic zone and ―over all mineral resources in the seabed, subsoil, water column, and
insular shelves within its continental shelf.‖ Since the amendment, however, the
Appellate Division has cited Article I, Section 2 for the proposition that the states hold
authority over the land below the high water mark. See House of Traditional Leaders v.
Koror State Gov’t, Civ. App. No. 09-004, slip op. at 9 (Feb. 10, 2010).
56

ROP CONST. Art. I, § 3.
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jurisdiction‖ to Palau, Section 3 clarifies that state governments cannot
expand their territory without national approval. The final section of
Article I states that nothing in Article I should be interpreted ―to violate
the right of innocent passage and the internationally recognized freedom
of the high seas.‖57
B. Establishment of Permanent Capital
The Constitution provides for continuation of the provisional
capital of Koror, but mandates that the legislature shall designate a
permanent capital in Babeldaob within ten years of the effective date of
the Constitution (essentially, by 1991).58 The Constitution only required
the ―designation‖ of a permanent capital within that time frame, not the
actual establishment of one. But the capital has since been established in
Ngerulmud, Melekeok State (on the island of Babeldaob), so this
provision provides little fodder for future dispute. One remaining issue,
however, is whether the constitutional designation of the capital as
―permanent‖ means that it could never be moved, even to another location
on Babeldaob.
C. Official and National Languages
Article XIII, Section 1 dubs Palauan and English the ―official
languages‖ and the ―Palauan traditional languages‖ as the ―national
languages.‖59 The national legislature is to dictate the appropriate use of
each, and the Constitution does not indicate the relevance of these titles.60
III. SPECIAL RIGHTS OF PALAUANS
A. Citizenship
The Constitution affords special rights to Palauan citizens. Article
III constrictively defines Palauan citizenship, although the requirements
have become less stringent through amendments. Citizens of the Trust
Territory at the time of the adoption of the Constitution who had ―at least
one parent of recognized Palauan ancestry‖ automatically became citizens
of Palau per Section 1 of Article III.61

57

ROP CONST. Art. I, § 4.

58

ROP CONST. Art. XIII, § 11.

59

ROP CONST. Art. XIII, § 1. The traditional languages are not enumerated.

60

Citing the ―official language‖ status of Palauan and English, Justice Beattie
denied a challenge to the ballots used in a presidential primary election based on the
failure to translate the instructions into Japanese. See Gibbons v. Republic of Palau, 5
ROP Intrm. 353, 356 (Trial Div. 1996) (Beattie, J.).
61

ROP CONST. Art. III, § 1.
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Section 4 of Article III, as modified in 2008 by the Seventeenth
Amendment, states that a person born of at least one parent who is a
citizen of Palau or ―of recognized Palauan ancestry‖ is a citizen of Palau.62
The Seventeenth Amendment also repealed Sections 2 and 3 of Article III
and rendered the Second Amendment a nullity by permitting unrestricted
dual-citizenship with the statement that ―[c]itizenship of other foreign
nations shall not affect a person‘s Palauan citizenship.‖63
The original text of Section 2 provided that a person born of at
least one Palauan citizen was a Palauan citizen by birth ―so long as the
person is not or does not become a citizen of any other nation.‖64 The
effect of Section 2 was then altered by the Second Amendment (enacted in
2004). Under this amendment, United States citizenship had no effect on
Palauan citizenship and persons with recognized Palauan ancestry who
were citizens of foreign nations could gain or retain Palauan citizenship.
Section 3 provided that a person with dual Palauan and non-Palauan
citizenship, who was under eighteen, must renounce her non-Palauan
citizenship by her twenty-first birthday (or within three years of the
effective date of the Constitution) or else be deprived of Palauan
citizenship.65
Before the Seventeenth Amendment, Section 4 allowed for
citizenship through naturalization only by a person born to at least one
parent of recognized Palauan ancestry (and on the condition that the
naturalized citizen renounce all other foreign citizenships).
The
Seventeenth Amendment struck all ―naturalization‖ language from Article
III—no longer explicitly permitting it, but also no longer restricting the
requirements for naturalization. Therefore, citizenship by naturalization of
persons not born to Palauan parents could be constitutionally
implemented.66
The Appellate Division applied the Constitution to conclude that
the appellee was a Palauan citizen—and thus entitled to acquire title to
land67—in Ucherremasech v. Hiroichi.68 Because the appellee was born to
parents of Japanese ancestry, she was ineligible for citizenship under the
62

ROP CONST. Art. III, § 4 & amend. 17.

63

ROP CONST. amend. 17.

64

ROP CONST. Art. III, § 2.

65

Such divestment was found in Aguon v. Aguon, 5 ROP Intrm. 122, 128 (1995).
Had the Second Amendment been enacted and applied in Aguon, no divestment of
Palauan citizenship would have been found, as the non-Palauan citizenship at issue was
United States citizenship.
66

Indeed, the legislature has the power to ―establish a uniform system of
naturalization.‖ ROP CONST. Art. IX, § 5(4).
67

See section III.B, infra.

68

Ucherremasech v. Hiroichi, Civ. App. No. 09-009 (May 14, 2010).
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original version of Article III, Section 2 or the Seventeenth Amendment.69
The question then became whether the appellee, who was adopted at the
age of eight by a Palauan couple in 1944, qualified as a citizen under
Article III, Section 1.
The Appellate Division found that an adoptive parent qualifies as a
―parent‖ for the purposes of Article III, Section 1 because the plain
meaning of the word ―parent‖ includes adoptive parents.70 Therefore, the
appellee had ―at least one parent of recognized Palauan ancestry‖ as
required by Article III, Section 1. The Court found that the appellee
satisfied Article III, Section 1‘s second requirement for citizenship (that
she was a citizen of the Trust Territory immediately prior to the effective
date of the Constitution) without analysis, because that point was not
argued before the Trial Divisions and had, in fact, been admitted by the
appellants.71
Palauan citizenship brings with it certain ―special rights,‖
including the right to acquire land, to vote, to freely migrate, to certain
health care benefits, and to complimentary primary and secondary
education. The equal protection clause also permits the ―preferential
treatment of citizens‖ by the government.72
B. Acquisition of Land
Acquisition of Palauan land or water is limited to Palauan citizens
(or corporations wholly-owned by Palauans) by Article XIII, Section 8. It
is important to note that this section does not prohibit ownership of land
by non-Palauans, only acquisition.73 The ―affirmative obligation‖ to prove
Palauan citizenship falls on the party claiming acquisition of land.74
Inability to prove citizenship at the time of the acquisition voids the
transfer.75 Regarding corporations, it is the citizenship of a corporation‘s
owners, not its officers or directors that is pertinent for the constitutional
inquiry.76

69

See id., slip op. at 9.

70

See id. at 10-11.

71

See id. at 13-16.

72

See section VI, infra.

73

See Aguon v. Aguon, 5 ROP Intrm. 122, 127 (1995).

74

See Dalton v. Borja, 8 ROP Intrm. 302, 303 n.2 (2001).

75

See Diaz v. Estate of Ngirchorachel, 14 ROP 110, 111 (2007) (holding that a
land transfer to a Palauan who had renounced his Palauan citizenship at the time of the
transfer was void).
76

See Airai State Pub. Lands Auth. v. Seventh Day Adventist Mission, 12 ROP
38, 42 (2004).
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The bar against acquisition of land by non-Palauans extends to
acquisitions via inheritance.77 Even if an inheritress becomes a Palauan
citizen before the formal distribution of the estate, she will be barred from
inheriting land if she was not yet a Palauan citizen at the time of the
decedent‘s death.78
Article XIII, Section 8 only limits land acquisition by nonPalauans, and cannot be used to bar acquisition by someone who is a
Palauan at the time of the acquisition.79 If a Palauan and a non-Palauan
jointly seek to acquire Palauan land (e.g., as joint purchasers), the
Appellate Division has stated that the acquisition by the Palauan would
still be effective.80 Such an interpretation safeguards situations in which
Palauan and non-Palauan spouses jointly purchase Palauan land, but nonPalauans must be wary that entering into such joint tenancies will leave
them with no legal claim to the land.
The Nineteenth and Twentieth Amendments to the Constitution,
enacted in 2008, added two caveats to Article XIII, Section 8. First,
―[f]oreign countries, with which Palau establishes diplomatic relations,
may acquire title to land for diplomatic purposes pursuant to bilateral
treaties or agreements.‖81 Second, non-citizen individuals or corporations
may lease land in Palau for up to ninety-nine years.82 Although a lease by
a non-citizen for 100 years or greater is not explicitly prohibited, the
implication of these amendments is that such a lease would constitute a de
facto ―acquisition‖ and therefore be rendered unconstitutional.

77

See Tengadik v. King, Civ. App. No. 08-039, slip op. at 7 (Nov. 4, 2009)
(―[W]e hold that the phrase ‗acquire title to land‘ in Article XIII, § 8 applies equally to
inheritance and the distribution of a decedent‘s estate as it does to other methods by
which one can acquire such title.‖).
78

Id. at 6. Although land usually vests in an inheritor immediately upon the
decedent‘s death, the land at issue in Tengadik was not determined to be owned by the
decedent until nineteen years after his death. Id. at 6-8. Therefore some question
surrounded whether the time of death or time of determination of ownership was the
relevant date to test the would-be inheritress‘ citizenship. See id. But, because the
would-be inheritress was not a Palauan citizen at either of those potentially relevant
times, the Appellate Division deemed it unnecessary to determine which date controlled.
See id. at 8.
79

See Anastacio v. Haruo, 8 ROP Intrm. 128, 129 (2000) (―Article XIII cannot
be read to prevent a Palauan citizen from acquiring title to land in Palau.‖).
80

See id. (―If a conveyance of title to land were made to a Palauan citizen and a
noncitizen as tenants in common, nothing in Article XIII, Section 8, would prevent the
Palauan citizen from becoming vested with title.‖).
81

ROP CONST., amends. 19-20.

82

Id.
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C. Voting Rights
Although Article VII secures the right to vote ―to all eligible
citizens of Palau‖ in state and national elections,83 it has also been read as
a restriction barring non-citizens from voting in those same elections.84
This right of citizens to vote, at least for ―key public officials at both the
national and state governments,‖ is ―an essential democratic principle.‖85
Beyond citizenship, the Constitution mandates several voter requirements,
one of which is that voters must be at least eighteen years old. The
Constitution delegates the responsibility to prescribe a minimum period of
residence and provide for voter registration to the national and state
legislatures for their respective elections.86
Article VII goes on to state that ―[a] citizen who is in prison,
serving a sentence for a felony, or mentally incompetent as determined by
a court may not vote.‖87 The language of the Constitution is ambiguous in
this respect—are all prisoners prohibited from voting, or just those serving
a sentence for a felony? If ―in prison, serving a sentence for a felony‖ is
only one category of prohibited voters, then those in prison serving
misdemeanor sentences and those physically out of prison serving felony
sentences (even if freed by an escape from Koror Jail) are constitutionally
guaranteed the right to vote. But if the article's language comprises two
separate categories—all citizens ―in prison‖ as well as all citizens serving
felony sentences—then the latter prohibition must include citizens serving
felony sentences who are not in prison. For instance, a person on parole or
on probation is ―serving a sentence for a felony‖ but not ―in prison.‖ This
latter reading is preferred—all prisoners, all persons serving felony
sentences, and all judicially-determined mental incompetents are

83

Olikong v. Salii, 1 ROP Intrm. 406, 412 (1987).

84

See Yano v. Kadoi, 3 ROP Intrm. 174, 184 (1992) (―Article VII of the Palau
Constitution provides that only citizens of Palau can vote in Palauan state and national
elections.‖).
85

Teriong v. Gov’t of State of Airai, 1 ROP Intrm. 664, 675 (1989).

86

This delegation has been read to impose a non-optional requirement on the
states—each state ―shall‖ prescribe a minimum period of residence and provide for voter
registration for state elections. See Mechol v. Soalablai, 1 ROP Intrm. 62, 62-63 (Trial
Div. 1982) (Hefner, J.).
87

ROP CONST. Art. VII.
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prohibited from voting.88 Both the sentence structure and logic favors this
approach, as does the statutory voter eligibility requirements.89
In dicta, in Teriong v. Government of State of Airai, the Appellate
Division stated that the only voter restrictions are that ―a person in prison
serving a sentence for a felony, or one who has been declared mentally
incompetent by a court is not eligible to vote.‖90 This interpretation
breaks with the reading advocated above. But the Court‘s recital of Article
VII in Teriong omits the crucial comma after ―felony,‖91 an omission that
may have poisoned the Court‘s entire interpretation of the clause.
Article VII mandates the use of secret ballots in Palauan elections.
The Eighteenth Amendment, enacted in 2008, added a provision to Article
VII requiring the availability of voting by absentee ballot for voters who
are outside of Palau during an election.
D. Right of Migration
Palauan citizens are guaranteed the right to ―enter and leave Palau‖
and ―migrate within Palau‖ by Article IV, Section 9.92 Non-citizens are
relegated to the whims of the legislature by Article III, Section 5: ―The
Olbiil Era Kelulau shall adopt uniform laws for admission and exclusion
of noncitizens of Palau.‖93
The right to migrate has been judicially-interpreted only once, in
King v. Republic of Palau, where a motorist was arrested for violating
Koror State‘s curfew law.94 The curfew law made it ―unlawful for any
person to be in any public area within the State of Koror‖ between 12:30
a.m. and 6:00 a.m. unless their reason for being in the public place fit one
of several enumerated exceptions (e.g., emergency, the seeking of medical
attention, transport to or from work, a funeral, or fishing).95 The arresting
88

A third reading, that only those voters who are both in prison and either
serving a felony sentence or have been determined mentally incompetent are prohibited
from voting, is not favored. This reading would permit mentally incompetent citizens to
vote as long as they are not in prison. And offenders who have been judiciallydetermined to be mentally incompetent would—hopefully—not be in prison, but rather
be receiving treatment.
89

23 PNC § 1403 requires an applicant for voter registration to swear that she is
―not currently under parole, probation, or sentence for any felony for which [she has]
been convicted by any court of the Republic or any court within the jurisdiction of the
United States‖ nor is she ―currently under a judgment of mental incompetency or
insanity.‖
90

Teriong v. Government of State of Airai, 1 ROP Intrm. 664, 675 (1989).

91

See id. at 674.

92

ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 9.

93

ROP CONST. Art. III, § 5.

94

King v. Republic of Palau, 6 ROP Intrm. 131, 132 (1997).

95

See id. at 132 n.2 (quoting Koror Public Law No. K1-25-88).
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officer found ammunition in the defendant‘s pocket and a subsequent
search of the automobile revealed a firearm under the driver‘s seat. 96 The
officer also found a matchbox on the defendant‘s person containing
methamphetamine.97 The trial court suppressed the methamphetamine,
but the defendant was found guilty of possession of a firearm and of
possession of bullets.98 The curfew violation was apparently not
prosecuted.
The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the curfew law—
the original basis for the stop and arrest—as an impermissible restriction
of his right to travel under Article IV, Section 9.99 The Court interpreted
the right of citizens to migrate within Palau as protection from the
government ordering a citizen to live in a certain place. 100 The Court
stated that the guarantee was not one of ―mobility and movement.‖101
Because the Committee on Civil Liberties and Fundamental Rights of the
Palau Constitutional Convention expressly stated that the police power of
the state include the power to impose and enforce a curfew, the Court
found the curfew law constitutional.102
The interpretation of King is truly restrictive: limiting the right to
migrate to mean only that citizens cannot be order to live in a certain
place. Of course, on the other extreme, the right to migrate within Palau
cannot be reasonably interpreted to mean that citizens are free to roam
anywhere in the country at any time. Such an interpretation would impede
land ownership rights and security. Given the confined scope of the issue,
the King Court‘s constitutional interpretations of Article IV, Section 9 may
have little application outside of the realm of curfew law.
E. Non-Impairment of Contracts by Legislation
The ―contracts clause‖ of Article IV, Section 6 guarantees that
legislation shall not impair ―[c]ontracts to which a citizen is a party.‖103
This safeguard has not been better defined in any reported opinion and its
meaning is unclear. Read broadly, any legislation (enacted by either a
state or a national legislature) that harmed an already executed contract of
96

See id. at 132.

97

See id.

98

See id.

99

See id. at 133.

100

See id. The Court read the rest of the constitutional provision—the right of
citizens to ―enter and leave Palau‖—to mean that the government could not ―arbitrarily
deny a citizen the right to leave or enter the country.‖ See id.
101

Id.

102

See id.

103

ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 6.
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a citizen would be unconstitutional. Carried to an extreme, this clause
could conceivably block many legislative enactments. Until it is betterdefined through judicial interpretation its bounds are largely unknown.
However, it is likely to be construed narrowly to avoid impinging on
legislative enactments (which presumably benefit the public at large) in
favor of private contracts (which presumably do not).
F.

Examination of Government Documents

Another clause that, if read broadly (or even literally), could
severely impact the functioning of the government is Article IV, Section
12. This section grants citizens the right ―to examine any government
document and to observe the official deliberations of any agency of
government.‖104 Pursuant to the literal language of this section, the
Republic cannot keep any document secret from its citizens. However,
this section must have yet-to-be-defined narrower bounds, lest all personal
information collected by the government, ongoing police investigations,
judicial deliberations, and matters of national security be exposed at great
detriment to the public at large.105
G. Health Care and Education
Article VI, ―Responsibilities of the National Government,‖
requires the national government to provide free or subsidized health care
and free public education (from grades one through twelve) to citizens.106
Article IV, Section 16, as added by the Twenty-Fourth Amendment,
mandates the free provision of preventive health care (as prescribed by
law) by the national government.107

104

ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 12.

105

The Trial Division declined to entertain an Article IV, Section 12 argument
because it was not presented ―squarely‖ to the Court. See Shell Co. v. Palau Pub. Utils.
Corp., 15 ROP 158, 161 (Trial Div. 2008) (Ngiraklsong, C.J.). But the lack of square
presentation in Shell arose because the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s
constitutional contentions in the plaintiff‘s application for a preliminary injunction. See
id. The defendant was thus able to duck the issue by ignoring the argument in the
plaintiff‘s filing.
106
107

ROP CONST. Art. VI.

For more on Article VI and the constitutional responsibilities of the national
government, see section XVII, infra.
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IV. FREEDOMS OF RELIGION, EXPRESSION AND ASSEMBLY
A. Freedom of Religion
The first three sections of Article IV secure important—although
infrequently litigated—rights to the people of Palau. Section 1 declares
―freedom of religion‖ and prohibits the government from either
compelling or hindering religious exercise.108 In a forward-thinking
clause, Section 1 permits the government to provide assistance ―to private
and parochial schools on a fair and equitable basis for nonreligious
purposes.‖ Although the meanings of ―fair and equitable basis‖ and
―nonreligious purposes‖ are open to debate, no reported opinion has yet to
address these issues.
B. Freedoms of Expression and Press
Section 2 guarantees the ―freedom of expression‖ through absolute
language as well as recognizing a reporter‘s privilege for ―bona fide‖
reporters.109 Although the language of the guarantee of freedom of
expression is seemingly absolute, it has been narrowed (as it must)
through interpretation.
The Appellate Division contemplated the freedom of expression
rights of governmental employees in April v. Palau Pub. Utils. Corp.:
Although citizens do not generally have a right to public
employment, it is impermissible for a public employer to
force employees to surrender fundamental rights as a
condition of their employment.
Otherwise public
employers would be free to require their employees to vote
for a certain candidate or join a certain religion. At the
same time, however, public employers must be afforded
sufficient autonomy to oversee and reprimand their
employees lest every grievance be elevated to a matter of
constitutional proportions.110
In April, the Appellate Division analyzed under what
circumstances a governmental employer could reprimand its employees
for employee expression. The Court first found that the ―government must
be free to oversee its employees without judicial interference when public
employees speak as government agents.‖111 But, because the ―government
no longer has the same level of self-interest in the employee‘s expression‖
108

ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 1.

109

ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 2.

110

April v. Palau Pub. Utils. Corp., Civ. App. No. 08-038, slip op. at 7 (Nov. 3,

111

Id. at 8.

2009).
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when the employee speaks as a private citizen, some—but not all—private
speech of public employees lies outside the bounds of employer
oversight.112 The Court held that ―[a]bsent a powerful justification,
punishing public employees for expressing themselves on issues of public
concern—whether those issues relate to the public employer or not—
would run afoul of our constitutional guarantee to freedom of
expression.‖113 Expression regarding matters of public concern ―is at the
heart of our guarantee of freedom of expression‖ and ―a bedrock of any
democratic society.‖114 The Court opted to leave ―issues of public
concern‖ undefined, but advised future jurists to ―inspect the gravity of the
substance of the expression to delineate between matters that may concern
only a few individuals and those that truly rise to the level of public
concern.‖115
The Court applied its newly-expressed jurisprudence to find that
the terminated employee in April did not suffer a violation of her freedom
of expression right. The employee‘s speech regarded her demotion at
work, which was not a matter of public concern.116 Therefore, her
governmental employer was unconstrained by the freedom of expression
clause in reacting to the employee‘s speech.117
Opponents to the Compact of Free Association between Palau and
the United States claimed that denial of airtime on Palau‘s radio station
infringed their constitutional right to free expression.118 The undisputed
facts showed that, leading up to the 1993 Compact plebiscite, two
Compact opponents and one Compact supporter requested airtime, and all
three requests were denied.119 Justice Miller found that Palau‘s radio
station was a government entity, and then proceeded to the inquiry of
whether the radio station was required to grant the requested airtime.120
The Court waxed about the ―idea‖ behind Article IV, Section 2—that
―more speech, not enforced silence‖ would benefit the Republic (quoting a
Justice Brandeis concurrence to a 1927 United States Supreme Court
case), but then contrasted it with the notion that freedom of expression
does not guarantee access to government property (quoting another United

112

Id.

113

Id. at 9.

114

Id.

115

Id.

116

See id. at 9.

117

See id.

118

See Wong v. Nakamura, 4 ROP Intrm. 364, 371 (Trial Div. 1994) (Miller, J.).

119

See id.

120

See id.
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States Supreme Court case).121 Ultimately, Justice Miller found that the
issue need not be resolved because the remedy sought—the invalidation of
the entire plebiscite—did not follow from the harm allegedly inflicted.122
Given the result, the Court should have refrained from breaking this new
ground in declaring the ―idea‖ behind the freedom of expression in Palau,
especially without citation to Palauan authority.
C. Freedoms of Assembly and Petition
Section 3 compiles two related, yet distinct, fundamental rights:
the right ―to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress
of grievances‖ and the right to ―associate with others for any lawful
purpose.‖123 The first clause appears to be written as a required
conjunctive—the first clause of Section 3 only guarantees the right to
peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances,
but not to peacefully assemble for other purposes or to petition the
government for redress of grievances other than in a peaceful assembly
(e.g., individually or in a violent assembly). However, the second clause
of Section 3 would protect peaceful assemblies for purposes other than
petitioning the government (as long as those purposes were lawful) and
Section 2‘s freedom of expression guarantee would protect an individual
petitioning the government for redress of grievances. In an apparent effort
to avoid clarifying litigation, Section 3‘s second clause explicitly states
that the right to associate with others for lawful purposes includes ―the
right to organize and to bargain collectively.‖ The ―right to organize,‖
when conjoined with the right ―to bargain collectively,‖ most naturally
means the right to form unions.
V. TAKINGS CLAUSES
Two sections of the Constitution relate to the ―taking‖ of private
property by the government. Article IV, Section 6 is written as a negative
limitation protecting the right of individuals: ―nor shall private property
be taken except for a recognized public use and for just compensation in
money or in kind.‖124 Article XIII, Section 7 is written as a positive grant
of power to the government: ―The national government shall have the
power to take property for public use upon payment of just
compensation.‖125 The latter provision enumerates further requirements
before a governmental taking may be made, including exhaustion of ―good
121

See id. at 372.

122

See id.

123

ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 3.

124

ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 6.

125

ROP CONST. Art. XIII, § 7.
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faith negotiation‖ and consultation with the state government where the
property is located. It also grants state governments an identical power to
―take‖ as the national government. Furthermore, a taking ―for the benefit
of a foreign entity‖ is prohibited, and this clause has been read to prohibit
a taking even if it only secondarily benefits a foreign entity.126
The remedy for an unconstitutional taking is ―not . . . return of full
rights to the land to the original owner,‖ but rather ―payment of [just]
compensation.‖127 An unconstitutional taking conveys title (or a use right)
to land despite its unconstitutionality.128 Therefore, the consent of the
landowner to the ―taking‖ is wholly irrelevant to the question of whether
the land became government land—it only portends to whether just
compensation is due.129 These statements were made in the context of a
case where a landowner claimed that the installation of power poles on his
property constituted an unconstitutional (and therefore, void) ―taking.‖130
The Court noted in dicta that, ―[g]enerally, a taking may be
unconstitutional in one of two ways: (1) for lack of just compensation or
(2) for non-public use.‖131 In deciding whether a ―taking‖ through
regulation has occurred, ―a court will focus on both the character of the
governmental action and the nature and extent of interference with
rights.‖132 Takings clause constitutional claims are subject to procedural
rules (almost) just like any other lawsuit.133
When a governmental ―taking‖ occurs, interest accrues to the
former landowner from the time of the taking until the time just

126

Id.

127

Ulechong v. Palau Pub. Utils. Corp., 13 ROP 116, 120-21 (2006).

128

See id. at 120.

129

See id. at 121.

130

See id. at 120-21.

131

Id. at 120 n.2. Non-public use arises when the taken land is put to a private

use.
132

Toribiong v. Gibbons, 3 ROP Intrm. 419, 422-23 (Trial Div. 1993) (Beattie,
J.) (addressing whether the national Lagoon Monument Act was so restrictive that it
―took‖ Koror State‘s use and exploitation of World War II relics sunk in its waters),
(citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 2662 (1978)).
133

See Olkeriil v. Republic of Palau, Civ. App. No. 09-027, slip op. at 11 (June
23, 2010) (―The takings clause does not guarantee Olkeriil the right to bring a claim in
any manner, at any time, no matter how far removed from the alleged taking; it only
creates a cause of action to be brought within the bounds of reasonable procedural
rules.‖). The Olkeriil appellant was barred from bringing her constitutional takings
clause claim for failure to bring it as a compulsory counterclaim in an earlier lawsuit.
The Court did add, by way of a footnote, that ―overly-strict procedural rules that limit the
filing of constitutional claims so severely as to strip the constitutional guarantees of their
meaning would not survive review.‖ Id. at 11 n.3.
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compensation is paid.134 Interest ―is part of the constitutionally required
just compensation.‖135
Therefore, the constitutionally-required
―reasonable‖ rate of interest must be judicially determined and the issue
cannot be left to legislation alone.136
In Gibbons v. Salii, the Appellate Division tackled the question of
whether the military defense site provisions in the Compact of Free
Association between Palau and the United States were per se
unconstitutional under Article XIII, Section 7.137 The Compact grants
rights to the United States to designate land and water areas to use as
defense sites in Palau. The Military Use and Operating Rights Agreement,
a separate agreement referenced by the Compact, describes the specific
designated areas within Palau. Under the Compact, when the United
States wishes to establish a defense site in one of the designated areas, it is
to notify Palau and Palau shall make the designated site available. Palau
may suggest alternative sites, but the United States has the right to reject
such suggestions and demand access to the originally-designated site
within sixty days of the designation.138
The Gibbons plaintiffs argued that this provision violated the
provision in Article XIII, Section 7 of the Constitution preventing the
Palauan government from exercising its eminent domain powers ―for the
benefit of a foreign entity.‖139 The plaintiffs further contended that the
sixty-day time frame would necessarily prohibit the government from
fulfilling its constitutional duty to exhaust good faith negotiations and use
its eminent domain powers ―sparingly‖ as a ―final resort.‖140
The Court found that the Compact provisions were not per se
unconstitutional because such a designation and transfer to the United
States could be effected without Palau even exercising its eminent domain
powers—Palau could (hypothetically) purchase the designated land from
the private landowners.141 Notwithstanding this possibility, the Court
stated that the sixty-day time limit provided in the Compact is
―extraordinarily tight‖ to transfer title to land by mutual agreement and
that ―constitutional risk [is] inherent in these provisions‖ of the Compact

134

See Wally v. Republic of Palau, 16 ROP 19, 22 (2008).

135

Id.

136

See id. at 22-23.

137

Gibbons v. Salii, 1 ROP Intrm. 333 (1986).

138

See id. at 351-52.

139

See id. at 352.

140

See id.

141

See id. at 352-53.
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and Military Use Agreement.142 The Court foresaw the following
impasse:
It is plain to us that the defense site provisions may
eventually place the government of Palau at a fork where
one road points toward violation of the Constitution and the
other leads to breach of the Compact. That fork, however,
has not yet been reached and we see a possibility that the
fateful choice may never present itself. The Compact does
not by its terms require exercise of the power of eminent
domain. It would be premature and improper for us simply
to assume that such an event will come to pass.143
Despite the under-ripeness of the issue before it, the Court went on
to provide an advisory opinion on the ―for the benefit of a foreign entity‖
provision of Article XIII, Section 7.144
The Court rejected the
government‘s syllogism that whatever use the Executive Branch chose to
exercise its eminent domain powers for must inherently be ―for the benefit
of Palau‖ because otherwise it would not have chosen to exercise its
eminent domain powers—even if the land is given to a foreign entity.145
The Court, narrowly construing the Constitution, stated that ―if the [taken]
land in question is to be used by a foreign nation[,] the government of the
Republic of Palau has an extremely heavy burden of showing
extraordinary circumstances which establish that the particular use is for
the sole benefit of Palauan persons or entities.‖146 Thus, the prohibition
against the use of the eminent domain power ―for the benefit of a foreign
entity‖ is read to mean that the use of the eminent domain power must be
―for the sole benefit of Palau.‖147
142

See id. at 353.

143

Id. at 354.

144

See id. at 354-55.

145

See id. The government argued that the United States‘ use of Palau‘s land to
establish defense sites was ―for the benefit of Palau‖ rather than for the benefit of the
United States because the overall Compact—including the obligation of the United States
to defend Palau—is beneficial to Palau (otherwise Palau would not have ratified the
Compact). See id. at 354.
146

Id. at 355. The Court went on to reject the contention that, because of the
close relationship between Palau and the United States under the Compact, the United
States is not a ―foreign entity.‖ See id.
147

The ―for the benefit of a foreign entity‖ clause was later discussed in Airai
State Gov’t v. Ngkekiil Clan, 11 ROP 261 (Trial Div. 2004) (Ngiraklsong, C.J.). Chief
Justice Ngiraklsong found an Airai state law invalid to the extent that it granted a broader
eminent domain power than that found in the national Constitution. See id. at 262 n.1.
With regard to foreign entities, the Airai law prohibited takings only when made for the
sole benefit of a foreign entity, a less restrictive clause than the national Constitution‘s
prohibition of the use of the eminent domain power ―for the benefit of a foreign entity.‖
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After ratification of the Compact, the appellants in Wong v.
Nakamura sought a judicial order barring implementation of the
Compact.148 Among other arguments, the appellants pressed again
(apparently without citation to authority) that the Compact was facially
invalid under the eminent domain clauses of the Palau Constitution.149
The Court summarily rejected this contention with a citation to
Gibbons.150
Land lost to the government through erosion has not been ―taken.‖
Pursuant to statute, the government owns all marine areas below the
ordinary high water mark.151 Chief Justice Ngiraklsong found that erosion
that expands the government-owned area below the high water mark was
not a ―taking‖ for purposes of Article IV, Section 6.152 Although no
erosion was proved in the case, the Chief Justice stated that ―the Court
hereby adopts the legal authority stating that even a registered or titled
land lost by erosion returns to the government and no compensation to the
original owner is required for the lost portion of the land.‖153
In Micronesian Yachts Co. v. Palau Foreign Inv. Bd., the Appellate
Division affirmed a Trial Division ruling that placing additional conditions
on a renewal on a foreign investment certificate is not an unlawful taking
of property in violation of Article IV, Section 6 of the Constitution.154 At
The taking at issue was Airai‘s proposed use of its eminent domain power to
condemn land in order to lease it to a Japanese corporation for the development of a golf
course. See id. at 262. And, although Airai‘s proposed taking was ultimately found to be
unconstitutional under the Airai State Constitution, the decision sheds some light on the
national Constitution because the eminent domain clauses in each are similar. See id. at
263 (―The [Airai State] Constitution does not require the foreign entity to be the ‗sole‘
beneficiary, and it does not include an exception for situations in which the citizens of
Airai might also benefit. Very simply, it prohibits the use of the power ‗for the benefit of
a foreign entity,‘ which is exactly what the proposed condemnation would be.‖). See also
id. at 263 (discussing the Gibbons interpretation of the national Constitution in
determining what constitutes a ―benefit‖ and a ―foreign entity‖ for purposes of the Airai
State Constitution.‖).
148

Wong v. Nakamura, 4 ROP Intrm. 243 (1994).

149

See id. at 248.

150

See id. (―Appellants have offered us no good reason to doubt the propriety of
that holding.‖). The Trial Division reached the same conclusion based on stare decisis:
―The Court is bound by the Gibbons court‘s determination of facial validity and, given
that the Compact has not yet been implemented and no actual taking of land proposed, by
its ripeness determination.‖ Wong v. Nakamura, 4 ROP Intrm. 331, 345 (Trial Div. 1994)
(Miller, J.).
151

35 PNC § 102.

152

See In re Cadastral Lots 050 B 02, 14 ROP 191, 193 (Trial Div. 2007)
(Ngiraklsong, C.J.).
153

Id.

154

Micronesian Yachts Co. v. Palau Foreign Inv. Bd., 7 ROP Intrm. 128 (1998).
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the renewal of the certificate, the Palau Foreign Investment Board added a
provision that the foreign investment certificate was subject to revocation
if any of the company‘s shares were transferred to a non-citizen without
Board approval.155 However, this ―renewal addendum‖ was not an actual
addendum because the original certificate was flatly non-transferable;
therefore, the Court found nothing ―taken‖ by the addendum.156
Justice Miller found no constitutional ―taking‖ where a plaintiff
alleged that the building of a road would injure his business in
Ngiraiuelenguul v. Ngchesar State Government.157 The plaintiff alleged
that the new road interfered with his ability to float logs up a stream to his
sawmill.158 The Court found that the new road did not ―take‖ any of the
plaintiff‘s existing property or interfere with his riparian right of access to
water; it merely interfered with the plaintiff‘s ability to float logs from the
greater ocean to the saltwater pond adjacent to his property.159 Justice
Miller stated the Constitution required that ―[w]hen the government
actually takes away or invades in some destructive fashion a person‘s land,
compensation must be paid.‖160 But the decision went on to state that
―when the government acts only upon its own property, and in what it
believes to be the public interest, it should be able to do so without fear
that it may be called upon to pay damages for consequential injuries to the
value of nearby land, or to businesses located there.‖161 To safeguard
abuse, Justice Miller stated (aspirationally) that abuses of this confidence
would harm the decisionmakers, because the aggrieved populous would
vent their frustrations through the democratic process.162 This procedure
would provide little safeguarding, however, where the harmed individuals
are not citizens (and therefore cannot vote) or, as is usually the case, are a
marginalized population.

155

See id. at 128.

156

See id. at 129.

157

Ngiraiuelenguul v. Ngchesar State Gov’t, 8 ROP Intrm. 342 (Trial Div. 1999)

(Miller, J.).
158

See id. at 342.

159

See id. at 343.

160

Id. at 346.

161

Id. (footnote omitted).

162

See id.

30

Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal

[Vol. 12:2

VI. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Section 5 of Article IV guarantees, inter alia, equal protection:
―Every person shall be equal under the law and shall be entitled to equal
protection.‖163 This unqualified statement is immediately checked and
categorized, creating tension even within Section 5. Some bases of
governmental discrimination are explicitly prohibited: sex, race, place of
origin, language, religion or belief, and social status or clan affiliation.
However, the Constitution specifically permits preferential treatment of
Palauan citizens, minors, the elderly, the indigent, handicapped, and ―other
similar groups.‖ Discrimination is also permitted ―in matters concerning
intestate succession and domestic relations.‖164
A. Foundations of Equal Protection Review: The Rising Tide of Suspect
Classifications
In an early equal protection case, the Appellate Division adopted
an expansive reading of the clause and found a constitutional violation in
Alik v. Amalei.165 In Alik, the Court reviewed the appeal process of Land
Commission determinations.
Appeals from Land Commission
determinations were to be made within 120 days of the determination by
statute.
The Alik appellant filed his appeal 149 days after the
determination, but only eighty-nine days after receiving service of the
determination.166 The Court found that it would be unconstitutional under
Article IV, Section 5 for some claimants to receive more time and others
less time to appeal depending on when they received service of the Land
Commission determination.167 To avoid this unconstitutional construction,
the Court interpreted the statutory language to mean that the 120-day time
to appeal runs from receipt of service of the determination and not from
the date of the determination itself.168
In Alik the Court effectively applied Article IV, Section 5 in an
unqualified way—permitting no unequal treatment of anyone without
looking at the basis of discrimination. The Alik plaintiff did not allege
discrimination based on any ―protected class‖ such as sex or race; he
merely claimed that he had a diminished opportunity to appeal because he
received service of his determination sixty days after the determination
was made whereas other claimants might receive service two (or 102)
days after determination. Although this application of the equal protection
163

ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 5.

164

Id.

165

Alik v. Amalei, 1 ROP Intrm. 513A (1988).

166

See id. at 513B.

167

See id. at 513C.

168

See id. at 513D.
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clause tracks the constitutional language (―[e]very person shall be equal
under the law‖), it could hinder the operation of the government if applied
to literally and too broadly. The Alik interpretation has not been repeated
in later opinions.169
As stated in Ikeya v. Melaitau, Justice Miller‘s view of the equal
protection clause, placing great stock in the ―suspect classifications,‖ bore
very little resemblance to the Alik panel‘s interpretation:
The declaration that ―Every person shall be equal under the
law and shall be entitled to equal protection[‖,] Palau
Constitution Art. IV, Section 5, plainly does not forbid the
legislature from making policy choices and passing laws
that may benefit one person over another if it acts
reasonably and does not discriminate on the basis of any of
the suspect classifications contained in the next sentence of
that section.170
When none of the ―suspect classifications‖ contained in Article IV,
Section 5 are at play, Justice Miller advised that the ―only criterion for
constitutionality [] is reasonableness.‖171 In Ikeya, Justice Miller found
the legislature‘s distinction between bona fide and non-bona fide
purchasers of land to be reasonable and therefore not violative of the equal
protection clause.172
Justice Miller‘s creation of ―rational basis‖
(―reasonableness‖) review for ―non-suspect classifications‖ (although
more in line with United States case law) is at odds with the Appellate
Division‘s earlier decision in Alik, wherein the Court did not question the
basis for the appellant‘s claim of unequal treatment.
Chief Justice Ngiraklsong separated equal protection analysis into
―at least two levels of judicial review‖:
the rational basis test
(―governmental action will be upheld if there is a rational relationship
between the action taken and the objective‖) and the strict scrutiny test
(―governmental conduct will only be upheld if it is necessary to achieve a
‗compelling‘ governmental purpose‖).173 The Chief Justice stated that the
169

Justice Materne, sitting in the Trial Division, later found that Alik‘s holding
that the 120-day time frame runs from the date of service rather than from the date of
determination does not apply retrospectively to appeals filed pre-Alik. See Temol v. Tellei,
15 ROP 156, 157-58 (Trial Div. 2007) (Materne, J.) (finding appeal filed 181 days after
the determination was issued, but only seventy-nine days after the notice of determination
was served to be untimely). The notice of appeal in Temol was filed in 1985, three years
before the Alik decision was rendered. See id. at 157.
170

Ikeya v. Melaitau, 3 ROP Intrm. 386, 392 n.2 (Trial Div. 1993) (Miller, J.).

171

Id.

172

See id. at 392-93.

173

C.J.).

Perrin v. Remengesau, 11 ROP 266, 269 (Trial Div. 2004) (Ngiraklsong,
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strict scrutiny test should be applied where governmental action creates
―suspect‖ classifications (such as those based on race or national
origin).174
Shortly thereafter, the Appellate Division (in a panel including
both Chief Justice Ngiraklsong and Justice Miller) applied the rationalbasis test in denying an equal protection challenge based on an allegation
that individuals were classified based on the source of their land.175 The
challenge was to a resolution stating that land acquired in fee simple from
the Trust Territory government was to pass to the oldest living male child
in the event that the deceased left no will. The Court, in its brief analysis,
found that the distinction between land acquired from the Trust Territory
government and land acquired from all other sources was not irrational.176
The Appellate Division again applied rational basis review to an
equal protection challenge in Tulop v. Palau Election Commission.177 The
alleged unequal treatment required absentee voters to submit their votes by
the day before the special election rather than on the day of the election.
The Court stated that under rational basis review—―a relatively low level
of judicial review‖—―almost any rational reason provided by the
government would serve to defeat a challenger‘s case.‖178 The Court
upheld the voting requirement, finding that requiring absentee votes to
arrive by the day before the election was a ―rational means to avoid delay
in certifying the results of the special election.‖179 This rationale does not
seem ―rational,‖ especially given the Court‘s concession that the purpose
would have been equally served by requiring the absentee votes to arrive
by the day of the election.180 In Tulop, the Court lowered the bar in
rational-basis review so low that it became no test at all.
B. Representation in Government
Challenges relating to representation in government, specifically
the redistricting of electoral precincts, loom large in equal protection
jurisprudence. Eriich v. Reapportionment Commission resolved disputes
concerning the Senate redistricting plan, including an equal protection
challenge under Article IV, Section 5.181 In prefacing its equal protection

C.J.).
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See id.

175

See Children of Merep v. Youlbeluu Lineage, 12 ROP 25, 28 (2004).
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See id.
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Tulop v. Palau Election Comm’n, 14 ROP 5, 8-9 (2006).
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Id. at 9.
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Id.
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See id.
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Eriich v. Reapportionment Comm’n, 1 ROP 134 (Trial Div. 1984) (Nakamura,
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analysis, the Court stated that ―[e]qual protection in the context of
representation in government means that all persons must be represented
equally‖ and that ―equal protection does not apply only to voters, but to all
persons within the government‘s jurisdiction.‖182 Chief Justice Nakamura
analyzed United States equal protection law and chose the more lenient
standards that apply to state redistricting rather than the more stringent
rules regarding federal redistricting.183 The more lenient ―state standard‖
allows for recognition of historical subdivisions, a distinction that the
Court felt was important given the cultural significance of traditional
villages in Palau.184 In sum, a reviewing Court should attempt to
minimize statistical deviations but must balance that effort against other
legitimate state interests.185 Chief Justice Nakamura then went about
redistricting, splitting the country into five districts represented by
fourteen Senators.186
Chief Justice Nakamura‘s redistricting of the Fifth Senatorial
District was challenged on appeal.187 As designed by the Chief Justice, the
Fifth Senatorial District comprised eight states and had the power to elect
two Senators. Six of the states within the district objected, claiming that
the two most populous states could collude to elect both of the Senators.188
The appealing states also complained that the Fifth Senatorial District was
not geographically compact, as it included four states located on the large
northern island of Babeldaob and four states composed of outlying
southern and southwest islands.189 In response to these complaints, the
Appellate Division chose to further subdivide the district into two districts
of four states each (splitting the northern Babeldaob and the southern
island states into separate districts) even though such grouping resulted in
a somewhat higher statistical deviation.190
Senatorial redistricting was again before the Court in Yano v.
Kadoi.191 The Court followed the redistricting equal protection test of
Eriich:
182

Id. at 140-41.

183

See id. at 143.

184

See id.

185

See id. at 143-45.
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See id. at 148.

187

See Eriich v. Reapportionment Comm’n, 1 ROP Intrm. 150 (1984).

188

See id. at 151.

189

See id. (with Ngardmau, Ngeremlengui, Ngatpang and Aimeliik to the north
and Peleliu, Angaur, Sonsorol and Hatohobei in the south).
190

See id. at 152-53.

191

Yano v. Kadoi, 3 ROP Intrm. 174 (1992).
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When reviewing such a plan, this Court must first examine
the existing deviations in the plan and determine if they can
be reduced. Second, if the deviations can be reduced, we
must consider other arguments made in favor of the
existing plan by its drafters, to see if they represent
legitimate national interests. Finally, we must strike a
balance between the deviations from strict mathematical
equality and the asserted national interests.192
Article IX, Section 4 requires senatorial districting to be ―based on
population,‖ which the Court read to mean ―citizen population‖ rather than
―actual population‖ or ―voter population.‖193 Because only citizens are
afforded the right to vote, the Court felt it proper to address only citizens‘
rights to equal protection rather than the rights of all inhabitants to equal
protection.194 The Court stated that it would be incongruous to allow a
state to benefit in redistricting from an influx in non-citizen population
when those elected would have ―absolutely no duty‖ to respond to the
needs of those non-citizens.195 While the Court‘s ―absolutely no duty‖
language was hopefully hyperbole, it is true that even a few hundred noncitizens could alter the voting districts significantly were the districting to
be done on the basis of total population. And, because Article IV, Section
5 permits discrimination in favor of citizens, no equal protection objection
could stand in favor of the non-citizens.
C. Additional Equal Protection Case Law
The equal protection cases decided before ―suspect classifications‖
and ―rational-basis review‖ came into vogue still remain good law and
may be useful in the proper instance. These cases largely fail to articulate
a standard of review, but provide discrete measuring points along the equal
protection continuum.
In Governor of Kayangel v. Wilter, the Court ruled on the
constitutionality of the President‘s impoundment of funds appropriated to
the state governments as block grants.196 The Court found that, while the
President is authorized to impound funds, such impoundment must not
violate other constitutional provisions, such as the equal protection
clause.197 Chief Justice Nakamura stated that ―the impoundment authority
192

Id. at 182.

193

See id. at 183-84.

194

See id. at 184.
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See id. at 187.

196

Governor of Kayangel v. Wilter, 1 ROP Intrm. 206 (Trial Div. 1985)
(Nakamura, C.J.).
197

See id. at 209.
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may not be exercised in a manner so as to invidiously discriminate against
a person or class of persons.‖198 The Court found that no equal protection
violation was properly stated, as the plaintiffs did not allege that, for
instance, the impoundment was done to discriminate against one state
(―place of origin‖ discrimination).199
Although the case was resolved on non-constitutional grounds, the
Appellate Division noted that authority for judicial review of non-uniform
voter standards is implicitly found in Article IV, Section 5 (along with
Article X, Section 5) in Skebong v. Election Commissioner.200 This
statement seems questionable, as Article IV, Section 5 is not a grant of
jurisdiction but a guarantee of rights (however, every grant of a
constitutional right does implicitly carry with it the right of judicial review
of deprivation of that right). But judicial jurisdiction to review such
deprivation is more properly found in the constitutional grant of
jurisdiction, Article X of the Constitution.
An Airai legislator challenged a recall election for violating her
equal protection rights in Simeon v. Election Commission.201 The petition
for recall stated as the reason for recall that the legislator ―no longer
represent[ed the petitioners‘] interests.‖202 The legislator objected,
arguing that the stated reason was so ambiguous that it violated her right
to equal protection.203 The Court disagreed and permitted the recall
election, finding no constitutional violation.204
The appellant, a United States citizen, asserted that he was denied
equal protection by Palau‘s Memorandum of Agreement with the
Federated States of Micronesia in Kruger v. Social Security Board.205 The
Memorandum of Agreement provided unlimited social security benefits to
non-resident non-citizens who were citizens of the Federated States of
Micronesia while other non-resident non-citizens (such as United States
citizens) were limited to only six months of Palauan social security
benefits.206 Although the equal protection violation appears plain, the
Court declined to expressly rule on the ―hypothetical‖ issue because the
appellant was not in a position to receive social security benefits
198

Id.

199

See id. at 211.

200

Skebong v. Election Comm’r, 1 ROP Intrm. 366 (1986).

201

Simeon v. Election Comm’n, 3 ROP Intrm. 372 (Trial Div. 1991)
(Ngiraklsong, J.).
202

See id. at 373.
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Kruger v. Soc. Sec. Bd., 5 ROP Intrm. 91 (1995).
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See id. at 92-93.
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regardless of his country of citizenship.207 However, the Appellate
Division did agree with the Trial Division‘s finding that any potential
equal protection problem could be cured by simply denying the extra
benefit to citizens of the Federated States of Micronesia (or by granting
the extra benefit to citizens of all non-Palauan countries).
The plaintiff in Sechelong v. Republic of Palau attempted to stretch
the coverage of equal protection too far by arguing that the statute
prohibiting certain types of automobile window tinting violated Article IV,
Section 5 because it allowed some types of window tinting (e.g., factoryinstalled tinting) and prohibited others (e.g., reflective tinting).208 Justice
Beattie properly rejected the equal protection argument, but gave short
shrift to his rationale, stating only that ―it is not the province of the Court
to supplant the judgment of the [Olbiil Era Kelulau].‖209
In Palau Marine Indus. Corp. v. Seid, a plaintiff-cum-appellant
challenged the Trial Division‘s decision to allow the defendant/appellee to
amend his answer as an abuse of discretion because the plaintiff/appellee
was denied leave to amend its answer in a different lawsuit.210 The Court
found the equal protection argument to be frivolous and sanctionable,
because Article IV, Section 5 ―does not assure uniformity of judicial
decisions.‖211

207

See id. at 93.

208

Sechelong v. Republic of Palau, 6 ROP Intrm. 368, 370 (Trial Div. 1997)

(Beattie, J.).
209

Id. Justice Beattie would have assumedly felt differently had the Olbiil Era
Kelulau enacted a law unconstitutionally discriminating on the basis of a suspect
classification. Such deference to the legislature is inappropriate in constitutional
analysis.
210
211

Palau Marine Indus. Corp. v. Seid, 9 ROP 173, 175 (2002).

Id. at 176 (citing numerous United States cases for support). The Appellate
Division echoed its Seid axiom most recently in Taima v. Sun Xiu Chun, Civ. App. No.
09-005 (Dec. 10, 2009). The Taima appellant argued that his right to equal protection
was violated when the lower court permitted his adversary to miss a hearing but
―unequally‖ entered a default judgment against him when he missed a hearing. See
Taima, Civ. App. No. 09-005, slip op. at 10. Because the Appellate Division found that
the appellant‘s opponent never missed a hearing—and therefore no unequal treatment had
occurred—it rejected the equal protection claim while stressing that the equal protection
guarantee ―‗does not assure uniformity of judicial decisions or immunity from judicial
error.‘‖ See id. at 10 n.7 (quoting Palau Marine Indus. Corp. v. Seid, 9 ROP 173, 176
(2002) (quoting Beck v. Washington, 82 S. Ct. 955, 962-63 (1962))).
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VII. DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
A. Due Process Overview
―Due process‖ is guaranteed before the government may take
action ―to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property‖ by Article IV,
Section 6 of the Palau Constitution. Because the government may use a
wide-range of vehicles to deprive persons of their life, liberty, or
(especially) property, courts have been called upon to define what
quantum of process is ―due‖ in a variety of situations. Consistency can be
hard to achieve in this area, but certain guiding standards have emerged.
The first inquiries in any due process analysis should be whether
(1) the actor alleged to have caused the deprivation is a ―government‖
actor and (2) the ―thing‖ allegedly taken qualifies as life, liberty, or
property. If either inquiry results in a negative response, ―due process‖ is
not due and no constitutional violation may be rightfully claimed. The
next step in a due process analysis is to determine what level of process
was ―due,‖ and then determine whether that process was afforded. If the
proper level (or a greater level) of process was afforded to the
complainant, no due process violation has occurred.
Courts in the United States have read the United States due process
clause to encompass two different guarantees: the right of procedural due
process and the right of substantive due process. Procedural due process
ensures that a person is afforded the proper level of process before
deprivation of life, liberty, or property occurs. Substantive due process
requires that governmental action ―shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or
capricious, and… the means selected shall have a real, and substantial
relation to the object sought to be attained.‖212 Only one reported Palauan
decision—the Chief Justice Nakamura penned Governor of Kayangel v.
Wilter Trial Division opinion—engages in a substantive due process
analysis (and no violation was found).213 The Appellate Division has not
recognized substantive due process as an aspect of the Palauan due
process clause.214
212

Nebbia v. New York, 54 S. Ct. 505, 511 (1934) (quoted in Governor of
Kayangel v. Wilter, 1 ROP Intrm. 206, 211 (Trial Div. 1985) (Nakamura, C.J.)).
213

Governor of Kayangel v. Wilter, 1 ROP Intrm. 206, 211 (Trial Div. 1985)
(Nakamura, C.J.). In response to an allegation of denial of equal protection, substantive
due process, and procedural due process, the Trial Division recounted the Governor of
Kayangel substantive due process standard, but engaged in a hybrid equal protectionprocedural due process analysis in Perrin v. Remengesau, 11 ROP 266, 268-70 (Trial Div.
2004) (Ngiraklsong, C.J.). Chief Justice Ngiraklsong found no constitutional violation in
Perrin.
214

The Appellate Division has uttered the words ―substantive due process‖ only
twice: ―The [Land Claim Hearing Office‘s] delay in issuing this determination is
condemnable, but it did not deny procedural or substantive due process to the appellant.‖
Elbelau v. Semdiu, 5 ROP Intrm. 19, 22 (1994). The question of whether the 6.5 year
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Procedural due process ―requires notice and an opportunity to be
heard.‖215 The person attacking a governmental act by alleging lack of
due process bears the burden of demonstrating the constitutional
violation.216
B. The Process Due for Deprivation of Life
No Palauan case has addressed the process due before the Republic
may deprive someone of their life. No criminal statute provides for the
death penalty and the issue has not otherwise arisen.
C. Decisionmakers in Criminal Proceedings
The Constitution, as originally drafted, did not guarantee the right
to a trial by jury in any prosecution. The Ninth Amendment provided for
jury trials for certain criminal cases starting on January 1, 2010.217 Before
this constitutional amendment, defendants had attempted to find a jury
trial ―right‖ in the due process clause but Palauan courts steadfastly
rejected those attempts.
Stated quite bluntly in Republic of Palau v. Chisato, ―There have
never been jury trials in Palau.‖218 Palau chose to not exercise its option
to hold jury trials during its Trust Territory days and again rejected jury
trials during the Constitutional Convention.219 On the basis of such (lack
delay that intervened between the Land Commission‘s rendering its Summary and
Adjudication awarding the land at issue to the Elbelau appellees and the formal Land
Claims Hearing Office Determination of Ownership violated due process called into
question the procedure employed, not the substance of its decision. The Court did not
engage in a substantive due process analysis and therefore its comment that the procedure
did not violate ―substantive due process‖ is merely dictum.
The Appellate Division summarily rejected the appellant‘s deprivation of due
process claim in Ngerungel Clan v. Eriich with the words, ―Neither a substantive nor a
procedural due process claim can lie here.‖ 15 ROP 96, 100 (2008). The Appellate
Division rejected the deprivation claim because the appellant was provided notice of the
hearing and an opportunity to present witnesses at the land claim hearing at issue—issues
of procedure, not of substance. See id.
215

Pedro v. Carlos, 9 ROP 101, 102 (2002) (citing Ngerketiit Lineage v. Seid, 8
ROP Intrm. 44, 47 (1999)); see also Governor of Kayangel v. Wilter, 1 ROP Intrm. 206,
209 (Trial Div. 1985) (Nakamura, C.J.).
216

See Pedro, 9 ROP at 102 (citing Uchellas v. Etpison, 5 ROP Intrm. 86, 89
(1995)). The Pedro Court did not meaningful review the appellant‘s due process
argument, however, because the record on appeal did not include the pertinent records.
See id. at 102. Therefore, because the appellant bore both the burden of creating a
sufficient appellate record and the burden to demonstrate a due process violation, the
Appellate Division denied the appeal and affirmed the opinion below. See id. at 102-03.
217

See section XIII.I, infra.

218

Republic of Palau v. Chisato, 2 ROP Intrm. 227, 229 (1991).

219

See id. at 230.
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of) history of jury trials in Palau, the Court held ―that the due process
clause of the Palau Constitution does not, by implication or otherwise,
grant the right to trial by jury in the Republic of Palau.‖220 Given that
Chisato was a murder trial and the appellant was facing a sentence of life
imprisonment plus ten years, this statement eviscerates any due process
right to a jury trial in any criminal proceeding.
Even during the Trust Territory days, the right to a jury trial for
United States citizens as guaranteed by the United States Constitution did
not apply to criminal prosecutions in Palauan courts.221 Justice Beattie
reasoned that Palau was a Trust Territory of the United Nations, not the
United States, and therefore the American rule that the Bill of Rights
guarantees (including the right to trial by jury) apply when the United
States prosecutes its citizens abroad did not apply.222
Murder trials are conducted by special ―murder panels‖ at the trial
level—one ―presiding‖ judge accompanied by two ―special‖ judges. This
procedure does not violate the due process rights of the accused.223
Indeed, it would be anomalous for a three-judge panel to violate due
process where a lone decisionmaker would not.

220

Id. at 231.

221

See Republic of Palau v. Wolff, 3 ROP Intrm. 278, 278-81 (Trial Div. 1993)

(Beattie, J.).
222

See id. at 280 (―The Palau Supreme Court was created by the Government of
Palau, not the United States… The Palau Supreme Court is not an agency of the United
States… [I]t is the Palau Constitution which applies to criminal proceedings in Palau for
violation of its statutes.‖).
223

See Chisato, 2 ROP Intrm. at 232 (confirming the holding of Republic of
Palau v. Santos, 1 ROP Intrm. 274 (1985)).
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D. Translation of Criminal Proceedings
A criminal defendant‘s due process rights include the right to an
interpreter if needed to understand the proceedings. 224 This right of
interpretation is ―rooted in fundamental fairness and integrity of court‖
and cannot ―be abandoned absent an express waiver‖ by the defendant.225
Although the determination of who is to provide and pay for the
interpretation is left to the trial court, the Appellate Division‘s Pamintuan
v. Republic of Palau opinion demands that trial courts ―halt proceedings
until an interpreter [is] present.‖226 The duty to inform the court of the
need for interpretation falls on the defendant, as does the duty to provide
and pay for translation unless the defendant provides proof of
indigence.227
E. Statutory Issues
An overly-vague statute describing a crime can violate the due
process clause because it does not provide sufficient notice of the acts
constituting a crime. The Appellate Division set out the boundaries of
constitutionally-acceptable concreteness in Ngirengkoi v. Republic of
Palau:
It is established that a law fails to meet the requirements of
the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless
that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it
prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without
any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is
not in each particular case.228
The Ngirengkoi Court upheld the constitutionality of the indecent
assault statute against a void-for-vagueness challenge. Palau‘s indecent
assault statute criminalizes ―tak[ing] indecent and improper liberties with
224

See Pamintuan v. Republic of Palau, 16 ROP 32, 40 (2008) (―[W]e find that
the Palauan Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to an interpreter if they
are unable to meaningfully understand the English language…‖).
225

Id.

226

Id.

227

See id. at 39 n.2. This structure—requiring a defendant to provide a
translator and not commencing proceedings until a translator is present—may tempt
abuse, especially because the right of interpretation can only be waived expressly. A nonEnglish speaking, non-indigent defendant could attempt to postpone her criminal trial—
perhaps indefinitely—by simultaneously refusing to waive her right to translation and
refusing to provide a translator. But a trial court could presumably coerce a criminal
defendant into providing an interpreter through its contempt powers or appoint a
translator and require the non-indigent defendant to pay for the translator‘s services.
228

Ngirengkoi v. Republic of Palau, 8 ROP Intrm. 41, 42 (1999) (quoting
Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 86 S. Ct. 518, 520-21 (1966)).
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the person of a child under the age of 14 years without committing or
intending to commit the crime of rape or carnal knowledge.‖229 In
Ngirengkoi, the defendant contended that ambiguousness of the phrase
―indecent and improper liberties‖ unconstitutionally deprived him of his
right to due process in violation of Article IV, Section 6 and to be
informed of the nature of the accusation against him as guaranteed by
Article IV, Section 7.230
The Court applied the canon of construction ―that a law should be
construed to sustain its constitutionality whenever possible‖ and noted that
at least six United States jurisdictions have found that statutes
criminalizing the taking of ―indecent liberties‖ are not unconstitutionally
vague.231 Furthermore, vagueness challenges not involving free speech
must be examined in light of the facts of the case at hand and the conduct
at issue in Ngirengkoi was of the sort that ―a person of ordinary
intelligence‖ would know were acts of indecent liberties.232 The Court
upheld the constitutionality of the indecent assault statute without
engaging in a separate Article IV, Section 7 analysis regarding an
accused‘s right to be informed of the nature of the charges.
The constitutional right to due process may be violated by a
conviction of a crime that lacks a mens rea requirement.233 The Court—
because it found a mens rea requirement in the statutory crime at hand—
did not fully define the rationale or boundaries of this due process right,
other than to say that ―where a statute incorporates an offense from the
common law, a culpable state of mind must accompany the conduct
proscribed by the statute.‖234
F. Charging Issues235
It is violative of due process to find a defendant guilty of a crime
without charging the defendant of that crime. In Franz v. Republic of
Palau,236 the defendant was charged with assault and battery and
229

17 PNC § 2806.

230

See Ngirengkoi, 8 ROP Intrm. at 42.

231

See id. at 42-43.

232

Id. at 43.

233

See Takada v. Sup. Ct. of the Republic of Palau, Trial Div., 3 ROP Intrm. 262,

263 (1993).
234

Id.

235

See also section XIII.E infra, (discussing an accused‘s right to be informed of
the nature of the accusation).
236

Franz v. Republic of Palau, 8 ROP Intrm. 52 (1999).
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attempted assault and battery with a dangerous weapon but convicted of
assault and battery and assault and battery with a dangerous weapon.
Because the prosecution had charged only an attempted assault and battery
with a dangerous weapon, but not a completed assault and battery with a
dangerous weapon, the Appellate Division reversed the conviction for that
offense.237 ―Attempted‖ and ―completed‖ crimes are separate offenses
because, under the applicable statute,238 an ―attempt‖ offense requires that
the perpetrator ―fall short of actual commission of the crime.‖239 In Franz,
the Court found ―fundamental due process prevents a court from
convicting an accused of an offense not charged in the information and not
necessarily included in an offense charged.‖240 The Franz decision has
often been cited as setting forth the due process standard as it relates to
charging documents: ―The constitutional right of a defendant to know the
nature and cause of the accusation means that the offense charged must be
set forth with sufficient certainty so that the defendant will be able to
intelligently prepare a defense.‖241
In dicta, the Franz Court appeared to uphold the constitutionality
of ROP R. CRIM. P. 31(c), which permits conviction of a defendant ―of an
offense necessarily included in the offense charged or of an attempt to
commit either the offense charged or an offense necessarily included
therein if the attempt is an offense.‖242 It is not immediately clear why a
237

See id. at 52.

238

17 PNC § 104.

239

Franz, 8 ROP Intrm. at 54.

240

Id. at 55.

241

Pamintuan v. Republic of Palau, 16 ROP 32, 44 (2008) (citing Franz v.
Republic of Palau, 8 ROP Intrm. 52, 54-55 (1999)). See also Republic of Palau v.
Kasiano, 13 ROP 289, 290 (Trial Div. 2006) (Salii, J.) (A criminal information is
sufficient—under both ROP R. CRIM P. 7 and the due process clause—―if it contains all
the essential elements of the offense charged and fairly informs the accused of the
charges against him which he must defend.‖) (citing Franz v. Republic of Palau, 8 ROP
Intrm. 52, 55 (1999)).
In a pre-Franz opinion, the Appellate Division formulated the standard as
follows: ―A criminal information is sufficient if it ‗contains the elements of the offense
charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against he must defend.‘‖ Sungino
v. Republic of Palau, 6 ROP Intrm. 70, 70-71 (1997) (quoting Hamling v. United States,
94 S. Ct. 2887, 2907 (1974)). Without explanation, the Appellate Division chose not to
finish the Hamling quotation, which reads in whole:
[A]n indictment is sufficient if it, first, contains the elements of the
offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against he
must defend, and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or
conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.
Hamling, 94 S. Ct. at 2907.
242

Franz, 8 ROP Intrm. at 55, n.4.
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defendant may be charged with a completed crime, but instead found
guilty of an attempted crime when it is not constitutionally permissible for
the opposite to be true. Permitting conviction of an attempted crime when
only a completed crime has been charged may be sensible in the United
States where, as the Supreme Court of Palau noted, attempted and
completed crimes are not ―separate offenses.‖243 But, given that attempted
and completed crimes are ―separate offenses‖ in Palau because of the
statutory requirement that an attempted crime ―fall short‖ of completion,
due process should disallow a conviction of an attempt crime where only
the completed offense was charged.
In Gotina v. Republic of Palau, the Appellate Division held that
charging the accused with unlawful fishing ―on or before‖ a certain day is
not unconstitutionally ambiguous in violation of Article IV, Section 6 or
7.244 The Court read ―on or before‖ as ―reasonably synonymous‖ with the
―widely used ‗on or about‘ language, and as providing an equally
sufficient measure of reasonable particularity as to the time of the alleged
offense.‖245 While (as the Court stated) this reading of the charges
recognizes ―practical‖ rather than ―technical‖ considerations, it skews the
literal meaning of the words. ―On or before‖ a certain date does not carry
the same meaning as ―on or about‖ a certain date. Indeed, ―on or before‖
could literally mean any time before the stated cut-off date, and therefore
provides almost no information about the alleged time frame of the
offense (nor of whether the alleged offense occurred within the applicable
statute of limitations).
In Republic of Palau v. Kumangai, Chief Justice Ngiraklsong
dismissed a count charging the defendant with committing child abuse
from September 23, 1997 to September 22, 2000 for ―being too indefinite
with respect to the time of the alleged offense‖ and thus violating the
defendant‘s constitutional due process rights.246 Noting the similarity to
the United States due process clause, the Chief Justice stated that the
clause ―requires that a defendant in a criminal case be given notice of the
elements of the offense charged against him and a fair opportunity to
defend himself against those charges.‖247 It is a due process violation for a
charge to fail to give the defendant the approximate time the charged

243

Id. at 54 n.3 (citing United States v. York, 578 F.2d 1036, 1038 & n.4 (5th Cir.

244

Gotina v. Republic of Palau, 8 ROP Intrm. 56 (1999).

245

Id. at 58.

1978)).

246

Republic of Palau v. Kumangai, 10 ROP 176, 177 (Trial Div. 2001)
(Ngiraklsong, C.J.).
247

Id.
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conduct occurred because the defendant is deprived of a fair opportunity
to defend against the charge.248
In Kumangai, the government could only point to one specific act
of child abuse, but could not pinpoint the date more specifically than the
three-year time period noted above.249 Although the information charged
an ongoing abuse for those three years, it became clear at trial that the
government only had evidence of a single act; because it was too late for
the defendant to request a bill of particulars, the Court found that the
charged count was too indefinite as to time for the defendant to adequately
defend himself against the charge.250
G. Warrant Issues
As long as an arrest warrant for breach of parole is supported by
probable cause, no immediate preliminary post-arrest hearing must occur
to comport with due process.251 All that due process requires is ―notice
and an opportunity to be heard within a reasonable time frame.‖252 Justice
Michelsen outlined the procedure required to satisfy due process: (1)
service of summons on a parolee and a hearing within thirty days; or (2)
issuance of an arrest warrant by the court based on probable cause
supported by an affidavit.253
H. Non-Disclosure of Evidence
In Malsol v. Republic of Palau, the Appellate Division
contemplated the due process implications of the prosecution‘s late
disclosure of a written witness statement.254 The prosecution waited until
the week before trial to produce the witness statement of a murder victim‘s
neighbor, and by that time the defendant was unable to locate the
witness.255 Although the witness statement was somewhat ambiguous, the
defendant argued that the witness statement showed that the murder victim
was still alive up until the time that the defendant had a solid alibi, thereby
248

See id.

249

See id.

250

See id.

251

See Masami v. Kesolei, 10 ROP 213, 214 (Trial Div. 2003) (Michelsen, J.).

252

Id.

253

See id. at 216. But, because the relevant statute improperly authorized
members of the Parole Board, rather than a judge, to issue an arrest warrants upon an
allegation of a parole violation, the Court ordered the parolee‘s release. See section
VIII.C, infra.
254

Malsol v. Republic of Palau, 8 ROP Intrm. 161 (2000).

255

See id. at 162
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proving that the defendant was not present when the victim was slain.256
Although the witness statement was admitted at trial, the defendant
claimed the prosecution‘s withholding of the evidence violated her due
process rights because she was denied an opportunity to question the
witness in person.257 Because the defendant did not argue a constitutional
violation to the Trial Division, the Appellate Division reviewed only the
conduct of the Trial Division—admitting the witness statement on the
defendant‘s motion—rather than the prosecution‘s late disclosure of the
witness statements.258 The Court found no constitutional violation, but did
urge the Attorney General‘s office to adopt an ―open file‖ policy and
freely share all non-privileged information with defense counsel.259
Like Malsol, in Kumangai v. Republic of Palau, the defendant
claimed a due process violation in the government‘s failure to disclose
evidence to him in advance of trial.260 The withheld evidence was the
confidential informant‘s audiotape, which the government allegedly
misplaced until after trial. The Court stated its test:
In determining whether a criminal defendant‘s due process
rights have been violated by the government‘s failure to
disclose impeachment evidence, the Appellate Division
must ask whether, but for the failure to disclose, the
outcome of the proceeding below would have been
different.261
Recounting the Ngiraked v. Republic of Palau decision, the Kumangai
Court stated the a due process violation only occurs when the withheld
evidence is ―material‖ to the issue of a defendant‘s guilt or punishment
and that, to be ―material,‖ disclosure of the evidence creates a reasonable
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different.262
A ―reasonable probability‖ is described as ―a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.‖263 The Court summarily ruled that
256

See id.

257

See id. at 163.

258

See id.

259

See id. at 163 & n.2. To be sure, it does not offend the Constitution for the
government to fail to turn over a witness statement that does not exist. See Republic of
Palau v. Worswick, 3 ROP Intrm. 269, 276-78 (1993) (finding that trial court‘s
determination that no witness statements were taken was not clearly erroneous and
therefore no constitutional violation for withholding the witness statements could have
occurred).
260

Kumangai v. Republic of Palau, 9 ROP 79 (2001).

261

Id. at 82-83 (citing Ngiraked v. Republic of Palau, 5 ROP Intrm. 159, 172 &

n.9 (1996)).
262

See id. at 85.

263

Id.
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no showing had been made that disclosure of the misplaced tape would
create such a reasonable probability and therefore the defendant‘s due
process rights were not violated by the government‘s failure to produce the
tape.264 This ―reasonable probability of a different outcome‖ standard, as
applied, is a high bar to meet, especially where the defendant does not
know what is contained in the withheld evidence.
The Court rejected a second ―failure to disclose‖ due process
argument in Kumangai, where the defendant alleged that the government‘s
untimely disclosure of the confidential informant‘s counterfeiting
activities prejudiced his ability to impeach the witness.265 But, as in
Ngiraked, the Court felt that the defendant had ―significant impeachment
material‖ about the same witness, including a drug trafficking arrest and
the information that the witness was testifying in order to gain leniency for
himself.266 Again, the ―reasonable probability‖ standard proved a high bar
to hurdle, even where the government withheld evidence of an important
witness‘s criminal dishonesty.
The Ngiraked decision cited in Kumangai is a grave case stemming
from the assassination of Palau‘s first President. The prosecution initially
interviewed a witness, but then the interview tapes were inadvertently
destroyed. The witness was subsequently called at trial and testified. The
defendants alleged that the destruction of the interview tapes violated their
due process rights, as well as their right to examine all witnesses.267 With
regard to due process, the Ngiraked Court adopted the United States‘
―Brady rule‖ in Palau.268 The Brady rule states that suppression of
exculpatory evidence by the prosecution in the face of a defendant‘s
request for evidence violates the due process clause where the evidence is
―material‖ to guilt or punishment.269 Evidence is ―material‖ only if the
disclosure of the evidence to the defense would create a reasonable
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different.270
The ―suppressed‖ evidence in question in Ngiraked, however, was not
exculpatory, but instead was only potentially impeaching evidence. 271 The
Court found the suppressed evidence was not material in light of the other

264

See id.

265

See id.

266

See id.

267

See Ngiraked, 5 ROP Intrm. at 170. Ngiraked‘s examination clause analysis
is discussed in section X, infra.
268

See id. at 172 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963)).

269

See id.

270

See id.

271

See id.
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impeachment evidence available to the defense and therefore found no due
process violation.272
I.

Non-Disclosure of the Identity of a Confidential Informant

The government‘s non-disclosure of the identity of a confidential
informant potentially implicates due process clause considerations. The
Appellate Division visited this non-disclosure issue in Ueki v. Republic of
Palau.273 In Ueki, police officers used a confidential informant to execute
three controlled buys of methamphetamine from the defendant.274 The
government revealed the identity of the confidential informant to defense
counsel only for the purpose of the attorney running a conflict check and
prohibited the conveyance of the identity of the informant to the
defendant.275 After recounting United States case law, the Court stated the
constitutional rule:
[T]he question whether a defendant is entitled to disclosure
of and/or testimony from a confidential informant is
entirely distinct from the question whether the government
may prove its case without such testimony. ―When
disclosure is warranted, it is for the purpose of allowing the
defendant to determine whether he wishes to call the
informant as a witness in an effort to rebut the
government‘s case.‖276
And, because the confidential informant was the only ―direct participant‖
in the controlled buys, the informant‘s testimony in Ueki would not have
been cumulative.277 Based on the impermissible non-disclosure, the
Appellate Division vacated the Ueki defendant‘s convictions and
remanded the case for retrial.278 In the interest of safeguarding
informants, the Court noted that trial courts may, on a case-by-case basis
when appropriate and as demonstrated by the government, take steps to
protect witnesses in criminal prosecutions.279 But the Court stated that the
Republic‘s interest in prosecution of narcotics cases must, on some
272

See id.

273

Ueki v. Republic of Palau, 10 ROP 153, 159-61 (2003).

274

See id. at 155-56.

275

See id. at 159.

276

Id. at 160-61 (quoting Oiterong v. Republic of Palau, 9 ROP 195, 198

(2002)).
277

See id. at 161.

278

See id.

279

See id.
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occasions, ―be trumped by the defendant‘s constitutional due process right
to a fair trial, which includes the right to adequately prepare and present
his defense.‖280 Ueki was such a case.
Following Ueki, the Appellate Division held, in Ngirailild v.
Republic of Palau, that the disclosure of the identity of a confidential
informant to defense counsel only (and not to the defendant) did not run
afoul of the defendant‘s right to due process under Article IV, Section 6 or
his rights to effective counsel or to examine all witnesses in Article IV,
Section 7.281 The Ngirailild Court quoted extensively from the Ueki
opinion for the standard applicable to disclosure of a confidential
informant, but ultimately found that no disclosure was required.282 The
defense was told that it could call the informant as a witness and defense
counsel was permitted to interview the informant about the drug sale that
led to the arrest.283 In finding that none of the defendant‘s Article IV
rights were violated (without separately addressing the rights to due
process and to examine all witnesses), the Appellate Division put great
weight in the trial court‘s explicit direction to the defense that it was
permitted to call the confidential informant as a witness.284
J.

Civil Court Procedure for Deprivation of Property Rights

The due process clause guarantees that courts (and administrative
bodies) follow certain minimum procedures in adjudicating property
rights. Failure to adhere to these minimum procedures may violate a
litigant‘s due process right and invalidate the court‘s decision. The
―specifics of each case‖ determine whether and what sort of hearing a trial
court must hold on a motion, for ―procedural due process does not entitle a
litigant to a hearing on every motion.‖285 An oral hearing on a motion is

280

Id.

281

Ngirailild v. Republic of Palau, 11 ROP 173 (2004). The ineffective
assistance counsel claim, which was based on the assertion that defense counsel could not
effectively represent the defendant without revealing the identity of the confidential
informant, was summarily rejected: ―an ineffective assistance claim turns on decisions
made and actions taken by counsel, not by the court.‖ Id. at 174. While most of the time
an ineffective assistance claim will turn on the actions of counsel, it is not inconceivable
that a trial court could rule in such a way to limit defense counsel from achieving
effective representation. Such a blanket statement and summary disposition of the issue
was therefore not appropriate.
282

See id. at 175.

283

See id.

284

See id. See section X, infra, regarding the right to examine witnesses.

285

Ngerketiit Lineage v. Seid, 8 ROP Intrm. 44, 47 (1999).
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―necessary only if determination of the motion requires resolution of a
material and genuine factual dispute.‖286
The Appellate Division held that it is not violative of due process
for a lower court to hold a civil trial without a defendant‘s attendance in
the absence of proof that the absent defendant was not served with notice
of the trial date in Malsol v. Ngiratechekii.287 The Malsol defendant filed
an answer in the civil personal injury case, but failed to provide an address
for service (in violation of ROP R. CIV. P. 11).288 The case then dragged
on for nine years before trial (during which time the defendant appeared at
two status conferences).289 The absent defendant was found liable and
subsequently appealed.290 On remand for fact-finding, the Trial Division
found that the absent defendant had received notice of the trial date.291
The Appellate Division held that the due process clause guarantees a civil
defendant the right to notice of the trial date, but does not require a trial
court to make a determination as to whether an absent defendant received
such notice before going forward with trial.292 The Court noted that a
defendant is not guaranteed personal service of a trial notice when the
defendant does not comply with the rules requiring the furnishing of a
current address to the court: ―The service rules, however, do not require
the court or the litigants to track down a party whose address is
unknown.‖293 Following Malsol, the Appellate Division has found no due
process violation where service of notice of a land court hearing was
actually made, although not at the appellant‘s abode, place of business, or
to his specified agent.294
As held in Silmai v. Land Claims Hearing Office, it violates an
appellant‘s due process rights for a trial court to sua sponte dismiss the
pleadings without providing the parties with an opportunity to be heard.295
The lower court in Silmai had treated the defendant‘s answer and
affirmative defenses as a motion for judgment on the pleadings and issued

286

Id. at 48.

287

Malsol v. Ngiratechekii, 7 ROP Intrm. 70 (1998).

288

See id. at 71.

289

See id.

290

See id.

291

See id.

292

See id.

293

Id. at 72.

294

See Etpison v. Skilang, 16 ROP 191, 193 (2009) (―Litigants bear the
responsibility of notifying the court where they want to be served and making any
objections in a timely way.‖).
295

Silmai v. Land Claims Hearing Office, 3 ROP Intrm. 225 (1992).
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a sua sponte order dismissing the complaint.296 The Appellate Division, in
finding that the lower court had abused its discretion, did not state what
sort of ―opportunity to be heard‖ must be afforded before dismissal of the
pleadings is constitutionally permissible.
In Klai Clan v. Bedechel Clan, the Court reviewed the Trial
Division‘s sua sponte order to vacate and amend its previous order.297 The
amended order called for remand of the case to the Land Claims Hearing
Office (―LCHO‖) for further proceedings.298 Because the Trial Division
did not give the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard, as required
by ROP R. CIV. P. 59(d), the Appellate Court found that the sua sponte
vacation and amendment of the order violated the litigant‘s procedural due
process rights as set forth in Article IV, Section 6.299 This use of the due
process clause seems strained, especially in light of Rule 59(d)‘s focus on
a trial court‘s authority to grant a new trial, not amend an order.
The Appellate Division held that a court may rule on a motion for
default judgment without a hearing without offending the procedural due
process right of the party seeking the judgment in Western Caroline
Trading Co. v. Leonard.300 The Western Caroline appellant won a default
judgment, but appealed the amount of the trial court‘s judgment.301 The
Appellate Division found that the opportunity to file a motion in favor of
default judgment and supporting documents afforded the moving party
sufficient process.302
It is violative of due process for a trial court to apply res judicata to
bar a claimant‘s claim to land when the claimant was not involved in the
earlier proceeding that serves as the basis for the res judicata ruling.303
Instead of reaching this constitutional question, however, the Appellate
Division could simply have overruled the lower court‘s finding that res
judicata applied and thereby achieved the same result.
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The Appellate Court held in Bruno v. Santos that it does not violate
due process for the LCHO, in response to a request to define a boundary,
to define the boundary per the request without holding a hearing. 304 The
parties, in a letter, asked the LCHO to review four items and then make a
boundary determination; it did so, but the disappointed party claimed on
appeal that the determination violated due process because no hearing was
held.305 The Appellate Division disagreed, pointing out that ―[t]he
agreement neither requested nor anticipated that the Land Court would
hold a hearing regarding the disputed boundaries.‖306 This opinion
basically permits individuals to ―bargain away‖ their due process rights—
if a governmental body is jointly asked by both parties to complete certain
steps before coming to a determination and it does so, no more process is
due.
As to execution of money judgments, the Appellate Court relied on
United States case law to find that due process requirements are satisfied
if: (1) notice is provided to the judgment debtor that property has been
seized; (2) notice is provided to the judgment debtor of exemptions to
which the judgment debtor may be entitled; and (3) a prompt opportunity
to be heard is provided for the judgment debtor to assert exemptions or
challenge the seizure.307 Due process, however, does not require preattachment notice.308 The same process is due to judgment debtors when
property is seized by way of writ of attachment as when it is seized
through a writ of execution.309
In Peleliu State Government v. 9th Peleliu State Legislature, Chief
Justice Ngiraklsong laid out the minimum due process requirements in
prejudgment seizure cases:
(1) the availability of ex parte prejudgment seizure must be
limited to situations where plaintiff has established that the
property to be seized is of a type that can be readily
concealed, disposed of, or destroyed; (2) the plaintiff must
allege specific facts based on actual knowledge supporting
the underlying action and the right of plaintiff to seize the
property; (3) the application for the order of seizure must
be made to a judge rather than to a clerk; (4) the defendant
has a right to a prompt, postseizure hearing to challenge the
304
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seizure; and (5) the defendant must be able to recover
damages from the plaintiff if the taking was wrongful and
to regain possession of the seized items by filing a bond.310
Where the assets to be seized were fungible boat parts, the Chief Justice
found that the due process requirements had been met and ordered
prejudgment seizure upon posting of a sizeable bond.311
The Appellate Division recently stated, in In re Idelui, that a
judicial decision that violates a party‘s right to due process is a nullity. 312
In Idelui, four claimants to a parcel of land were overlooked and therefore
received no notice of the hearing determining ownership of the land.313
The Land Court held the hearing and issued a determination of ownership
and a certificate of title before it realized its mistake over a year later.314
The Appellate Division upheld the Land Court‘s cancellation of the
determination of ownership and certificate of title despite the lack of rulebased authority to do so. The Court found that, because the Land Court
hearing was conducted in violation of the four excluded claimants‘ due
process rights, the subsequent determination of ownership and certificate
of title were void ab initio and could be cancelled pursuant to the lower
court‘s inherent authority.315
K. Due Process Implications of Property Rights in Employment
Certain government employees and elected officials possess a
property right to their continued employment. When such a right is
recognized, an employee or elected official must be afforded due process
before she may be removed from office. Such a property right to
employment may arise through a contract for continued employment for a
specified time (or for an unspecified time upon certain conditions, such as
―good behavior‖ or ―satisfactory execution of duties‖).
In a since-vacated opinion, Justice Ngiraklsong ruled that the due
process clause entitles a member of the House of Delegates to notice and
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Peleliu State Gov’t v. 9th Peleliu State Legislature, 15 ROP 179, 181 (Trial
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82, 87-88 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)).
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an opportunity to be heard before expulsion from that body. 316 Justice
Ngiraklsong agreed that the expelled member was at least entitled to
notice of the resolution calling for his expulsion so that he could appear
before the House of Delegates to argue against (or acquiesce in) the
resolution.317 Justice Ngiraklsong found the lack of notice especially
unreasonable given that ―Koror is a small town‖ and ―[t]he Legislature
Building is within approximately 2 miles from [the expelled member‘s]
office and even less from his residence.‖318 The Appellate Division,
however, found that the controversy was moot because the House of
Delegates of the Second Olbiil Era Kelulau had already completed their
service; therefore the Court remanded the case back to Justice Ngiraklsong
with instructions to vacate the judgment.319
As found by Justice Miller in Ngiraingas v. Eighth Peleliu State
Legislature, due process requires that a state governor be given notice of
removal from office and an opportunity to state her case before the state
legislature vote that results in removal.320 In Ngiraingas, a super-majority
of the state legislature of Peleliu had resolved that the governor would be
removed from office unless the legislature voted to revoke the removal by
a certain date.321 The resolution of removal was the first notice the
governor received of the legislature‘s actions, and no further official
legislative meeting occurred between the notice and the date set for
removal.322 Justice Miller found that the governor‘s opportunity to speak
to the individual legislators on an ad hoc basis before his removal took
effect fell short of fulfilling the governor‘s due process rights:
The opportunity to be heard guaranteed by the due process
clause is not the opportunity to hear oneself talk, but to
have one‘s words and arguments given consideration by the
person or persons who will be determining whether to
deprive you of your life, liberty, or property.323
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Because the governor was not afforded an opportunity to present his case
before the legislature preceding the vote to remove him, the resolution
violated his due process rights.324
The Appellate Division found a violation of a terminated public
employee‘s right to procedural due process in April v. Palau Public
Utilities Corp.325 The defendant-employer utility company, a public
corporation wholly owned by the national government with board
members appointed by the President of Palau, qualified as a ―government
actor‖ for due process purposes.326 In determining whether the terminated
employee had a due process right to continued employment, the Appellate
Division looked no further than the defendant-employer‘s answer
admitting that a right to continued employment existed.327 Upon finding
that property right to continued employment with a government employer,
the Court stated that the employee ―should have been afforded due process
before [a] deprivation‖ of her employment occurred.328
In determining whether sufficient process was afforded to the
terminated employee, the April Court first rejected the appellant‘s
contention that her employer had failed to adhere to its own internal
procedures in terminating her employment.329 Turning to the ―notice and
an opportunity to be heard‖ aspect of procedural due process, the
Appellate Division found that the employee‘s constitutional rights had
been violated because she was terminated on the spot, without ―even a
minimal level of process.‖330 Without setting forth exactly what quantum
was due, the Court noted ―one procedure does not fit all‖ in determining
what or how much process is due before a particular deprivation of life,
liberty, or property may occur.331 Damages for a deprivation of procedural
due process ―should be calculated only to compensate a plaintiff for the
affront of suffering a deprivation of process‖ and recovery of ―anything
resembling back pay or compensation for her termination‖ would only be
permissible ―if proper process would have resulted in [the employee‘s]
reinstatement.‖332 Citing United States case law, the Court stated that
nominal damages are likely appropriate unless notice and an opportunity
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to be heard would have left the terminated employee in a better position
employment-wise.333
After remand to the Trial Division to calculate damages, the April
employee‘s plight returned to the Appellate Division a second time.334
The Trial Division awarded nominal damages of one dollar and the
employee appealed the amount of the award.335 After affirming the Trial
Division‘s decision not to impose punitive damages, the Appellate
Division again remanded because it found that the Trial Division had
failed to answer the vital question of whether a proper hearing would have
substantively improved the employee‘s situation.336
L. Other Property Rights
The Disciplinary Tribunal stated that a respondent in an attorney
disciplinary proceeding is afforded due process protection based on the
quasi-criminal nature of such proceedings.337 However, it is not the
―quasi-criminal‖ nature of disciplinary proceedings that confer due
process rights upon respondents—due process is afforded to parties in
many entirely non-criminal settings.
It is a type property—the
respondent‘s law license—that is on the line in such proceedings, not the
respondent‘s life or liberty.
The appellant claimed that failure to receive notice that certain
land was claimed as government land before the expiration of the time
period in which to file land claims against the government violated his
right to due process in Carlos v. Ngarchelong State Public Lands
Authority.338
The Appellate Division disagreed, ruling that the
constitutional provision (Article XIII, Section 10) and enabling legislation
(35 PNC § 1304(b)) at issue did not foreclose any rights because even
after the expiration of the time period set out to claim government lands
claimants could still file quiet title actions against the government.339
The Carlos Court improperly focused on whether the limited time
span of the rights afforded by Article XIII, Section 10 (and its enabling
333
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legislation) created a due process violation. Just because a right is ―new‖
and for a limited time (effectively an ―excess right‖) does not mean—as
the Court seemingly held—that deprivation of that right creates no due
process violation. The appellant did not argue that Article XIII, Section 10
deprived him of due process—he argued that the government‘s failure to
publish notice of its claim to certain land deprived him of due process
because he was unaware of his need to file an Article XIII, Section 10
claim. The Court dispensed of this argument in one sentence, finding that
it is the citizens‘ duty to identify public land rather than the government‘s
duty to publish notice regarding the allegedly public status of land.340
This analysis is clouded by the rest of the Court‘s opinion. While the
outcome was correct—no due process violation occurred—the Court‘s
reasoning should have focused solely on the actual claimed due process
violation.
In Western Caroline Trading Co. v. Philip, the Appellate Division
stated that a party to a contract ―does not have a constitutional right to
have a contract interpreted in its favor.‖341 The contract at issue in
Western Caroline included a clause governing the payment of attorney‘s
fee should litigation arise concerning the contract.342 Despite one party‘s
argument that the due process clause protected its property right, the Court
properly stated that ―there is no constitutional issue for us to decide.‖343
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SEARCHES AND WARRANTS

Article IV, Section 4 provides the seemingly absolute guarantee
that ―[e]very person has the right to be secure in his person, house, papers
and effects against entry, search and seizure.‖344 But Section 6 of the same
article then provides that ―[a] warrant for search and seizure may not issue
except from a justice or judge on probable cause supported by an affidavit
particularly describing the place, persons, or things to be searched,
arrested, or seized.‖345
By its own terms, Section 4 protects against all searches or
seizures, warranted or unwarranted. Section 4 does not limit only
government actors, but provides a freedom from searches and seizures by
anyone. As a result, even a private party could infringe on another‘s
search and seizure rights. Section 6 contradicts Section 4 by setting forth
a warrant procedure for conducting a search or seizure. The language of
Section 4‘s absolute freedom cannot be resolved with the incongruity of
Section 6‘s warrant provision without altering the plain meaning of one of
the provisions. It is Section 4 that has given way, and searches and
seizures pursuant to valid warrants have not been seriously challenged.
On the other hand, criminal defendants have mounted numerous
constitutional challenges to searches and seizures performed in the
absence of a warrant.
A. Interpretation of the Search and Seizure Guarantees
Facing a rule that would ―cripple[] law enforcement,‖ the government
appealed from the Trial Division‘s interpretation that the Constitution
prohibits all warrantless searches and seizures in Republic of Palau v.
Gibbons.346 In Gibbons, two officers arrived at the scene and were told
that the defendant had a gun in his automobile.347 The officers impounded
the vehicle and arrested the defendant.348 The Appellate Division, citing
United States authority, stated that ―[o]nce the police had facts sufficient to
indicate there was probable cause to believe that defendant was in
possession of an illegal firearm, they could have searched defendant‘s
automobile even if no search warrant was obtained.‖349 With that
statement, sanctioned warrantless searches and seizures came to Palau and

344
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the Appellate Division eviscerated the literal meaning of Article IV,
Section 4.
The Gibbons Court explicitly overruled the Trial Division‘s finding
that Article IV, Section 4 flatly prohibits warrantless searches and seizures,
stating that ―[s]uch a broad declaration is neither logical nor practical.‖350
The Court held that Article IV, Section 4 ―speaks only of the general right‖
to be free from searches and seizures and, ―[t]aken in a vacuum and
construed literally, this section would prohibit any search or seizure under
any circumstances.‖351 The Court found that a warrant procured pursuant
to Article IV, Section 6 permits a search or seizure and therefore, Section
4‘s prohibition against all searches and seizures ―is not, and cannot be, an
absolute right.‖352
Upon establishing this crack in Section 4‘s absolutism, the Court
went on to expand the exceptions, stating that Section 4 ―does not
preclude warrantless searches merely because it does not contain the word
‗unreasonable.‘‖353 The right to be free from ―unreasonable‖ searches and
seizure is guaranteed by statute (1 PNC § 403), and the Court found it
proper to read this ―unreasonable‖ limitation into the constitutional
language as well.354 For support, the Court noted that, in the absence of a
warrantless search and seizure exception, a police officer could not arrest a
person without first obtaining a warrant even if the officer observed the
person shoot and kill another person.355
Citing United States case law, the Court stated that a seizure of a
person (in the form of an arrest) occurs when, under the totality of the
circumstances, a reasonable person would not believe that she is free to
leave.356 The Court found that no warrant is needed for arrests based on
probable cause.357 The Court went on to state that the ―police are not
required to obtain a search warrant to stop an automobile‖358 when the
police possess probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains
contraband or evidence of a crime because (1) automobiles are inherently
mobile, thereby creating exigent circumstances that make the warrant
requirement impractical, and (2) people have a reduced expectation of
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privacy in automobiles.359 The Court stated that its examples were nonexhaustive and that any judicial proclamation prohibiting warrantless
searches across the board would only handicap law enforcement.360 The
Court‘s language not only cracked the door to warrantless searches, it blew
the hinges.
B. Exceptions to the Warrant “Requirement”
With the establishment of the constitutionality of warrantless
searches and seizures in Gibbons, the Court went about the difficult—and
unguided—task of delineating under what circumstances the warrant
―requirement‖ may be circumvented.361 Through case law, courts have
upheld warrantless seizures of items in plain view, border searches, and
searches incident to lawful arrests. In addition, courts have held that,
although police officers do not need warrants to enter public places,
officers may not rely on the ―open fields‖ doctrine to enter privatelyowned land surrounding a residence. These cases are discussed below.
Contraband in ―plain view‖ may be seized as long as the intrusion
that enabled the police to perceive and physically seize the item was
legal.362 Relying on United States law, the Appellate Division stated that
an ―investigatory stop short of an arrest is valid if based upon a reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot‖ and ―reasonably related in scope
to the justification for its initiation.‖363 Reasonable suspicion ―must be
based upon ‗specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant th[e]
intrusion.‘‖364
Justice Michelsen addressed the ―border search‖ exception to the
warrant requirement in Republic of Palau v. Techur.365 In Techur, the
defendant‘s cargo on an international flight alerted a trained narcotics dog;
the cargo was then opened by a customs officer (without a warrant) and
marijuana was discovered in the cargo.366 The defendant argued that the
search violated her constitutional rights. After stating (without citation)
359
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that ―[t]he Palau Constitution incorporated the search warrant requirement
that was a familiar part of [pre-Constitution] Trust Territory law,‖ the
Court went on to state that border searches were considered reasonable at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution and that nothing in the
Constitution ―can be construed to be an effort to restrict border searches to
something stricter than what had been previously allowed.‖367 Thus, the
―border search‖ exception to the warrant requirement was formally
recognized. The defendant further argued that the exception should only
apply to inbound (and not outbound) passengers and cargo, but the Court
was not moved by the argument.368 However, the Court did state—
without deciding—that ―secret searches‖ conducted outside the presence
of the owner may be held to more stringent standards, such as a reasonable
suspicion requirement, opening of cargo in the presence of a witness, or
the subsequent notification of the owner that a search was conducted.369
It seems dangerous to rely on ―whatever was considered
reasonable‖ at the time of the adoption of the Constitution (especially
without citation to evidence as to what that was) as a method of
constitutional construction. Under Techur it would seem that whatever
was reasonable at the time of the adoption would continue to be
permissible as long as it was not specifically made unconstitutional in the
Constitution.
The Appellate Division recognized the constitutionality of a
―search incident to a lawful arrest‖ in King v. Republic of Palau.370
Because the King defendant was ―validly‖ stopped and arrested for a
curfew violation, the Court held that the pat-down search incident to the
arrest and seizure of the ammunition from the defendant‘s pants pocket
was also valid.371 The arresting officer found ammunition in the
defendant‘s pocket and a subsequent search of the automobile revealed a
firearm under the driver‘s seat.372 The officer also found a matchbox on
the defendant‘s person containing methamphetamine.373 The trial court
suppressed the methamphetamine, but the defendant was found guilty of
both possession of a firearm and possession of ammunition.374
The King Court then examined 18 PNC § 301(a), the statute
dealing with searches incident to arrest, and concluded that the law—
367
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which was enacted under the Trust Territory government—may be written
over-inclusively to permit unconstitutional searches as it was written to
codify subsequently-overruled United States search and seizure case
law.375 The Court recounted its Gibbons decision wherein it
rejected the syllogism that (1) the United States
Constitution allows ―reasonable‖ searches without a
warrant; (2) Article IV Section 4 of the Palau Constitution
makes no mention of reasonableness; (3) therefore the
Palau Constitution does not allow ―reasonable‖ searches
without a warrant.376
Recognizing the danger attendant to custodial arrests (especially those
involving automobiles), the Court held that ―when a police officer has
made a lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of a motor vehicle, the
officer may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the
passenger compartment of that automobile.‖377 Therefore, the automobile
search and resulting seizure of the firearm were found to be
constitutional.378
The Trial Division ruled against the recognition of the ―open
fields‖ warrant exception in Republic of Palau v. Rafael.379 In Rafael,
Justice Miller granted the defendant‘s motion to suppress where police
officers entered the defendant‘s land without a search warrant and found
marijuana plants growing in the jungle. The Court looked to United States
case law to determine whether the marijuana patch was located on an
―open field‖ (in which, under prevailing United States case law, a
defendant does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy) or within the
defendant‘s ―curtilage‖ (in which a defendant does have a legitimate
expectation of privacy).380 Ultimately, however, Justice Miller found that
importing the United States approach was not appropriate in this instance
because ―the conception of privacy an[d] geography which underlie the
U.S. decisions do not translate well to Micronesia and to Palau in
particular.‖381 Noting that Palau‘s ―total area is less than some of the
ranches and forests in the U.S.,‖ Justice Miller found that a legitimate
expectation of privacy exists in Palauan family farms.382 The Court
375
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further noted that the ―open fields‖ doctrine even as applied in the United
States is problematic because it permits police officers to effectively
trespass on citizens‘ land without search warrants.383 The Court stated its
ultimate finding: ―privately-owned land surrounding a residence, as long
as it is not generally accessible or visible to the public, should be protected
from unwarranted searches regardless of whether it would be considered
curtilage under current U.S. law.‖384
In Republic of Palau v. Shmull, the Court considered whether or
not a warrant is required for law enforcement officers to enter a store and
conduct a search.385 In Shmull, three officers were sent to investigate a
report that illegal fish were being offered for sale at a store. 386 When the
officers arrived, the ―Open‖ signed was turned over to ―Closed‖ and one
of the store‘s three entrances were locked.387 As two customers exited one
of the open doors, two of the officers entered, and the third officer entered
through an open back door.388 Justice Miller recited that officers are free
to enter stores that are open to the general public without search warrants,
but that storeowners are free to refuse entry to any persons.389
Justice Miller found that the store owners did not sufficiently
exercise their right to exclude the officers from their store because a third
party arriving on the scene would have felt free to enter through the open
doors and the officers were not verbally told that the store was closed.390
The Court found no constitutional harm in the officers opening the display
freezers once inside the store, as any customer would be permitted to look
at the fish for sale.391
It is sensible that police officers do not need a search warrant to
enter public businesses and other areas generally open to the public. But
the Court‘s holding that store owners may exclude police officers from
their premises could be tested when put to extremes—for instance, a sign
on the door of the store saying ―Open to the Public, but No Police Officers
Allowed‖ or even a sign on a particular freezer within the fish market
forbidding only police officers from opening that specific freezer. Such
383
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hypothetical signs are not readily distinguishable from a shopkeeper‘s oral
request that an officer leave a store, and may well be within a
shopkeeper‘s rights.392
C. Probable Cause and the Issuance and Scope of Warrants
The Appellate Division has imposed a constitutional requirement
for probable cause hearings before the Republic may ―seize‖ an accused
person for extended periods:
Article IV, Sections 4 and 6, of the Palau Constitution
require a judicial determination of probable cause as a
prerequisite to any extended pretrial restraint on the liberty
of an arrested person. What must be determined is whether
there is probable cause to believe a crime has been
committed and that the arrested person has committed it.393
Following United States case law, the Court found that probable cause
hearings do not need be adversarial in order to be constitutional.394 And a
second probable cause hearing is not needed after arrest if a judge has
already found that probable cause existed to issue an arrest warrant.395
The Trial Division has since found that Article IV, Sections 4 and 6 do not
impose a constitutional requirement for a probable cause hearing if the
defendant is not subject to pretrial restraint.396
For a search warrant to issue, probable cause must exist to believe
evidence of a crime or contraband is to be found at the specific premises;
however, probable cause need not exist that the owner or occupier of the
property is involved in the crime.397 This rule is sensible because a
contrary rule would permit wrongdoers to hide their contraband or
criminal tools in the premises of innocent third parties. As the Court
stated, ―the culpability of the occupier of the premises is not an issue when
the court issues a search warrant.‖398 The question, in deciding whether to

392

An officer with a search warrant would have the right to ignore such signs in
executing the warrant.
393

Ngerur v. Sup. Ct. of the Republic of Palau, 4 ROP Intrm. 134, 135-36

(1994).
394

See id. at 136.

395

See id.

396

See Republic of Palau v. Olkeriil, 6 ROP Intrm. 361, 361-62 (Trial Div. 1997)
(Michelsen, J.).
397

Republic of Palau v. S.S. Enters., Inc., 9 ROP 48, 48, 51 (2002).

398

Id. at 51.
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issue a search warrant, is merely ―whether there is probable cause to
believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place.‖399
As long as a judge is the decisionmaker who decides whether to
issue a warrant, a criminal defendant‘s constitutional rights are not
violated if an affidavit in support of a warrant is sworn before a Clerk of
Courts instead of in front of the judge.400 This result is consistent with the
Constitution, which only requires that a warrant must be issued by a
―justice or judge on probable cause supported by an affidavit.‖ The
Constitution does not require the affidavit to be physically sworn before
the judge.
In Masami v. Kesolei, Justice Michelsen found the statutory
provision authorizing members of the Parole Board to issue arrest warrants
when a parolee is alleged to have violated the terms of their parole in
―direct conflict‖ with the constitutional requirement that a warrant for
search or seizure may not issue except from a ―judge or justice.‖401 The
Court also found the statute to be constitutionally infirm because it
permitted the issuance of an arrest warrant on the mere allegation of a
parole violation, a lower threshold than the constitutionally-required
standard of ―probable cause supported by an affidavit.‖402 Because the
arrest warrant in Masami was not issued by a judge or justice, the Court
granted the parolee‘s request for a writ of habeas corpus ordering his
release.403
Justice Miller considered the scope of a search warrant in Republic
of Palau v. Shao Wen Wen.404 The search warrant described the premises,
a beauty salon, as a ―two story concrete building,‖ and the defendants
argued that the description was insufficient to permit the officers to search
all of the apartments and rooms in the building.405 The general rule is that
the search of multiple units at a single address must be supported by
probable cause as to each unit. However, Justice Miller found exceptions
to the general rule in Shao Wen Wen.406 Given that a prostitution arrest
was made in one of the upstairs apartments, the Court found that probable
cause existed for the officers to extend the search to the other upstairs
399

Kotaro v. Republic of Palau, 7 ROP Intrm. 57, 61 (1998).

400

See Republic of Palau v. Tomei, 7 ROP Intrm. 25, 26 (1998).

401

Masami v. Kesolei, 10 ROP 213, 213-14 (Trial Div. 2003) (Michelsen, J.).
The due process analysis of Masami related to the issuance of the arrest warrant may be
found in section VII.G , supra.
402

See id. at 214.

403

See id.

404

Republic of Palau v. Shao Wen Wen, 9 ROP 279 (Trial Div. 2002) (Miller, J.).

405

See id. at 281.

406

See id. at 281-82.
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apartments.407 Furthermore, the Court found that the entire premises may
be searched including separate bedrooms if multiple people share common
living quarters.408
This second ―exception‖ seems particularly suspect, and was
supported by only a citation to a state appellate case from the United
States. It would not seem permissible to search the bedroom of person A
just because person A and person B share a living room where officers
have probable cause to believe that person B harbors evidence of a crime.
The separateness of the bedrooms should be recognized despite the
closeness of the quarters. Person A‘s expectation of privacy in her
bedroom should not be upended because her housemate is suspected of
prostitution.
The Shao Wen Wen Court also rejected the argument that the search
warrant was not sufficiently particularized in describing the items to be
seized.409 The search warrant authorized the seizure of ―evidence of
prostitution including, but not limited to condoms, pornography, sexual
devices and aids, and financial records, receipts, cash as well as articles of
personal property tending to establish the identity of persons in control of
the premises.‖410 Justice Miller found that the direction to seize only
―evidence of prostitution‖ constitutionally specific enough to guide the
officers in their search.411
In addressing the articles seized, the Court stated that, ―the
question whether evidence may be seized pursuant to a search warrant is
distinct from the question whether that evidence will prove defendants‘
guilt or even be deemed admissible at trial.‖412 According to the Court, it
is enough that the officers had ―cause to believe‖ that the seized items
would aid in the apprehension or conviction of persons involved in the
crime of prostitution.413 This last statement may go too far and permit
over-seizure of items when applied too leniently. For instance, the Court
approved the seizure of earrings from the beauty salon, even though it is
hard to imagine how such items would aid in the defendant‘s
conviction.414

407

See id. at 282.

408

See id.

409

See id. at 283.

410

Id.

411

Id. at 283-84.

412

Id. at 285.

413

See id.

414

See id. at 285 n.9 (―accessories‖ to the crime, as quipped by the Court).
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IX. CONFESSIONS AND SELF-INCRIMINATION
Section 7 of Article IV protects two related liberties: the freedom
from forced self-incrimination and from coerced confessions.415 The first
states that a person accused of a criminal offense ―shall not be compelled
to testify against himself.‖416 Although this privilege could be narrowly
construed to protect only in-court testimony, such a construction would
afford relatively little protection.
Similarly, ―[c]oerced or forced
confessions‖ are inadmissible as evidence and a conviction may not be
made ―solely on the basis of a confession without corroborating
evidence.‖417 These two clauses collectively protect accused persons from
compelled confessions, whether they be true or false, made at the police
station or during trial.
A. Freedom from Compelled Self-Incrimination
The freedom from compelled self-incrimination is almost absolute;
it is trumped only where an actual grant of immunity has been bestowed
upon the self-incriminator. Even a high unlikelihood of prosecution does
not prevent the invocation of the constitutional privilege against
compelled self-incrimination.418
The constitutional freedom from
compelled self-incrimination belongs to ―[a] person accused of a criminal
offense.‖ Hearings before the Disciplinary Tribunal, although serious in
nature, are not criminal and therefore those responding to such charges
should not be granted the privilege against compelled self-incrimination
(or at least the basis for the privilege should not be grounded in the
Constitution). The Disciplinary Tribunal has ruled that assertion of the
privilege before the tribunal requires that the person asserting the privilege
(or their counsel) actually assert it before the tribunal.419
415

ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 7.

416

Id.

417

Id.

418

See Secharaimul v. Palau Election Comm’n, 7 ROP Intrm. 246, 248 n.2 (Trial
Div. 1998) (Miller, J.). In Secharaimul, voters who wrongfully voted in a state election
refused to testify in depositions designed to demonstrate that a different candidate could
have won had all unqualified voters been excluded. See id. at 247-48. Justice Miller
recognized the deponents‘ privilege to refuse to testify against themselves despite the
government‘s own confusion in registering voters and the perceived remoteness of the
possibility that the wrongfully registered voters would be prosecuted for voter fraud. See
id. at 248 & n.2.
419

See In re Schluckebier, 13 ROP 35, 38-39 (Disc. Trib. 2006). In
Schluckebier, disciplinary counsel stated that she had spoken to the respondent‘s attorney
and that he had said that his client was asserting his privilege against compelled self-
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B. Inadmissibility of Coerced Confessions as Evidence
―Coerced‖ or ―forced‖ confessions are constitutionally excluded
from evidence ―regardless of whether the statement was given after an
advice of rights, and without a separate inquiry whether such statements
were truthful.‖420 The voluntariness of a confession is measured by a
―totality of the circumstances‖ approach, inspecting both questions of the
capacity of the suspect and the actions of the government. 421 Factors
considered in determining whether the suspect had the requisite ―capacity‖
to voluntarily confess include the suspect‘s age, intelligence, health, and
level of impairment due to drugs or alcohol.422 Actions by the government
that tend to demonstrate an involuntary confession include physical
threats, abuse, deceits, or impossible promises made by the police.423
In Republic of Palau v. Recheluul, the defendant was taken by
police officers to a hotel room rather than to jail in an attempt to secure her
agreement to act as a confidential informant.424 The defendant‘s young
son was with her and was also taken by the police to the hotel room.425
After several hours of questioning, the defendant agreed to make a
statement.426 The government then sought to use the statement against the
defendant at her trial.427 The defendant objected to the admissibility of her
statement, arguing that it was unconstitutionally procured because the
burden of the custody of her young son added undue psychological
pressure for her to cooperate with the police officers and because she was
misled into believing that the police officers were going to use her as a
confidential informant when in actuality they sought her confession to use
against her.428
incrimination. See id. at 38. However, the respondent filed no response to the
disciplinary complaint and the invocation of the privilege was never formally made to the
tribunal. See id. Therefore, the tribunal found that the privilege was not properly
invoked and did not rule on whether the privilege could be invoked by a respondent in a
disciplinary matter. See id. Should the issue be properly presented to the tribunal in the
future, it should decline to find a constitutional privilege against self-incrimination in
civil disciplinary proceedings.
420

Republic of Palau v. Recheluul, 10 ROP 205, 207 (Trial Div. 2002)
(Michelsen, J.).
421

Id.

422

See id.

423

See id.

424

See id. at 206.

425

See id.

426

See id.

427

See id. at 208.

428

See id. at 207-08.
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The Court rejected the defendant‘s constitutional arguments,
finding that the child was adequately cared for during the interrogation
and that the police officers did not attempt to use the presence of the
defendant‘s child against her.429 The Court further found that the police
officers were seeking to use the defendant as a confidential informant and
not merely seeking to elicit her confession.430 However, citing statutory
authority, the Court suppressed the defendant‘s statement because the
police officers denied the defendant‘s request to make a telephone call to
her family during the course of the interrogation.431
The Appellate Division took up contemplation of the voluntariness
of statements made to the police in Wong v. Republic of Palau, and, similar
to the Recheluul decision, found the statements to be voluntary.432 The
Wong defendant was found guilty of the first degree murder of his
cellmate at Koror Jail.433
In Wong, a guard found the defendant‘s cellmate badly beaten, and
asked the defendant either, ―What have you done to him?‖ or ―What
happened to him?‖434 The defendant responded that he had ―hurt‖ or ―hit‖
his cellmate.435 While walking the defendant out of the jail to a different
building, the officer told the defendant to ―relax, relax.‖436 The defendant
explained that a fight had unfolded after his cellmate had taken his
compact disc, refused to return it, and had threatened to beat him up.437
The defendant was given an hour to calm down before the officer read him
his constitutional rights.438
The Court held that these statements should not be suppressed
because the defendant‘s statements were not the result of ―interrogation‖
by the police.439 ―[C]ustodial interrogation is inherently coercive,‖ and
therefore ―a defendant in police custody must be advised of his right to
remain silent and right to counsel before interrogation begins.‖ 440 The
429

See id. at 208.

430

See id.

431

See id. at 208-09 (citing 18 PNC §§ 218, 220). Given this statutorily-based
suppression, it was unnecessary for Justice Michelsen to indulge in any constitutional
discussion.
432

Wong v. Republic of Palau, 11 ROP 178 (2004).

433

See id. at 181.

434

See id. at 180.

435

See id.

436

Id.

437

See id. at 181.

438

See id.

439

See id. at 181-82.

440

Id. at 182.
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Court cited to 18 PNC § 218,441 stating that it codifies the ―reading of
rights‖ rule of the United States case of Miranda v. Arizona442 and
therefore permits the consultation of United States authorities.443 The
Court stated the following regarding interrogation:
Interrogation includes ―either express questioning or its
functional equivalent,‖ which is defined as ―any words or
actions on the part of the police… that the police should
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the subject.‖ Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S.
Ct. 1682, 1689-90 (1980). A defendant is interrogated for
Miranda purposes when ―the inquiry is conducted by
officers who are aware of the potentially incriminating
nature of the disclosures is sought.‖ United States v.
Morales, 834 F.2d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1987). However, the
Miranda Court distinguished ―[g]eneral on-the-scene
questioning as to facts surrounding a crime‖ as beyond the
reach of the rule laid down in that case. See United States
v. Conley, 779 F.2d 970, 972 (4th Cir. 1985) (quoting
Miranda, 86 S. Ct. at 1629); United States v. Chase, 414
F.2d 780, 781 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding that limited, on-thescene investigative questioning need not be preceded by
Miranda warnings).444
The Court held that the guard‘s initial questioning of the defendant
was ―on-the-scene investigative questioning‖ to ascertain what had
occurred and the extent of the injuries, ―not a question calculated to
extract incriminating statements.‖445
The defendant‘s subsequent
statements, following the guard‘s statement to ―relax,‖ were held to be
―spontaneous‖ statements not responsive to any questioning.446 As a
result, both of the defendant‘s statements were deemed admissible.
The Wong defendant went on to make additional incriminating
statements after advisement of his rights.447 The Court found each of
441

18 PNC § 218(b) requires the advisement of ―any person arrested‖ of their
right to remain silent, right to request the presence of counsel, and right to the services of
the public defender. Although the Recheluul defendant had not been ―arrested‖ for the
attack on his cellmate, the Court applied that statutory section to its ―reading of rights‖
analysis because the defendant was ―in custody.‖
442

Miranda v. Arizona, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).

443

See Wong, 11 ROP at 182 & n.2 (citing Republic of Palau v. Imeong, 7 ROP
Intrm. 257, 259 (Trial Div. 1998) (Michelsen, J.)).
444

Id. at 182.

445

Id.

446

Id.

447

See id. at 181.
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those statements to be admissible because the defendant had been advised
of his rights prior to making the statements.448 The statements that the
defendant made before being advised of his rights did not disable the
defendant from subsequently waiving his rights after advisement and
confessing.449 Assessing the voluntariness of a defendant‘s waiver of his
rights ―requires the court to examine the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether the will of the suspect was overborne by government
coercion.‖450 The ―Wong test‖ for the voluntariness of a confession is
―‗whether the confession was extracted by any sort of threats or violence,
or obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, or by the
exertion of any improper influence.‘‖451 The defendant‘s subsequent
statements were found to be voluntary; therefore, the Court found that the
defendant‘s rights were not violated.452
Nevertheless, Wong leaves unanswered whether the reading of preinterrogation warnings is a constitutional requirement or merely a
statutory one. It is certainly the latter, but it is unclear whether the former
bears upon the issue as well. Given the present statutory nature of the
right, it is best to regard its constitutional nature as undefined, rather than
try to perceive the boundaries of a constitutional guarantee from an
analysis of what was largely a statutory issue.
C. Necessity of Evidence Corroborating a Confession
Article IV, Section 7 prohibits conviction solely based on a
confession without ―corroborating evidence.‖453 Justice Miller, in dictum
and without citation, stated that the Court had previous interpreted this
clause to mean ―that a person should not be convicted where his
confession is the only evidence that a crime was committed.‖454 While a
reasonable interpretation, it is not particularly illuminating.
This
constitutional guarantee is likely largely illusory, as some low quantum of
circumstantial or other evidence will virtually always exist. But where a
person walks off the street and confesses to some remote offense, the
police would at least have to engage in some investigation before a
prosecution could be brought. Hence, unless a defendant waived her
constitutional rights, a prosecution could not be successfully based on a
confession alone.
448

See id. at 183.

449

See id.

450

Id. (citing Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1253 (3d Cir. 1994)).

451

Id. at 183-84 (quoting Hutto v. Ross, 97 S. Ct. 202, 203 (1976)).

452

See id.

453

ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 7.

454

Republic of Palau v. Bells, 13 ROP 216, 218 n.1 (Trial Div. 2005) (Miller, J.).
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X. EXAMINATION AND COMPULSION OF WITNESSES
Section 7 of Article IV guarantees a person accused of a criminal
offense a ―full opportunity to examine all witnesses‖ as well as ―the right
of compulsory process for obtaining witnesses and evidence on his behalf
at public expense.‖455 This ―examination clause‖ protects criminal
defendants from anonymous accusers as well as provides a powerful tool
to enlist witnesses in their defense.456
The Appellate Division addressed the right of a criminal defendant
to ―examine all witnesses‖ in Rechucher v. Republic of Palau.457 A
victim‘s written statement was admitted at trial even though the victim
testified at trial that she could no longer remember some of the events in
question.458 The defendant challenged the statement as hearsay and its
admittance as violative of his constitutional examination clause right
because the victim could not be effectively questioned.459 Despite
differences between the constitutions, the Court found United States
confrontation clause case law instructive.
The Court quoted language from the United States Supreme Court
that ―when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the
Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior
testimonial statements.‖460 The Rechucher Court recognized that the
Crawford decision abrogated the earlier test set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts461 to determine whether admitting
hearsay evidence violates the ―confrontation clause.‖462 However, the
455

ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 7.

456

In an (unisolated) instance of post-facto ―Americanizing‖ of the Palauan
Constitution, the right to ―examine all witnesses‖ has been referred to as the
―Confrontation Clause‖ (a nod to the Sixth Amendment to the United State Constitution‘s
guarantee that an accused in a criminal case shall have the right ―to be confronted with
the witnesses against him‖). The Palauan clause is more properly known as the
―examination clause.‖
457

Rechucher v. Republic of Palau, 12 ROP 51 (2005).

458

See id. at 52-53.

459

See id. at 55.

460

Id. at 57 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1369 n.9 (2004)).

461

Ohio v. Roberts, 100 S. Ct. 2531 (1980).

462

See Rechucher, 12 ROP at 57. Under the Roberts test:

[H]earsay can be admitted, consistent with the Confrontation Clause in
the United States Constitution and thus consistent with the right to
examine witnesses granted by the Palau Constitution, if (1) the
declarant is unavailable and (2) the statement bears adequate indicia of
reliability.
Id. at 56 (citing Roberts, 100 S. Ct. at 2538-39). In Crawford:
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Rechucher Court still engaged in a full Roberts analysis, stating that it
need not choose between the Roberts or the Crawford approach because
Crawford did not apply because no confrontation clause violation can
occur if the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial.463 This
reading of Crawford confuses the issue. Crawford abrogated the Roberts
test and therefore a finding of no constitutional impropriety under
Crawford means that no constitutional impropriety is present, not that
Crawford does not apply to a particular case.
Chief Justice Ngiraklsong has since cited Crawford for the
proposition that ―testimonial statements, including custodial police
statements, cannot be admitted against a co-defendant because such
statements violate the co-defendant‘s right to confront witnesses against
him.‖464 Therefore, a co-defendant‘s statements to police are not
admissible to the extent that the statements regard the actions of the
declarant‘s co-defendant.465
In a similar vein as Rechucher, the Court established that the
examination clause is generally satisfied by a criminal defendant‘s
opportunity to cross-examine a witness. In Ngiraked v. Republic of Palau
the prosecution initially interviewed a witness, but then the interview tapes
were inadvertently destroyed.466 The defendants were not able to examine
the tapes; however, the witness was called at trial and testified. The
defendants alleged that the destruction of the interview tapes violated their
right to ―full opportunity to examine all witnesses.‖467 The Court looked
to United States case law without ruling whether the Palauan examination
clause grants more rights than its counterpart in the United States
confrontation clause.468 The Court ruled that the lack of production of a

[T]he [United States] Supreme Court divided hearsay statements into
testimonial and nontestimonial: admission of nontestimonial hearsay is
―wholly consistent‖ with the Constitution, but testimonial hearsay
evidence may only be admitted if the declarant is unavailable and if
there was a prior opportunity for cross-examination.
Id. (citing Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374).
463

See id. at 57.

464

Republic of Palau v. Avenell, 13 ROP 266, 267 (Trial Div. 2006)
(Ngiraklsong, C.J.) (citing Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374).
465
466

See id. at 267-68.
Ngiraked v. Republic of Palau, 5 ROP Intrm. 159 (1996).

467

See id. at 170. The Ngiraked defendants further alleged that the destruction
of the tapes violated their due process rights. For more on that aspect of the decision, see
section VII.H, supra.
468

See id. at 170-71.
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witness statement does not violate the examination clause where the
defense is permitted to cross-examine a witness at trial.469
Although usually analyzed under the guise of due process,470 the
government‘s non-disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant
can raise examination clause issues if the defendant is impeded from
calling the informant as a witness. Nonetheless, no examination clause
concerns are present if the court informs the defendant that the
confidential informant may be called.471 Lastly, the examination clause
does not carry with it the right for a defendant to demand that the
government call a certain witness.472
XI. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Constitution secures an ―accused‖ the right to counsel in
Article IV, Section 7: ―At all times the accused shall have the right to
counsel. If the accused is unable to afford counsel, he shall be assigned
counsel by the government.‖473 The Constitution leaves open the
questions of when the right to counsel attaches, how ―effective‖ counsel
must be, when an accused is deemed ―unable‖ to afford counsel, and even
who qualifies as ―counsel.‖ Case law has made steps to answer some of
the questions, but significant issues await resolution. The right to counsel
– appointed or otherwise – does not extend to civil cases, as civil litigants
are not ―accused.‖ 474
A. The Right to Appointed Counsel
The right to ―appointed counsel‖ only comes into play when the
accused is ―unable to afford counsel.‖ A proper showing of inability to
afford counsel must be supported by sufficient evidence; a court is not
obligated to accept a defendant‘s conclusory, unsworn statements of
469

See id. at 171-72.

470

See section VII.I, supra.

471

See, e.g., Ngirailild v. Republic of Palau, 11 ROP 173, 175 (2004) (finding no
constitutional violation where ―the defense was told explicitly that it could call the
informant as a witness.‖).
472

See Oiterong v. Republic of Palau, 9 ROP 195, 198 (2002) (―There is no right
for the defendant to compel the government to call the informant as a witness.‖ (footnote
omitted)).
473
474

ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 7.

Emaudiong v. Arbedul, 4 ROP Intrm. 200, 200 n.2 (1994) (stating that
litigants–even indigent litigants–in civil cases have no constitutional right to a waiver of
transcription fees).
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poverty.475 Although the right to appointed counsel does not amount to a
right to ―level the playing field,‖ indigent criminal defendants should, on a
proper showing of inability to pay, be afforded other considerations—such
as waiver of transcription fees—in order to ensure that they receive a fair
trial.
Appointed counsel, although required to be zealous advocates, are
not conscripted into slavery. They need not press frivolous appeals on
behalf of their clients. Upon determination that a filed appeal is frivolous,
appointed counsel is to make a ―no merit‖ motion accompanied by a brief
setting forth anything in the record that might arguably support the
appeal.476 The brief must be served on the client and the client must be
given an opportunity to rebut anything in the motion or the brief.477 The
court then decides whether the appeal is frivolous and therefore worthy of
dismissal or non-frivolous and worthy of continued representation.478 This
procedure safeguards the client‘s right to an attorney while also
recognizing an attorney‘s duty to refrain from engaging in frivolous
arguments.479 It should be noted, however, that in balancing these or any
other competing interests, a thumb should always be placed on the side of
the scale favoring the constitutional right.
B. The Qualifications and Effectiveness of Counsel
In Republic of Palau v. Decherong, the Appellate Division looked
to a memorandum issued by Chief Justice Nakamura to determine whether
a criminal defendant‘s right to counsel had been violated by representation
by a non-attorney ―trial counselor‖ rather than a full attorney.480 Trial
counselors, also referred to as trial assistants, are non-attorneys who
effectively act in the place of attorneys in both trial and pre-trial
proceedings. In 1983, the Chief Justice issued a memorandum to the
Attorney General and the Public Defender that outlined the Supreme
475

Wolff v. Ngiraklsong, 9 ROP 20, 20 (2001) (stating that a prior representation
of a defendant by the Office of the Public Defender does not demonstrate inability to
afford counsel, as that office ―has a longstanding practice of attempting to represent all
criminal defendants who ask for counsel, regardless of need.‖).
476

Orrukem v. Republic of Palau, 5 ROP Intrm. 256, 257 (1996) (stating where
counsel determines before filing a criminal appeal that it would be frivolous, counsel
should file the appeal and proceed with a no-merit brief).
477

Id.

478

Id.

479

See In re Tarkong, 4 ROP Intrm. 121, 132 (Disc. Trib. 1994) (ordering
attorney to reimburse client for the monetary sanctions imposed for filing a frivolous
appeal in a civil case).
480

Republic of Palau v. Decherong, 2 ROP Intrm. 152, 161 (1990).
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Court‘s policy on the use of such trial counselors. The memorandum
stated that trial counselors were to only handle criminal cases where the
possible maximum punishment would not exceed five years.481 The
memorandum further stated that this limitation necessarily restricted the
use of trial counselors to cases assigned to the Court of Common Pleas.482
The Decherong defendant was represented by a trial counselor at
her plea hearing despite facing a maximum of thirty years‘ imprisonment
in violation of the Chief Justice‘s policy memorandum.483 The Appellate
Division found that the guilty plea was void for violation of the policy set
forth by the memorandum, but drew short of actually injecting the
memorandum‘s policy with constitutional significance.484
The majority separately considered the defendant‘s constitutional
right to ―effective‖ assistance of counsel. The Court ruled that such
challenges are to be brought by collateral attack through a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus rather than via a direct appeal.485 The Court cited
United States case law for the rationale behind this approach: ineffective
assistance claims usually require development of facts outside the record
and habeas proceedings provide an appropriate format for such
development.486 A trial court‘s failure to take sua sponte notice of
―obviously‖ inadequate representation, however, could properly be
brought on direct appeal as it involves the actions of the trial judge rather
than defense counsel.487 Therefore, ―as a matter of policy, future claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel [shall] be brought via a writ, unless the
claimed conduct of counsel is so egregious as to amount to ‗plain
error.‘‖488
In concurrence, Justice Ngiraklsong complained that the majority
permitted the Chief Justice to ―establish ‗judicial policy‘ by memoranda
481

See id. at 160-61.

482

See id. at 161.

483

See id.

484

Id. (―Because appellant‘s guilty pleas were ultimately taken in the Trial
Division of the Supreme Court, defendant‘s representation by a trial counselor in that
court violates the procedure established in the 1983 memorandum from the Chief
Justice.‖). In doing so, the Court regarded the memorandum as a ―court rule,‖ the
violation of which could result in the reversal of a conviction, but avoided the
constitutional issue. Furthermore, the Court stated that it was unclear whether the trial
counselor was retained or appointed. Id. at 154. But retention of a trial counselor could
not violate the defendant‘s constitutional right to counsel, for such retention would be the
defendant‘s choice and act as a waiver of any right to representation by a full-fledged
attorney.
485

Id. at 167-68.

486

Id. at 167.

487

Id. at 167-68.

488

Id. at 168 (citation omitted).
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regarding constitutional issues such as effectiveness of counsel.‖489
Justice Ngiraklsong felt that, given the purpose of the right to counsel,
which is to ensure that a criminal defendant does not suffer as a result of
ignorance of the law, the Decherong defendant was constitutionally
entitled to the assistance of an attorney rather than a trial counselor.490
Although he concurred in the outcome, Justice Ngiraklsong voiced his
opinion that the policy of the use of trial counselors should be formed by
the legislature or through judicial opinions, not by a memorandum.491
Following Decherong, the ―right to counsel‖ guarantee of Article
IV, Section 7 has been specifically construed to ―confer a right to effective
assistance of counsel‖ and ―to give rise to a constitutional claim where
counsel‘s performance was deficient and the deficiency prejudiced the
defense.‖492 In Saunders v. Republic of Palau, the Appellate Division
confirmed the dictum of Decherong directing ineffective assistance of
counsel claims to be made by collateral attack rather than on direct
appeal.493 Only where the ―record is sufficiently developed‖ to allow a
reviewing court to rule on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
without any additional evidence is it proper to bring such a claim by direct
appeal.494 This holding clarifies the Decherong dictum stating that direct
appeal is appropriate where ―plain error‖ by the trial court occurs.495
Citing Saunders, Chief Justice Ngiraklsong stated that ineffective
assistance of counsel claims cannot be brought or resolved until after
judgment is entered in the trial court because no prejudice can be
489

Id. at 170 (Ngiraklsong, J., concurring).
succeeded Chief Justice Nakamura as Chief Justice.

Justice Ngiraklsong has since

490

Id. at 171.

491

Id. at 172.

492

Saunders v. Republic of Palau, 8 ROP Intrm. 90, 90-91 (1999).

493

Id. at 91.

494

Id. at 92.

495

Id. at 92 n.5 (citing Decherong, 2 ROP Intrm. at 167-68). The Saunders
decision does not, however, limit ineffective assistance of counsel claims to actions of
counsel, rather than actions of the trial court. A trial court could limit counsel‘s ability to
defend her client so stringently that the defendant is deprived of effective assistance of
her counsel. Such a possibility was overlooked in Ngirailild v. Republic of Palau, 11
ROP 173, 174 (2004) (―[A]n ineffective assistance claim turns on decisions made and
actions taken by counsel, not by the court.‖). The Ngirailild Court should not have
summarily rejected the appellant‘s claim that the trial court‘s order to limit disclosure of
the identity of a confidential informant to defense counsel and not to the defendant
violated his right to effective assistance of counsel. While that order may not have
violated the defendant‘s constitutional right to counsel, an order severely restricting the
length of time defense counsel could speak to a defendant (or another similarly stringent
restriction) could—by the act of the court, not the act of counsel—violate the defendant‘s
right to effective assistance of counsel.
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demonstrated before that time.496 Although the record is usually
inadequate for a trial court to assess the effectiveness of counsel, and few
attorneys would move for a finding of their own ineffectiveness, a trial
judge should be free to find ineffective assistance when the ineffectiveness
of counsel is clear from conduct before the judge. A trial judge should not
be forced to turn a blind eye to gross ineffectiveness, find the defendant
guilty, and hope that justice is served on collateral attack.
An important aspect of the constitutional right to counsel is the
right to an attorney unencumbered by conflicts of interest.497 In
safeguarding the right to counsel, a court may refuse to accept a criminal
defendant‘s waiver of her attorney‘s conflicts.498 The rejection of such a
waiver is questionable and perhaps overly paternalistic because a criminal
defendant‘s right to counsel is wholly waivable. By extension, it seems
reasonable that a facet of that right—the right to unconflicted counsel—
should also be waivable.

496

Republic of Palau v. Wolff, 10 ROP 180, 181 (Trial Div. 2002) (Ngiraklsong,
C.J.) (stating that ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be raised in post-trial
habeas proceedings). Even given the perceived prematurity of the motion, the Chief
Justice found that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim could not stand where it was
the actions of the defendant that ―destroyed‖ the attorney-client relationship. See id. at
182-83.
497

See generally Republic of Palau v. Taunton, 15 ROP 170 (Trial Div. 2008)
(Ngiraklsong, C.J.).
498

See id. at 174-75 (adopting the holding of Wheat v. United States, 108 S. Ct.
1692, 1698-99 (1988)).
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XII. DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE
Section 6 of Article IV states that ―[n]o person shall be placed in
double jeopardy for the same offense.‖499 This relatively simple statement
raises substantial questions, such as when it is applicable, when jeopardy
attaches, and what qualifies as the ―same offense.‖ The Supreme Court
has resolved these questions to some degree.
A. Jeopardy Limited to Criminal Prosecutions
The double jeopardy clause is a right to be free from criminal
prosecution. As the Court declared in Sugiyama v. Republic of Palau:
―The Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit multiple civil actions by
the government.‖500 In Sugiyama, officers confiscated two illegally
undersized sea creatures from a restaurant and the Trial Division imposed
a civil fine of $1,000 per illegal sea creature upon each of the three
defendants: the employee who procured the sea creatures, the employee‘s
supervisor, and the owner of the restaurant.501 Although the Sugiyama
proceeding may have been facially ―civil‖ in nature, the defendants argued
that the ―penalties‖ imposed were punitive in purpose.502 Despite the
Court‘s dicta to the contrary, it seems that multiple suits seeking civil
penalties may raise constitutional questions.503
Thus, careful
consideration of the nature of a proceeding must form the basis of any
499

ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 6.

500

Sugiyama v. Republic of Palau, 9 ROP 5, 7 (2001).

501

Id. at 6.

502

The Marine Protection Act of 1994 provides for civil penalties in 27 PNC §
1210. The owner of the restaurant in Sugiyama claimed a double jeopardy violation
because he paid three fines in total—his own fine plus the fines of his employees. Id. at
7. The Appellate Division was unimpressed, stating that ―[t]he fact that one defendant
chooses to pay the others‘ fines does not result in violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.‖ Id. This result is sensible because defendants could otherwise raise double
jeopardy violations by conspiring to have one defendant pay the fines of all codefendants. Double jeopardy is analyzed based on whom the punishment is assessed
against, not based on who actually pays the fine.
503

Double jeopardy considerations should likewise apply to restitution awards in criminal
actions. In Blanco v. Republic of Palau, 16 ROP 205 (2009), the Appellate Division left
open the question of whether a subsequent upward modification of restitution damages
violates the double jeopardy clause. See Blanco, 16 ROP at 208. Because the Appellate
Division disallowed the upward modification in restitution on non-constitutional grounds
(finding that the Trial Division‘s jurisdiction to modify the sentence expired seven days
after imposition of the sentence per ROP R. CRIM. P. 35), it properly declined to address
the double jeopardy implications of the modification of a restitution award five months
after sentencing.
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double jeopardy analysis.
B. The Attachment of Jeopardy
In wrestling with the question of whether jeopardy had attached,
the Appellate Division laid much of the foundation for later interpretations
of the double jeopardy clause in the early case of Akiwo v. Supreme Court
of the Republic of Palau Trial Division.504 Upon defense counsel‘s motion
that the prosecuting attorney was not qualified to serve as special
prosecutor, the Akiwo defendant‘s first prosecution ended in dismissal
after the presentation of the first witness.505 A second information was
then filed and the defendant objected on grounds of double jeopardy per
Article IV, Section 6.506 Citing United States case law, the Court outlined
the interests involved in the double jeopardy clause:
The double jeopardy provision manifests a constitutional
policy of finality in criminal proceedings for the benefit of
the defendant. If a defendant is acquitted, or if he is
convicted and the conviction is upheld on appeal, he may
not be retried for the same offense. In cases culminating in
an acquittal, this will prevent the Government from having
another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to
offer in the earlier proceeding.507
The Court also noted that a defendant has the right to have her guilt or
innocence decided in a single proceeding in front of a particular tribunal,
that the government should not be allowed multiple attempts to prosecute,
and that a defendant should not be punished multiple times for the same
offense.508 However, these interests must be balanced against ―society‘s
interests in the fair and prompt administration of justice.‖509
The Court found two general rules in United States case law: (1)
―[w]hen a mistrial is declared upon the motion of defendant, or otherwise
with his consent, the general rule is that the double jeopardy bar to
reprosecution is removed‖ except where the reason for the mistrial is
prosecutorial or judicial misconduct intended to provoke the defendant
504

Akiwo v. Sup. Ct. of the Republic of Palau Trial Division, 1 ROP Intrm. 96

505

Id. at 97-98.

506

Id. at 98.

507

Id. at 99 (citations omitted).

508

Id. at 99-100.

509

Id. at 100.

(1984).
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into moving for a mistrial, and (2) ―[w]hen a mistrial is declared over a
defendant‘s objection or where he has not consented to the mistrial, the
general rule is that double jeopardy bars retrial‖ except where mistrial was
justified by ―manifest necessity.‖510 The Court found that jeopardy
(―exposure to danger‖) had attached in Akiwo (a bench trial) because the
first witness had been sworn and had given testimony.511 However, the
Court ruled that the defendant could be retried because the motion for
dismissal could have been brought before jeopardy attached and the Trial
Division specifically stated that the Government could re-file the case.512
C. Multiple Punishments
Aside from barring multiple prosecutions, the double jeopardy
clause also protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.
This guarantee raises the issue of how to define a single ―offense‖ and
when multiple charges are permissible. In Kazuo v. Republic of Palau,
the Appellate Division laid out its analysis of this issue in concluding that
aggravated assault and use of a firearm constitute different offenses and
are therefore separately punishable.513 In its analysis, the Appellate Court
applied the so-called ―Blockburger test,‖ imported from the United
States.514 The Blockburger test finds that two offenses are ―separate‖ if
each of the offenses requires proof of a different statutory element. 515 A
single act can therefore be punished as two separate offenses without
offending the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.516
510

Id. at 101.

511

Id. at 102.

512

Id. at 104-05. Jeopardy has attached—and retrial is barred by the double
jeopardy clause—where the appellate court overturns a conviction for lack of legally
sufficient evidence. See Republic of Palau v. Tmetuchl, 1 ROP Intrm. 443, 465 (1988)
(noting that retrial was barred where Appellate Division overturned the convictions of the
alleged assassins of Palau‘s first President for lack of reasonable evidence). Justice King,
writing separately, opined that the majority‘s application of the double jeopardy clause to
pre-deny retrial of the defendants was premature. See id. at 511-13 (King, J., concurringin-part and dissenting in-part). Although unnecessary dictum, the majority likely made
this note to discourage further prosecution in a politically and emotionally charged case.
(Justice King opined that the prosecutorial misconduct in the case was so great that the
convictions should be overturned for a violation of Article IV, Section 6‘s due process
guarantee. See id. at 506-07.)
513

Kazuo v. Republic of Palau, 3 ROP Intrm. 343 (1993).

514

See id. at 346-47 (citing Blockburger v. United States, 52 S. Ct. 180 (1932)).

515

See id.

516

See id. at 347. Quite sensibly, ―[i]f the two convictions are based on different
acts then the Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated.‖ Mechol v. Republic of Palau, 9
ROP 17, 19 (2001). The defendant in Mechol had forged the Director of the Palau
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The Court applied the test to find separate offenses because each
offense required proof of an element that the other did not.517 Specifically,
aggravated assault requires an unlawful assault while the use of a firearm
requires use of a gun.518 The Court further noted that the legislative intent
did not favor a fifteen-year mandatory minimum which accompanies ―use
of a firearm‖ to envelope all crimes involving the use of a firearm. The
Court sensibly concluded that ―[a] person who shoots a human and is
convicted of Aggravated Assault and Use of a Firearm would face no
greater sentence than the person who shoots a beer can on a tree stump and
is convicted of only Use of a Firearm.‖519
In an earlier opinion, Republic of Palau v. Ngiraboi, the Court had
held that attempted murder in the second degree merged with use of a
firearm because the ―same evidence‖ was required to establish each of
those offenses in that case.520 The Kazuo decision overruled Ngiraboi to
the extent it was inconsistent, thereby eviscerating the ―same evidence‖
test for future offenders. However, because Kazuo broke new ground in
applying the Blockburger test, the Court applied the old ―same evidence‖
rule of Ngiraboi to the Kazuo defendant and vacated the sentence on
aggravated assault.521 While applying an overruled standard to a
constitutional issue is questionable, the Ngiraboi ―same evidence‖ test
resulted in a more favorable result to the Kazuo defendant than the KazuoBlockburger test, so no harm was visited on the defendant‘s rights.522
The Appellate Division further refined the double jeopardy right in
Scott v. Republic of Palau.523 The defendant in Scott was convicted of
four counts of arson after a fire she set in one apartment spread and

Maritime Agency‘s signature on fishing permits and then later photocopied his own
signature onto the same permits in an attempt to conceal the forgeries. See id. The
Appellate Division found that these two acts constituted separate offenses and therefore
could be separately punished without violation of the double jeopardy clause. See id.
517

See Kazuo, 3 ROP Intrm. at 347.

518

See id.

519

Id. at 348.

520

Republic of Palau v. Ngiraboi, 2 ROP Intrm. 257, 272 (1991).

521

Kazuo, 3 ROP Intrm. at 349.

522

The Court engaged in dicta in a footnote, stating that ―[w]here the question is
whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents a subsequent prosecution following an
acquittal or conviction,‖ the subsequent prosecution will be barred if, in order to establish
any element of an offense charged in that prosecution, the government will prove conduct
that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted. See id.
at 348 n.3. Because this scenario was not even tangentially before the Court, the Court
should have refrained from commentary or said merely that a different rule may apply in
such a situation.
523

Scott v. Republic of Palau, 10 ROP 92 (2003).
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destroyed numerous adjacent buildings.524 The Court recounted that the
double jeopardy clause protects three separate interests: to avoid being
tried, convicted, or punished for the same offense more than once. 525 The
issue in Scott was whether the defendant was subjected to multiple
punishments for the same offense. While recognized as good law, the
Kazuo-Blockburger test was not applied because its application is limited
to when a defendant is tried under two different statutory provisions.
Conversely, the Scott defendant was convicted four times under a single
statutory provision.526 The Court therefore sought to determine what ―unit
of prosecution‖ was intended by the statutory provision. This approach is
also referred to elsewhere as the ―same transaction‖ test.527
The arson statute punishes every person who, with the requisite
intent, ―set[s] fire to or burn[s] any [building].‖528 The Court inspected
whether the ―unit of prosecution‖ intended by the statute was the act of
―setting fire to or burning‖ or whether it focused on ―any building.‖529
After attempting to review the legislative history (and finding none) and
identifying an analogue in United States law, the Court concluded that the
proper unit of prosecution was the act of setting the fire. Therefore,
―where a defendant starts only one fire, the statute permits only one
conviction.‖530 The Appellate Division found that two of the defendant‘s
arson convictions violated her double jeopardy rights because only one
fire was set.531
The terms ―multiplicity‖ and ―duplicity‖ are sometimes employed
when referring to double jeopardy violations:
Multiplicity of charges refers to the improper charging of
the same offense in several counts in the information. This
should not be confused with duplicity, which is the
charging of separate offenses in a single count.532
The Scott Court found that the sentences imposed for the remaining two
arson counts were multiplicitous because only one crime had actually been
524

Id. at 94.

525

Id. at 96.

526

See id.

527

See id. & n.4.

528

17 PNC § 401(a).

529

See Scott, 10 ROP at 96-97.

530

Id. at 97.

531

See id.

532

Republic of Palau v. Avenell, 13 ROP 268, 269 n.2 (Trial Div. 2006)
(Ngiraklsong, C.J.) (citations omitted).
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committed.533 The first count charged the arson of a dwelling and the
apartments, including a laundry and two salons.534 The second count
charged the arson of an office and the apartments, including a laundry and
two salons.535 The only difference between the counts was the presence of
the ―dwelling‖ in the first count, thereby subjecting the defendant to the
enhanced penalty provision applicable only to arson of dwellings. The
Court found the charges multiplicitous and vacated the sentence that
resulted from the conviction of the latter count.536
Chief Justice Ngiraklsong addressed a multiplicity argument in a
later case in which the defendant had removed a porthole and possibly
other items from a shipwreck in the Palau Lagoon.537 The government
charged, in separate counts, violation of the Palau Lagoon Monument Act,
grand larceny, malicious mischief, conversion of public funds and
property, and improper removal from territorial waters.538 Despite finding
that the issue of multiplicity was waived because the defendant did not file
a timely motion, the Court went on to analyze the hypothetical merits of
the defendant‘s arguments.539
The Chief Justice identified three protections afforded by the
double jeopardy clause: ―against a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal, against a second prosecution for the same offense
after conviction, and against multiple punishments for the same
offense.‖540 Even though multiplicity in charging does not fall into any of
the three categories, it offends the double jeopardy clause because it
creates the potential for multiple punishments for a single offense.541
Applying the Kazuo-Blockburger test, Chief Justice Ngiraklsong found no
double jeopardy violation because each of the charges required proof of
separate elements.542
The appellant in Uehara v. Republic of Palau alleged the
government‘s charging document was duplicitous because Counts 87-89
(perjury) and Counts 90-92 (misconduct in public office) were each
533

See Scott, 10 ROP at 98.

534

Id.

535

Id.

536

Id. at 99.

537

See Avenell, 13 ROP at 269.

538

Id.

539

Id. at 270.

540

Id.

541

Id. at 270 n.4.

542

Id. at 271-72 (―[I]t is possible to violate the Palau Lagoon Monument Act
without committing grand larceny, and it is possible to commit grand larceny without
violating the Palau Lagoon Monument Act.‖).

84

Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal

[Vol. 12:2

contained in a single paragraph.543 The Appellate Division defined
duplicity as ―where a single count charges the defendant with more than
one criminal offense‖ and stated it is ―troublesome because it may be
unclear whether a subsequent conviction rests on merely one of the
offenses within a single count and, if so, which one.‖544 Upon reviewing
the information, the Uehara Court found no double jeopardy violation
because although three counts were consolidated into one paragraph, each
count was separated within the paragraph.545
D. Double Jeopardy Implications of Suspended Sentences
A later imposition of a suspended sentence does not violate a
defendant‘s double jeopardy rights, even if the entirety of the sentence is
imposed (e.g., the defendant does not receive credit for the time during
which the sentence was suspended). In Blesoch v. Republic of Palau, the
appellant, Blesoch, pled guilty to two counts of trafficking of a controlled
substance.546 On August 12, 2008, the Trial Division sentenced Blesoch to
three years imprisonment, but suspended the entire sentence and placed
the defendant on probation for that period.547
After more than a year on probation, on August 28, 2009, Blesoch
pled guilty to five new charges (larceny, burglary-related, and traffic
offenses) and was sentenced to five years in prison on these new
convictions, but the Trial Division suspended the final three years of the
sentence (and ordered probation for that time).548 These 2009 convictions
constituted violations of Blesoch‘s 2008 probation and, at an October 14,
2009 revocation hearing, the Trial Division ordered Blesoch to serve one
year of his suspended three-year sentence on the 2008 trafficking
convictions.549 That year of imprisonment was to be served consecutively
to Blesoch‘s two-year prison term for the 2009 convictions.550
Meting out the dates, if Blesoch had served three years in prison
for his trafficking conviction starting on August 12, 2008, he would have
543

Uehara v. Republic of Palau, Crim. App. No. 09-001, slip op. at 13 (Apr. 29,

544

Id. at 13-14.

2010).
545

See id. at 14 (―Even a quick read makes apparent that each paragraph charged
three counts of perjury and three counts of misconduct in public office.‖).
546

Blesoch v. Republic of Palau, Crim. App. No. 09-003, slip op. at 1-2 (May

21, 2010).
547

Id. at 2.

548

Id.

549

Id.

550

Id.

2011]

Bennardo

85

completed his sentence by August 12, 2011. In reality, however, Blesoch
was sentenced to serve two years for the 2009 convictions starting on
August 28, 2009 and then was set to serve his one-year sentence for the
2008 trafficking convictions. Therefore, Blesoch would not finish his
prison sentence on the 2008 trafficking convictions until August 28,
2012—more than four years after he had been sentenced for the 2008
convictions—for which he had only received a sentence of three years.
Blesoch appealed, arguing that this sentencing arrangement violated his
right to be free from double jeopardy. He argued that ―all punishment for
his 2008 offense—whether probation or jail time—must conclude within
three years of the date of the original sentence, that is, by August 12,
2011.‖551
The Appellate Division interpreted Blesoch‘s argument to be that
―he should receive credit against his original three-year prison sentence for
time spent on probation, such that the court cannot impose a prison
sentence that would, when added to his probation, exceed a total of three
years.‖552 The Court rejected this argument, citing United States case law
holding that ―[t]he general rule is that, upon revocation of probation, the
sentencing court may execute the entire sentence that it originally imposed
and suspended.‖553 Upon revocation of a convicted person‘s probation for
violation of its terms, the Trial Division ―has the discretion to impose the
entire suspended prison sentence or any lesser term.‖554 The execution of
a suspended sentence does not violate a defendant‘s double jeopardy rights
because it does not amount to multiple punishments for the same
offense—it is merely the execution of the original punishment.555
XIII.

ADDITIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RIGHTS AND RIGHTS OF THE
ACCUSED
A. Overview

Article IV, Section 7 guarantees numerous rights to ―accused‖
persons. Such basic rights include the right to ―be presumed innocent
until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,‖ the right to ―be informed
of the nature of the accusation,‖ and the right ―to a speedy, public and

551

Id. at 2-3.

552

Id. at 3.

553

Id. at 4.

554

Id. at 5.

555

Id.
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impartial trial.‖556 Accused persons in custody are to be ―separated from
convicted criminals‖ and further separated ―on the basis of sex and
age.‖557 Those in pre-trial custody are guaranteed non-excessive bail.
Section 6 of Article IV prohibits ex post facto punishment, conviction or
punishment by legislation, and imprisonment for debt. Article IV was
amended to include a limited jury-trial right for qualifying criminal
defendants in Section 14.
B. Bail Provision
The Appellate Division has cited the bail provision of Section 7 as
authority to grant post-conviction bail.558 The Constitution, however, only
provides for bail to be set for those ―detained before trial.‖ 559 Section 7
offers no authority to offer and affords no right to request release on bail
after conviction.
C. Habeas Corpus
Article IV, Section 7 ―recognizes‖ the writ of habeas corpus and
prohibits its suspension. Although useful to accused persons in pre-trial
custody,560 the writ of habeas corpus is often invoked by convicted
criminals and others in physical detention.561

556

ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 7.

557

Id. Convicted criminals do not enjoy an explicit constitutional right to be
separated by sex or age.
558

See Republic of Palau v. Tmetuchl, 1 ROP Intrm. 296, 297 (1986) (grant of
bail pending appeal to criminal defendants convicted of murder and conspiracy);
Republic of Palau v. Decherong, 1 ROP Intrm. 438 (1988) (grant of bail and release
pending appeal to defendant convicted by plea to charges of embezzlement).
559

ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 7.

560

See e.g., In re Oiwil, 1 ROP Intrm. 238 (Trial Div. 1985) (Nakamura, C.J.)
(granting writs of habeas corpus to petitioners arrested in Palau on arrest warrants issued
by the United States District Court for the Territory of Guam).
561

The Appellate Division reversed the Trial Division‘s grant of a writ of habeas
corpus in Ringang v. Chiang, 16 ROP 129 (2009). The issuance of the writ was a moot
point, however, because the petitioner‘s conviction had been overturned by the time the
appeal of the issuance of the writ was decided. Despite noting the mootness of the
appeal, the Appellate Division addressed the merits of the appeal and the issuance of the
writ and found that the petitioner had not been denied effective assistance of counsel. See
Ringang, 16 ROP at 131, 133-34.
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D. Liability of National Government for Unlawful Arrest and Damage to
Private Property
Section 7 of Article IV states that ―[t]he national government may
be held liable in a civil action for unlawful arrest or damage to private
property‖ but then limits that liability ―as prescribed by law.‖ 562 In the
early days of the Constitution, the Trial Division ruled that ―prescribed by
law‖ included laws of the Trust Territory government.563 As Justice Lane
stated, ―no requirement is expressed that the Palau Congress must
prescribe them.‖564 Therefore, the Constitution did not supersede the Trust
Territory laws waiving immunity from civil suit.565 The provision
permitting suits against the national government for unlawful arrest or
damage to private property does not apply to a suit for non-payment for
work rendered.566
E. The Accused’s Right to Be Informed of the Nature of the Accusation
An accused person ―enjoy[s] the right to be informed of the nature
of the accusation‖ against her.567 Violation of this right also implicates
due process concerns, discussion of which may be found in section VII.F,
supra.
Charges for minor offenses are often issued by citation. The
defendant in An Guiling v. Republic of Palau, argued that his charge by
citation failed to plead the essential elements of the crime and therefore
violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.568 The constitutional requirement that a
charging instrument must sufficiently allege all essential elements of the
charged offense may not be waived, and therefore may be challenged for

562

ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 7.

563

See Ngirausui v. Nat’l Gov’t of the Republic of Palau, 1 ROP Intrm. 185
(Trial Div. 1985) (Lane, J.).
564

Id. at 186.

565

Id. (applying ROP CONST. ART. XV, § 3(a), which provides that all existing
laws in effect at the time of the Constitution remain in force).
566

See Renguul v. Ililau, 1 ROP Intrm. 188, 190 (Trial Div. 1985) (Sutton, J.)
(―This section clearly is not applicable to the present case.‖). The Renguul case dealt
with a complaint by a plaintiff who had contracted to haul lumber to a sawmill and saw it
to specification in return for a sum of money, but had not been paid for the services. See
id. at 188.
567

ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 7.

568

An Guiling v. Republic of Palau, 11 ROP 132 (2004).
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the first time on appeal.569 On the other hand, an objection that the
charging instrument fails as to its factual specificity may be waived if not
raised at the appropriate juncture.570 As set forth by 18 PNC § 101(c), a
criminal citation briefly describes the criminal charge and instructs the
defendant to appear at a specified time and place to answer the charge.571
The Court of Common Pleas may accept a criminal citation in lieu of a
formal information for misdemeanor offenses.572
The brevity of criminal citations creates the potential for violation
of the constitutional guarantee that an accused has the right to have ―the
offense charged [] set forth with sufficient certainty so that the defendant
will be able to intelligently prepare a defense.‖573 A charging instrument
is also constitutionally required to be specific enough ―to provide
protection against [the defendant] being tried a second time for the same
offense‖ in violation of the double jeopardy clause.574
The An Guiling Court held that the restriction of the use of
criminal citations to ―simple misdemeanors‖ and the issuance of such a
citation ―soon after the offense is committed‖ with a reference to the time
and place of the offense sufficiently ―put[s] the defendant on notice of
charges relating to a particular incident.‖575 The information contained in
the An Guiling defendant‘s citation—the approximate time, date, and
location of the offense and the name of the offense charged (―disturbing
the peace‖)—was held to be sufficient to allow him to prepare his defense
and to protect him from a second trial arising out of the same offense.576
The An Guiling ―simple misdemeanor‖ restriction is worrisome.
The constitutional right to be informed of the charges applies to
misdemeanors as well as felonies. The emphasis must therefore be placed
on the word ―simple‖ rather than the word ―misdemeanors.‖
Misdemeanors may be complex and a brief citation may not pass
constitutional muster for such allegations. Only when the allegations are
simple—and therefore detailed explanation is unnecessary to put the
defendant on notice of the nature of the charges—should the limited
information contained in a criminal citation pass constitutional muster.

569

See id. at 134.

570

See id.

571

See id. at 134-35.

572

See id.

573

Id. at 135.

574

Id.

575

Id.

576

See id. at 136.
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The Accused’s Right to a Speedy Trial

Charging within the statute of limitations does not guarantee that
an accused‘s right to a speedy trial is met.577 The Republic of Palau v.
Decherong majority recognized Palau‘s pre-Constitution adoption of the
four speedy trial factors laid out in Barker v. Wingo:578 length of delay, the
reason(s) for the delay, the defendant‘s assertion of the right to a speedy
trial, and prejudice to the defendant.579 ―[M]ost important[ly],‖ because
the Decherong defendant did not articulate any prejudice caused by the
delay between the start of her prosecution and the planned trial, the
majority found no violation of her speedy trial right despite a seventeen
month delay between arrest and guilty plea.580
The Appellate Division found no merit in the defendants‘
contention that they were denied their constitutional and statutory speedy
trial rights in Republic of Palau v. Sisior.581 A twenty-one month period
intervened between the time of the Sisior defendants‘ arrest and the
issuance of the information charging them with a crime.582 At the time of
their arrest, the defendants signed a statement and were released from
custody.583 Citing Decherong, the Court stated that the speedy trial right is
―relative to the circumstances of the case and permits certain delays.‖584
Because the defendants were not subjected to pre-charging restraint
following arrest, the speedy trial right did not attach until the filing of the
information.585 The Court noted but ultimately did not decide that a delay
in the filing of a charging document could potentially violate the due
process clause of Article IV, Section 6.586 The Court went on to find that
the six and one-half month delay between the filing of the information and
trial was not presumptively prejudicial and did not, under a Decherong577

See Republic of Palau v. Decherong, 2 ROP Intrm. 152, 163 (1990) (―[O]n
rare occasions there are speedy trial considerations even for prosecutions begun within
the limitations period.‖).
578

Barker v. Wingo, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2186-95 (1972).

579

See Decherong, 2 ROP Intrm. at 164 (citing Trust Territory v. Waayan, 7 TTR
560, 563-66 (1977)).
580

See id. at 165-66. Justice Ngiraklsong concurred in the result, but opined that
the Court should not have even engaged in speedy trial analysis because that issue had
not been appealed. See id. at 172-73 (Ngiraklsong, J., concurring).
581

Republic of Palau v. Sisior, 4 ROP Intrm. 152 (1994).

582

Id. at 154.

583

Id.

584

Id. at 158.

585

Id. at 159.

586

Id. at 159 n.1.
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Barker analysis, violate the speedy trial right of the defendants.587
As stated by Chief Justice Ngiraklsong in Republic of Palau v.
Wolff, even a lengthy pre-trial delay does not violate the speedy trial right
if the delay is attributable to the defendant.588 The Chief Justice applied
the Decherong-Barker factors and found that the defendant‘s freedom
from confinement for the entirety of the pre-trial period, the defendant‘s
lack of attempts to press for a trial, and the defendant‘s failure to show
prejudice resulting from the delay all weighed against the finding of a
constitutional violation.589
G. The Accused’s Right to an Impartial Trial
The constitutional right to an ―impartial trial‖ may be more
appropriately labeled the right to an ―impartial judge‖ or ―impartial factfinder,‖ as the trial itself cannot be partial or impartial. A defendant
convicted of rape appealed his conviction on, inter alia, the constitutional
basis that he was denied a ―fair trial‖ by the bias of the trial judge in Liep
v. Republic of Palau.590 In scrutinizing the partiality of the trial judge, the
Liep Court examined the ―entire record‖ of the case to determine whether
it was left with an ―abiding impression‖ of partiality.591 Upon conclusion
of its analysis, the Appellate Division was left with no such ―abiding
impression.‖
Post-Liep, the Appellate Division has employed more stringent
language, stating that a judge‘s bias violates a defendant‘s right to an
impartial trial ―only in the most extreme of cases.‖592 Without hinting at
what those extreme cases might be, the Court quoted a United States case
to say that ―[m]atters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of
interest, would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative
discretion.‖593 If these matters, particularly ―kinship‖ and ―personal bias,‖
are to be taken out of the mix, it would indeed take an ―extreme‖ case for
a judge‘s bias to be found to constitute a constitutional violation.

587

Id. at 160.

588

Republic of Palau v. Wolff, 10 ROP 180, 183-84 (Trial Div. 2002)
(Ngiraklsong, C.J.) (finding thirty month pre-trial delay after the filing of the information
constitutional because the delay was attributable to the defendant‘s health and his offisland travel seeking medical treatment).
589

Id.

590

Liep v. Republic of Palau, 5 ROP Intrm. 5 (1994).

591

Id. at 9.

592

Sandei v. Tungelel Lineage, 8 ROP Intrm. 228, 299 (2000).

593

Id. (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 106 S. Ct. 1580, 1584-85 (1986)).
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H. Ex Post Facto Laws
The ex post facto clause of Article IV, Section 6 ―is violated when
a law defining a crime or increasing punishment for a crime is applied to
events that occurred before its enactment to the ‗disadvantage‘ of the
offender.‖594 The ex post facto clause is not violated by the application of
a statute describing a ―continuing offense‖ to an enterprise that began prior
to, but continued after, the effective date of the statute.595
In Republic of Palau v. Siang, Justice Miller found that the
retroactive application of an extended statute of limitations for criminal
prosecution of grand larceny violated neither the ex post facto nor the due
process clauses of Article IV, Section 6.596 Justice Miller borrowed United
States law to find that prosecution under an extended statute of limitations
does not violate the Constitution unless the time for prosecution had
expired before the extension went into effect.597 Because the three-year
statute of limitations had not run before it was enlarged to six years, the
Court found that the extension to six years was constitutionally
permissible.598
I.

The Accused’s Right to a Jury Trial

The Ninth Amendment added a fourteenth section to Article IV.
Section 14 permits the legislature to provide for jury trials in both criminal
and civil cases.599 The legislature was not previously banned from
instituting jury trial by statute, so this clause of Section 14 carried little
significance. Of more consequence, however, is the second clause of
Section 14 which creates an accused‘s ―right to a trial by jury, as
prescribed by law‖ for criminal offenses alleged to have been committed
after December 31, 2009 and punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of

594

Pamintuan v. Republic of Palau, 16 ROP 32, 41 (2008) (citing Collins v.
Youngblood, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 2718 (1990)).
595

Id. The Pamintuan Court found no ex post facto clause violation in a human
trafficking conviction where the criminalized conduct—―harboring‖ a trafficked
person—continued after the enactment of the statute. Id. at 43.
596

Republic of Palau v. Siang, 10 ROP 202 (Trial Div. 2002) (Miller, J.). The
court need not have reached the constitutional question, however, because it found that
the defendant‘s absence from the Republic tolled the statute of limitations so that neither
the three year (nor extended six year) statute of limitations had run. Id. at 203.
597

Id. at 204.

598

Id.

599

ROP CONST. amend. 9.
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twelve years or longer.600 In calculating the relevant trigger, it is the
alleged offense that must have occurred after December 31, 2009, not the
allegation itself. It is unclear to what degree the legislature could narrow
this right ―as prescribed by law.‖

600

Id.
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XIV. FREEDOM FROM INHUMANE PUNISHMENT AND EXCESSIVE FINES
Article IV, Section 10 prohibits ―[t]orture, cruel, inhumane or
degrading treatment or punishment‖ as well as ―excessive fines.‖601 This
section is not limited to government action—broadly read, it secures
protection from cruel or degrading treatment from private individuals.602
A. Firearm-Related Punishments
Article XIII, section 13(2) requires the legislature to impose a
mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment of fifteen years ―for
violation of any law regarding importation, possession, use or manufacture
of firearms.‖603 Interestingly, the legislature is not required to outlaw
these practices—only to provide for the fifteen-year mandatory minimum
sentence in the event that they are outlawed.604
In Palau‘s post-Constitution, pre-independence days, the Appellate
Division, over a strongly-worded dissent, effectively suspended Article
XIII, Section 13(2)—specifically the fifteen-year mandatory minimum
sentence for possession of a firearm—for violation of the Trusteeship
Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands between the United
States and the United Nations.605 In Kazuo v. Republic of Palau, the Court
read the right to be free from ―cruel and unusual punishment‖ as secured
by the United States Constitution into the Trusteeship Agreement under
the mantle of the agreement‘s guarantee of ―human rights.‖606 Applying
601

ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 10.

602

Appreciating that Article IV, Section 10 includes ―treatment‖ as well as
―punishment,‖ the Appellate Division has stated that the government is prohibited from
employing torture or cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment regardless of the cause (be it
as punishment or because of antipathy or indifference to a person or a group of people).
See Eller v. Republic of Palau, 10 ROP 122, 130 (2003). This reading of the provision is
still overly constricting—by its terms, Article IV, Section 10 prohibits torture, cruel,
inhumane or degrading treatment (or punishment) by anyone, not just by the government.
Article IV secures ―Fundamental Rights,‖ not just fundamental rights vis a vis the
government. The Constitution need not be construed to only limit governmental action—
it may proscribe private action as well.
603

ROP CONST. Art. XIII, § 13(2).

604

Article XIII, Section 12 provides that ―[n]o persons except armed forces
personnel lawfully in Palau and law enforcement officers acting in an official capacity
shall have the right to possess firearms or ammunition unless authorized by legislation
which is approved in a nationwide referendum by a majority of the votes cast on the
issue.‖
But this constitutional section does not provide for punishment for
noncompliance.
605

Kazuo v. Republic of Palau, 1 ROP Intrm. 154 (1984).

606

See id. at 161-64.
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United States case law, the Kazuo majority found that the fifteen-year
mandatory minimum for firearm possession violated that right.607 Justice
Gibson, in dissent, read the Trusteeship Agreement‘s provision that the
administering authority should promote self-governance and recognize the
―freely expressed wishes of the people‖ as giving power and effect to the
Palau Constitution and its imposition of a fifteen-year mandatory
minimum for possession of a firearm.608
In other pre-independence cases, the Court established that the
fifteen-year mandatory minimum for use of a firearm did not violate the
Trusteeship Agreement and therefore was permissible. Again, the analysis
was not under the Palau Constitution, but under the United States
Constitution as imported by the Trusteeship Agreement.609 Indeed, the
same defendant from Kazuo came before the Court again on separate
firearm charges—this time for ―use‖ instead of ―possession‖—and argued
that the fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence for ―use‖ of a firearm
violated the Trusteeship Agreement as cruel and unusual punishment.610
607

See id. at 164-72.

608

See id. at 177-80 (Gibson, J., dissenting). In a concurring opinion in a later
case, Justice Ngiraklsong voiced his disagreement with the majority‘s holding in Kazuo:
I do not see a conflict between Article XIII, Section 13 (2) of the Palau
Constitution with its enabling legislation and the Trusteeship
Agreement. The primary purpose of the Trusteeship Agreement is to
provide ―self government‖ or ―i[n]dependence‖ to the inhabitants of the
Trusteeship. I see the Constitution as perhaps the best living expression
of what the people of Palau want…. I accept and recognize, as I
believe we must, the supremacy of the Palau Constitution.
Republic of Palau v. Ngiraboi, 2 ROP Intrm. 257, 275-76 (1991) (Ngiraklsong, J.,
concurring). Had Justice Ngiraklsong been on the Kazuo panel along with Justice
Gibson, the decision may have turned out far differently.
609

See Republic of Palau v. Ngiraboi, 2 ROP Intrm. 257, 265 (1991) (―The
findings of [] Kazuo v. ROP; Yano v. ROP, 1 ROP Intrm. 154 (App. Div. Nov. 1984),
which are specifically limited to the ‗grave and serious‘ crime of Possession of a Firearm,
are not applicable to a case involving Use of a Firearm.‖); Republic of Palau v. Sakuma, 2
ROP Intrm. 23, 40-41 (1990) (―[Use of a firearm to shoot at an occupied dwelling] is so
fraught with peril to the safety of the Republic‘s citizens, and to the safety of the
Republic of Pal[a]u itself, and the legislative intent is so clear, that the 15 year minimum
sentence does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, irrespective of whether the
sentence is longer than the sentence for other more violent crimes in Palau, and
irrespective of comparisons with foreign jurisdictions.‖); Republic of Palau v. Singeo, 1
ROP Intrm. 551, 560 (1989) (in case where defendant was convicted of use of a firearm
for discharging ammunition in a deserted area: ―Here, appellant clearly used the pistol
and, therefore, Kazuo/Yano simply does not apply. Kazuo/Yano is therefore clearly and
factually distinguisha[]ble from this case. Accordingly, we affirm the Trial Court‘s
sentence imposing 15 years impri[]sonment for use of a pistol.‖). (The Kazuo opinion
involved the consolidated appeal of Kazuo v. Republic of Palau and Yano v. Republic of
Palau. See Kazuo, 1 ROP Intrm. at 154.)
610

See Kazuo v. Republic of Palau, 3 ROP Intrm. 343, 345 (1993) (―Kazuo II‖).
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The Court summarily rejected the argument as previously decided, which,
by that time, it was.611
Although still ―suspended‖ because of its ―conflict‖ with the
Trusteeship Agreement, the fifteen-year mandatory minimum for
possession of a firearm was found constitutional and, specifically, not in
violation of the Article IV, Section 10 prohibition against cruel and
inhumane punishment.612 The Court also upheld the five-year statutory
maximum punishment for possession of ammunition against an Article IV,
Section 10 challenge despite the ―disproportionality‖ of the punishment
for possession of ammunition to the ―suspended‖ punishment for
possession of a firearm.613 The Court stated that, except for instances of
capital punishment, the proportionality approach is not favored and
creation of the boundaries of punishment for separate crimes should
generally be left to the legislature.614
Since Palau gained its independence in 1994 and the Trusteeship
Agreement is no longer in effect, the fifteen-year mandatory minimum
sentence for firearm possession, use, importation, or manufacture
mandated by Article XIII, Section 13(2) cannot be unconstitutional.615
Any future challenges to this provision based on Article IV, Section 10
must fail.616
Because the Constitution requires a punishment of fifteen years of
imprisonment for firearms-related violations, suspension of such a
sentence by the sentencing court is not constitutionally permissible.617
611

Id. (―In [Sakuma] we held that the minimum sentence of fifteen years was not
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.‖). In its double jeopardy analysis, the Kazuo II Court held that Ngiraboi
was overruled to the extent it was inconsistent. See id. at 348-49. This aspect of the
decisions is discussed at section XII.C, supra.
612

See Ngiraboi, 2 ROP Intrm. at 268 (―The Constitutional prohibition against
cruel or inhuma[n]e treatment set forth in Article IV, Section 10 of Palau‘s Constitution
cannot be used to subordinate or delete the equally weighty mandate contained in Article
XIII, Section 13.‖).
613

See id. at 265-68.

614

See id. at 267 (―[Except in extraordinary cases], it would be inappropriate for
this Court to second guess the Legislature as to whether a given sentence of
imprisonment is excessive in relation to the crime.‖).
615

The fifteen year mandatory minimum does not extend to convictions for
attempted firearm possession. See Ongalibang v. Republic of Palau, 8 ROP Intrm. 219,
220 (2000) (reviewing firearms mandatory minimum as a matter of statutory
construction).
616

Indeed, such challenges have always failed. But, pre-independence, the
―cruel and unusual punishment‖ guarantee of the United States Constitution as imported
through the Trusteeship Agreement provided an alternate—and stricter—basis for
challenge.
617

See Ngemaes v. Republic of Palau, 4 ROP Intrm. 250, 252 (1994) (―We
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Nor does a firearm sentence permit work release during the fifteen-year
mandatory period of imprisonment.618 The structure of the work release
system permits prisoners to work during the day, but requires them to
return to and sleep in the jail each night.619 The Parole Reform Act of
1992, however, categorizes work release as a type of ―parole‖ and a
―release from imprisonment.‖620
Because any ―release from
imprisonment‖ would offend the Article XIII, Section 13(2) mandatory
minimum imprisonment requirement, the Court held that work release is
not permissible within the mandatory minimum sentence period.621
Oddly, the Court noted that it was declining to pass on the question of
―whether the Parole Board may parole a convict before the conclusion of
his 15 year term of imprisonment.‖622 It is not odd that the Court declined
to rule on that question—as that question was not before it. But it is odd
that the Court specifically noted that it was declining to rule on that
question, because its holding that any ―release from imprisonment‖ is
impermissible during the mandatory period of imprisonment all but made
the answer to the question a foregone conclusion. Under the current case
law, no parole or release from imprisonment is permissible before the
conclusion of the mandatory minimum sentencing period.
B. Controlled Substance-Related Punishments
A defendant, sentenced to twenty-five years for importing
methamphetamine, challenged the twenty-five year mandatory minimum
sentence for that crime in Eller v. Republic of Palau.623 The Court
deferred strongly to the legislative will:
[A]bsent circumstances that compel the conclusion that a
particular sentence is properly characterized as cruel,
inhumane, or degrading, ―it would be inappropriate for the
Court to second guess the Legislature as to whether a given
believe it plain that the framers of the Constitution intended by this [mandatory minimum
imprisonment] language that the mandated punishment not be subject to suspension.‖).
In Ngemaes, the Appellate Division stated that whether parole before the conclusion of
fifteen years of imprisonment is constitutional is a ―separate question from whether a
sentencing court may suspend a portion of the fifteen year term of imprisonment‖ and
withheld judgment. See id. at 254.
618

See Teriong v. Republic of Palau, 15 ROP 88 (2008).

619

See id. at 90.

620

See id. (quoting 18 PNC § 1202(b)).

621

See id. at 91.

622

Id.

623

Eller v. Republic of Palau, 10 ROP 122, 129 (2003).
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sentence is excessive in relation to the crime.‖624
In considering the severity of a sentence in relation to the offense, it is
appropriate to consider the availability of parole.625 The Court reviewed
the legislative history of the methamphetamine statutes, identified the
legislative will to be tough on drugs, and held that the twenty-five year
mandatory minimum sentence could not be called ―cruel, inhumane, or
degrading‖ by any reasonable standard.626
In reaching this decision the Court did not independently measure
the harshness of the punishment to the severity of the crime—it merely
identified legislative history demonstrating that the legislature had made
an affirmative choice to punish drug importation harshly. Although some
deference to the legislature is appropriate, the Court‘s analysis did not
answer the constitutional question—whether the punishment was cruel,
inhumane or degrading—but rather centered on a different question—
whether the legislature purposefully arrived at the mandatory minimum
sentence. Such deference to the legislature is not appropriate in
constitutional matters.
The Court extended the Eller holding in Silmai v. Republic of
627
Palau.
Basing its decision on the reasoning of Eller regarding
importing methamphetamine, the Silmai Court held that the twenty-five
year mandatory minimum sentence for the crime of trafficking
methamphetamine was constitutional.628
C. Excessive Fines
In Gotina v. Republic of Palau629 the Appellate Division‘s first
application of the excessive fines clause,630 the Court found otherwise
non-excessive fines were not made excessive by the criminal defendants‘
624

Id. at 130 (quoting Republic of Palau v. Ngiraboi, 2 ROP Intrm. 257, 267

(1991)).
625

See id. at 131 & n.9 (considering availability of parole after completion of
one-third of sentence for a sentence for methamphetamine importation).
626

See id. at 131.

627

Silmai v. Republic of Palau, 10 ROP 139 (2003).

628

See id. at 141.

629

Gotina v. Republic of Palau, 8 ROP 65 (1999).

630

In an earlier decision—decided on other grounds—the Appellate Division
stated that forfeiture of a four-million dollar vessel for remaining in Palauan waters for
two months beyond the expiration of its permit in violation of the statute prohibiting
passage in Palauan waters without a permit ―would raise substantial issues as to possible
violation of the constitutional prohibition against excessive fines.‖ Republic of Palau v.
M/V Aesarea, 1 ROP Intrm. 429, 434 (1988). But the M/V Aesarea decision contained
only excessive fines dicta, not an actual application of the clause.
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inability to pay the fines. The four Gotina defendants were each convicted
of two counts of unlawful fishing.631 Two defendants were fined $10,000
per count and two were fined $25,000 per count.632
In construing the excessive fines clause, the Court found it
appropriate to consider United States case law.633 The Court‘s review of
the case law uncovered ―many cases that have declined to scrutinize
inability to pay as an element of the constitutional excessiveness inquiry,
and have held that indigence becomes relevant only as a defense to any
attempt on the part of the government to enforce payment of the fine.‖634
The Court therefore found that arguments regarding ability to pay ―fail to
raise a cognizable challenge under the Excessive Fines Clause‖ and
therefore upheld the constitutionality of the fines.635
Less than a month after Gotina, the Appellate Division revisited
the same issue in Flaga v. Republic of Palau.636 The Flaga defendant,
sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment and a $50,000 fine, appealed
the fine on the basis of her inability to pay.637 The Court was unimpressed
with her argument, holding that a defendant‘s ―ability to pay ha[s] no
bearing on the constitutionality of the fine.‖638 The Court affirmed the
imposition of the fine stating that a ―fine can only violate the Excessive
Fines Clause if the fine[] bears no relationship to ‗the gravity of the
offense that it is designed to punish.‘‖639
In measuring the size of a fine, the Court has found the $50,000
mandatory minimum fine for trafficking in methamphetamine to be
constitutionally un-excessive.640 In doing so, the Court measured the
gravity of the offense against the magnitude of the fine.641 The Court
found two considerations particularly relevant: (1) courts should grant
substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily
possess in determining the types and limits of criminal punishments; and
(2) any judicial determination regarding the gravity of a particular offense
631

See Gotina, 8 ROP at 65.

632

See id.

633

See id.

634

Id. at 66.

635

Id. at 67.

636

Flaga v. Republic of Palau, 8 ROP Intrm. 79 (1999).

637

See id. at 79.

638

Id. at 80 (citing Gotina, 8 ROP Intrm. at 67).

639

Id. (quoting Gotina, 8 ROP at 66).

640

See Silmai v. Republic of Palau, 10 ROP 139, 141-42 (2003).

641

See id. at 142 (quoting United States v. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 2036
(1998) (―The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the
offense.‖)).
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will be ―inherently imprecise.‖642
Deferring to the legislature‘s
determination that methamphetamine trafficking is a ―grave offense‖
deserving of a punishment eliciting a ―strong deterrent effect,‖ the Court
found that the $50,000 mandatory minimum fine ―bears a constitutionally
adequate relationship to the gravity of the crime of trafficking
methamphetamine.‖643

642

See id. (citing Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2037).

643

Id. at 142.
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XV. ADDITIONAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES
A. Victims’ Compensation
Although compensation of victims is included in the ―Fundamental
Rights‖ article of the Constitution, victims are not ―fundamentally‖
guaranteed compensation. A victim of a criminal offense ―may‖ be
compensated by the government ―as prescribed by law or at the discretion
of the court.‖644 This section, therefore, only states that the legislature or
the court has the power to prescribe victim compensation by the
government, a power that certainly the legislature (and perhaps the
judiciary) held without this explicit grant of power.
B. Freedom from Slavery and Protection of Children
Slavery or involuntary servitude—whether it be imposed by the
government or by a private entity—is prohibited by Section 11 of Article
IV. The only exception to the slavery and involuntary servitude ban is as
punishment for a crime.645 Section 11 also includes an open-ended
directive that ―[t]he government shall protect children from
exploitation.‖646 Although a worthy sentiment, the vagueness of this
provision dooms it to carry little weight.
C. Familial Rights
As amended by the Twenty-Second Amendment, Section 13 of
Article IV contains three distinct ideas.647 First, the grant of a right: the
government is required to ―provide for marital and related parental rights,
privileges and responsibilities on the basis of equality between men and
women, mutual consent and cooperation.‖648 Second, a restriction of
liberty: marriages contracted in Palau must ―be between a man and a
woman.‖649 Lastly, an imposition of liability: parents (or those acting as
644

ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 8.

645

ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 11.

646

Id.

647

ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 13 & amend. 22.

648

Id.

649

This second clause, restricting the nature of marriage, was added by the
Twenty-Second Amendment in 2008.
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parents) are ―legally responsible for the support and for the unlawful
conduct of their minor children as prescribed by law.‖650 This last clause
carries no weight on its own, but only provides for the enactment of
effectuating statutes.
D. Academic Freedom
The Sixteenth Amendment added Section 15 to Article IV,
guaranteeing ―academic freedom‖ in ―post secondary education and any
institution of higher learning.‖651 It is unclear what the promise of
―academic freedom‖ provides, especially in post secondary education. It
is uncertain whether this section grants ―freedom‖ to students, teachers,
administrators or, if to all, how these competing freedoms should be
reconciled.
E. Prohibition on Land Tax
Article XIII, Section 9 prohibits the imposition of tax on land.652
But the taxation forbidden by this section is only a ―direct tax on the land
itself.‖653 A tax on revenue derived from land is not barred by this
section.654 And the profit-sharing arrangement whereby the national
government collects twenty-five percent of the revenue realized by a state
public lands authority from the administration of public lands does not
qualify as a ―tax‖ on land.655

650

ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 13 & amend. 22.

651

ROP CONST. amend. 16.

652

ROP CONST. Art. XIII, § 9.

653

Koror State Gov’t v. Republic of Palau, 3 ROP Intrm. 314, 320 (1993).

654

See id. (addressing revenue generated from the operation of a quarry).

655

See id. at 318-19.
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XVI. TRADITIONAL RIGHTS
A. Prohibition from Diminishing Roles of Traditional Leaders
Section 1 of Article V provides that—other than through the
Constitution—the government is not to infringe upon the role or function
of traditional leaders.656 This section formed the basis of the challenge in
House of Traditional Leaders v. Seventh Koror State Legislature.657 The
HOTL traditional leaders argued that several amendments to the Koror
State Constitution that diminished their roles in the legislative affairs of
the state (as previously granted by the Koror State Constitution) violated
their traditional rights under Article V.658 The post-amendment state
constitution altered the traditional leaders‘ status from ―the supreme
authority of the State of Koror‖ to ―more of a consultative role.‖659
Despite the Article V, section 1 language proscribing actions of the
―government,‖ the Court found no relevance in the fact that the
amendments to the Koror State Constitution were proposed via legislative
resolution rather than voter petition or citizen initiative.660 This section
applies regardless of the method of constitutional amendment.661
The Court interpreted Article V, Section 1 restrictively:
The amendments [to the Koror State Constitution] also do
not prevent traditional leaders from being ―recognized,
honored, or given a formal or functional role‖ in the Koror
State Government. As the trial court explained, ―[e]ven
taking the language of Article V, Section 1, at face value,
the Court does not believe it requires that traditional leaders
be accorded any particular role in the government.‖ A plain
reading of Article V indicates that this article merely
intends to ensure that no impediments are placed in the way
of traditional leaders holding a governmental position.
Instead of preventing the traditional leaders from holding
office, the amendments merely adjust the role played by
HOTL in the current structure of the Koror State
656

ROP CONST. Art. V, § 1.

657

House of Traditional Leaders v. Seventh Koror State Legislature, 14 ROP 52
(2007) (―HOTL‖).
658

See id. at 53-54.

659

Id.

660

See id. at 54-55.

661

See id. at 55.
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government.662
The Court‘s ultimate inquiry boiled down to whether the amendments
prevented traditional leaders from running for office in their individual
capacities.663
The Court specifically rejected the argument that, once granted,
powers of traditional leaders in state government can never be diminished
or removed.664 According to the Court, the right of the people to choose
the structure of their government includes the right to change it.665
However (as argued by the traditional leaders) Article V, Section 1—
explicitly made applicable to the state government through Article XI,
Section 1‘s guarantee that the structure and organization of state
governments shall not be inconsistent with the national Constitution—
freezes the roles and functions of traditional leaders as recognized by
custom and tradition. Therefore, no constitutional issue would arise with a
state granting a traditional leader a non-traditional power and then
subsequently taking it away. But, under the terms of the Constitution, a
state should not be able to take away power of a traditional leader,
regardless of whether the process by which the power is removed
comports with the state constitution.
A similar conflict played out in Gibbons v. Koror State
Government.666 In Gibbons, Koror State passed a law vesting the power to
select all seven members of the Koror State Public Lands Authority Board
of Trustees (the ―Board‖) in the hands of the Governor.667 One seat on the
Board had previously been reserved for the High Chief Ibedul, who had
the authority to select three additional board members.668 The appellants,
including the Ibedul, argued that the statute unconstitutionally stripped the
Ibedul of his customary role in deciding and allocating use of public lands
in Koror.669 The Appellate Division reviewed earlier case law stating that
traditional leaders have no ―customary or traditional‖ function in state or
national constitutional governments.670 The Court concluded that the
662

Id. at 56.

663

See id.

664

See id. at 56-57.

665

See id. at 57.

666

Gibbons v. Koror State Gov’t, 13 ROP 156 (2006).

667

See id. at 157.

668

See id.

669

See id. at 158.

670

See id. at 159-60 (citing Becheserrak v. Koror State Gov’t, Civ. No. 166-86
(Trial Div. May 16, 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 6 ROP Intrm. 74 (1997); Ngara-Irrai
Traditional Council of Chiefs v. Airai State Gov’t, 6 ROP Intrm. 198 (1997)). See section
XVIII.B, infra, for a discussion of the Becheserrak appellate opinion and Ngara-Irrai
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statute at issue was constitutional because ―traditional leadership had no
customary and traditional role in selecting members of the KSPLA Board‖
and:
[I]nsofar as Article V, Section 1 [and a similar provision of
the Koror State Constitution] protects the roles and
functions of traditional leaders as recognized by custom
and tradition, it does not protect their role with respect to
the KSPLA Board, a part of the constitutional government
of Koror, for, as the Trial Division noted, there was and is
no customary role or function of traditional leaders in the
constitutional government.671
This restrictive reading essentially eviscerates any protection
provided to traditional leaders by Article V, Section 1 by permitting
exclusion of traditional leaders from their traditional roles by merely
statutorily assigning another to that role. In Gibbons, the state government
assigned the role of allocating public lands (a role allegedly traditionally
occupied by the Ibedul) to a statutorily-created Board and the Court held
that the Ibedul need not be afforded a place on the Board because his place
as a Board member was not a ―traditional‖ one. A better result in Gibbons
would have been to find that the power over state land had been
constitutionally granted to the states (and therefore taken from the Ibedul)
by Article I, Section 2 rather than relying on the statutorily-created Koror
State Public Lands Authority.
B. Conflict Between Statutory and Traditional Law
Section 2 of Article V states that statutes and traditional law are
―equally authoritative.‖672 Section 2 goes on to provide that statutory law
prevails over conflicting traditional law ―only to the extent it is not in
conflict with the underlying principles of the traditional law.‖ Traditional
law thus trumps statutory law when the statutory law is in conflict with the
―underlying principles‖ of the traditional law. It seems unlikely that
Traditional Council of Chiefs.
671

Gibbons, 13 ROP at 161. In concurrence, Chief Justice Ngiraklsong found
the majority‘s constitutional determinations unnecessary and stated that he found the
statute constitutional because insufficient evidence was presented at trial to demonstrate
the Ibedul‘s traditional powers over public lands. See id. at 166 (Ngiraklsong, C.J.,
concurring).
672

ROP CONST. Art. V, § 2. No mention is made of the Constitution‘s
weightiness in relation to traditional law, but, based on the transitive property, the
superiority of the Constitution to statutory law should mean that the Constitution is also
superior to traditional law (given that statutory law and traditional law are ―equally
authoritative‖).
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contradictory laws would not also conflict with the ―underlying
principles‖ of each other. Therefore, despite its wording, Section 2 may
imbue greater superiority to traditional laws than to statutory laws. When
no statute is on point, customary law applies.673
Chief Justice Ngiraklsong has explained the effect of Article V,
Section 2 in the following way: ―Perhaps an appropriate statutory rule to
use here, given the equal status of both statutes and Palauan custom, is that
a statute should be read in a way to avoid nullifying Palauan custom more
than the statute prescribes.‖674 Although not precisely in concert with the
constitutional language, the Chief Justice‘s formulation is certainly more
straight-forward and leaves less uncertainty about the effectiveness of
Palauan statutes.
In dicta and without decision, the Appellate Division has stated
that ―[t]here may be an argument… that the statute of limitations should
not be applied at all to actions involving some issues of custom and
traditional law‖ based upon Article V, Section 2.675 The Court noted such
an argument was supported in some degree by ―[t]he fact that certain
Palauan customary processes take longer in their normal course to work
themselves out within the parameters of traditional law than would be
allowed by the statute of limitations.‖676
The Court has consistently denied application of Article V, Section
2 to disposition of assets belonging to a person who died before the
enactment of the Constitution. Such analysis, first articulated by Justice
Miller, is proper in light of Article XV, Section 3(b)‘s protection of ―rights,
interests, obligations, judgments and liabilities arising under the existing
law‖ before the Constitution took effect.677 The Appellate Division has
subsequently adopted this approach.678
673

See Marsil v. Telungalk ra Iterkerkill, 15 ROP 33, 36 (2008) (―Absent an
applicable [] statute, customary law applies.‖).
674

Bandarii v. Ngerusebek Lineage, 11 ROP 83, 88C (2004) (Ngiraklsong, C.J.,
concurring).
675

Kumangai v. Isechal, 1 ROP Intrm. 587, 588 (1989).

676

Id. Given that the Court was called upon in Kumangai only to rule whether
the trial judge erred in raising the statute of limitations issue sua sponte, it was imprudent
of the Court to offer such constitutional musings.
677

See Morei v. Ngetchuang Lineage, 5 ROP Intrm. 292, 293 (Trial Div. 1995)
(Miller, J.) (―It is clear that as of 1973, statutory law did prevail over traditional law.‖).
678

See Nakamura v. Markub, 8 ROP Intrm. 39, 40 n.4 (1999) (finding that the
intestacy statute could not violate the yet-to-be-enacted Article V, section 2: ―We merely
note that the Palau Constitution did not exist in 1962, at the time of Markub‘s death. We
apply the law in effect at the time of his death.‖); Ngirchokebai v. Reklai, 8 ROP Intrm.
151, 152 n.2 (2000) (―[T]he application of [statutory law] to property disposed of [at an]
eldecheduch before the adoption of the Constitution does not conflict with article V, § 2
of the Constitution.‖).
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C. Preservation and Promotion of Palauan Heritage
In 2008 the Twenty-First Amendment added Section 3 to Article V.
This new section mandates that the ―national government shall take
affirmative action to assist traditional leaders in the preservation,
protection, and promotion of Palauan heritage, culture, languages, customs
and tradition.‖679 While an admirable display of support for traditional
leaders and culture, Section 3 bears little teeth as far as enforceability.

679

ROP CONST. amend. 21.
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XVII. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
According to Article VI (as altered by the Twenty-Third
Amendment), the national government is required to ―take positive steps‖
in the interest of the following:
conservation of a beautiful, healthful, and resourceful
natural environment; promotion of the national economy;
protection of the safety and security of persons and
property; promotion of health and social welfare of the
citizens through the provision of free or subsidized health
care; and provision of public education for citizens which
shall be free from grades one (1) to twelve (12) and
compulsory as prescribed by law. 680
The first three ―responsibilities,‖ conservation of the environment,
promotion of the economy, and security, are amorphous and provide little
limitation on the actions of the national government. Furthermore, it is
unclear who bears responsibility for their provision—the legislature, the
executive, or some combination of the two.681 The buck could assuredly
be passed between governmental branches and amongst ministries in
almost any challenge to non-provision of these responsibilities.
The latter two responsibilities—free or subsidized health care and
free and compulsory public education for citizens—are more measurable
and thus more enforceable. However, questions still exist, such as what
level of health care or quality of public education must be provided for the
national government to meet its responsibilities. Although included in
Article IV (―Fundamental Rights‖) rather than Article VI
(―Responsibilities of the National Government‖), the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment added a new section mandating that the national government
―provide free preventive health care for every citizen as prescribed by
law.‖682 As with its Article VI responsibility to provide free or subsidized
health care, this free preventive health care provision also leaves questions
to be answered regarding the quantum and quality of care that is required.

680

The Twenty-Third amendment, enacted in 2008, clarified this provision by
adding the ―from grades one (1) to twelve (12)‖ language.
681

Justice Gibson cited Article VI as evidence that the framers of the
Constitution intended a ―strong central government.‖ See Nakatani v. Nishizino, 1 ROP
Intrm. 289, 295 (Trial Div. 1985) (Gibson, J.). Although Justice Gibson perhaps
overstated the implication of Article VI to some degree, Article VI does inferentially
grant the national government ―powers‖ to carry out its enumerated responsibilities.
682

ROP CONST. amend. 24.
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XVIII. POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF STATE GOVERNMENTS
A. State Governance Overview
Palau comprises sixteen states. Each state is granted exclusive
ownership over the natural resources within its territories by Article I,
Section 2.683 States may not secede from Palau and new states—
comprising territory ―historically or geographically part of Palau‖—may
be admitted upon approval by the national legislature and not less than
three-fourths of the states.684
Article XI addresses (some of) the powers and responsibilities of
state governments. Section 1 concerns the structure of state governments
and contains the ―guarantee clause.‖685 Section 2 grants all undelegated
powers to the national government, while Sections 3 and 4 delegate
powers to the state governments (subject to national statutes).
B. Guarantee Clause
The most litigated portion of Article XI, located in section 1, is the
guarantee clause. It ―guarantees‖ that the ―structure and organization of
state governments shall follow democratic principles, traditions of Palau,
and shall not be inconsistent‖ with the Constitution.686 As found in
Teriong v. Government of State of Airai, the issue of whether a state
constitution ―conforms‖ to Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution is a
justiciable issue.687 Because the Airai State Constitution did not afford
citizens the right to vote for key public officials—an ―essential democratic
principle‖ as guaranteed by Article VII688—it violated the guarantee clause
of Article XI, Section 1.689
Like a state constitution, the structure of a state government may
be challenged under the guarantee clause.690 The Court revisited the
683

See section II.A, supra.

684

ROP CONST. Art. XIII, §§ 4-5.

685

Or, as some prefer, the ―guaranty clause.‖

686

ROP CONST. Art. XI, § 1.

687

Teriong v. Gov’t of State of Airai, 1 ROP Intrm. 664, 673-74 (1989).

688

See section III.C, supra.

689

See Teriong, 1 ROP Intrm. at 675-76 (―Without the right to vote, a state
constitution does not conform with the minimum requirement of ‗democratic
principles.‘‖); see also id. at 681 (―We further hold that Article VII and Section 1, Article
XI of the Constitution require that key state officials be elected and that the electorate be
given the opportunity periodically to determine whether to retain or replace those
officials through elections.‖).
690

See Becheserrak v. Koror State, 3 ROP Intrm. 53, 56 (1991) (―We hold that
the issue of whether the Koror State government complies with the Guarantee Clause of
the Palau Constitution is a justiciable issue which does not bar judicial review.‖).
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Teriong decision in Koror State Government v. Becheserrak.691 It clarified
that the Teriong decision focused on a state constitution that did not
provide for the election of any key government officials and stated that
―[t]he Teriong court did not hold that a constitution that failed to provide
for the election of every key government official would be in violation of
Article XI, section 1.‖692
The Court reasoned that democratic
governments regularly have unelected key public officials and that a
requirement that all key public officials must be elected would create an
overly broad reading of the guarantee clause.693
Justice Beattie, writing separately, voiced his view that the
majority, in an attempt to avoid Teriong without overruling it, created a
mischievous brand of jurisprudence by inserting a post facto ―some‖ into
the holding of Teriong.694 In Justice Beattie‘s view, the proper course
would be to admit that Teriong‘s requirement of election of all key public
officials was too broad and overrule it.695 The concurring justice did not
agree that any key state officials need be elected to comport with the
constitutional guarantee—only that the state constitutions permit the
electorate to alter the structure of their state government should the
citizens tire of non-elected leadership.696
Just as a state government cannot constitutionally run with wholly
unelected officials, it also cannot constitutionally run without any role for
traditional leaders.697 It is, however, for the states to decide in what
capacity the traditional leaders should serve.698
In the most recent addition to its guarantee clause jurisprudence,
the Appellate Division upheld the Trial Division‘s order finding the
amendment provision of the Ngatpang State Constitution unconstitutional
in The Ngaimis v. Republic of Palau.699 The Ngatpang government was
691

Koror State Gov’t v. Becheserrak, 6 ROP Intrm. 74 (1997).

692

Id. at 77 (emphasis added).

693

See id.

694

See id. at 79-80 (Beattie, J., concurring).

695

See id. at 80 (Beattie, J., concurring).

696

See id. at 80-82 (Beattie, J., concurring). For Chief Justice Ngiraklsong‘s
overview of Teriong and Koror State Government v. Becheserrak, see Gibbons v. Seventh
Koror State Legislature, 13 ROP 156, 164 n.1 (2006) (Ngiraklsong, C.J., concurring).
697

See Ngara-Irrai Traditional Council of Chiefs v. Airai State Gov’t, 6 ROP
Intrm. 198, 202-04 (1997).
698

See id. at 204 (finding use of traditional leaders in purely advisory roles to be
constitutional).
699

The Ngaimis v. Republic of Palau, 16 ROP 26 (2009). The Trial Division‘s
treatment of the Ngaimis—affirmed on appeal—can be found at Republic of Palau v.
Ngatpang State, 13 ROP 292 (Trial Div. 2003) (Ngiraklsong, C.J.) and Republic of Palau
v. Ngatpang State, 13 ROP 297 (Trial Div. 2006) (Ngiraklsong, C.J.).

110

Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal

[Vol. 12:2

configured so that all state legislative and executive power was held by the
Ngaimis, an unelected traditional council of ten chiefs.700 The amendment
provision of the Ngatpang Constitution required approval of eight
members of the Ngaimis before any amendment would take effect.701
When a constitutional convention sought to place amendments on the
ballot that would potentially restructure the government to drastically
reduce the power of the Ngaimis, the Ngaimis canceled the vote and
removed the proposed amendments from the ballot.702
Finding that ―the Teriong and Beches[]er[r]ak decisions establish
that the right to change one‘s constitution and government as one chooses
is fundamental to achieving democratic principles,‖ the Appellate Division
held that the Ngaimis-controlled constitutional amendment provision was
unconstitutional under the Guarantee Clause of the national
Constitution.703 The right for the populous to change the structure of
government is the heart of the Guarantee Clause as interpreted in the
Teriong-Becheserrak-Ngaimis trilogy of cases. State governments need
not be run by elected officials to comport with Article XI, Section 1‘s
requirement to ―follow democratic principles.‖ The main requirement is
that a majority of the population can choose to alter the organization of
government (and, presumably, shift away from unelected leaders) if they
so desire.
C. Delegation of Powers to the States
Section 2 of Article XI reserves to the national government all
powers not expressly delegated to the state governments. The national
government may, by statute, delegate powers to the state governments.
But the lack of reservation of powers to the states does not mean that the
states are akin to ―municipal corporations,‖ the actions of which are
subject to judicial review because of lack of separation of powers
concerns.704
In assessing whether a state has a certain power, ―[t]he limiting
language of Article XI, Section 2 significantly narrows the relevant
inquiry… to whether either the Palau Constitution or the national

700

See The Ngaimis, 16 ROP at 27. Ngatpang had one elected official, but that
official‘s capacities were largely administrative and under the supervision of the
(unelected) governor. See id. at 27.
701

See id.

702

See id.

703

Id. at 30. The Court attempted to explain the relationship between its
previous Teriong and Koror State Government v. Becheserrak decisions, avoiding any
mention of ―overruling‖: ―[t]he Teriong holding was followed and clarified in Koror
State Government v. Becheserrak . . . ‖ Id. at 28.
704

See Tudong v. Sixth Kelulul A Ngardmau, 13 ROP 111, 113 n.2 (2006).
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government has expressly delegated to the states the power.‖705
Delegation by the national government has been found to grant states the
power to prosecute their own criminal laws706 and to enact and enforce
zoning laws.707 State legislatures also possess the constitutional power to
tax.708 The national government, however, may limit a state‘s taxing
power by legislation.709

705

State of Koror v. Blanco, 4 ROP Intrm. 208, 209 (1994) (finding that states
have the power to prosecute their own criminal laws through a legislative delegation by
the national government).
706

See id. at 211-12.

707

See Koror State Planning Comm’n v. Haruo, 8 ROP Intrm. 361, 361 (Trial
Div. 2001) (Ngiraklsong, C.J.).
708
709

ROP CONST. Art. XI, § 3.

See id.; see also Koror State Gov’t v. Republic of Palau, 3 ROP Intrm. 127,
128 (1992) (upholding statute prohibiting states ―from enacting any taxes or fees on
persons, goods, services, sales, income, activities, objects, or other matters already taxed
or charged by the national government‖ on the grounds that ―[t]he language of Article XI,
Section 3 is a clear pronouncement that the Olbiil Era Kelulau (‗OEK‘) has authority to
regulate state taxation.‖).
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APPENDIX: SELECTED TEXT OF THE PALAU CONSTITUTION710
Article I (Territory), as amended by the Twenty-Sixth Amendment
Section 1
(a) The Republic of Palau shall have jurisdiction and
sovereignty over its territory which shall consist of all the
islands, atolls, reefs, and shoals that have traditionally been
in the Palauan archipelago, including Ngeruangel Reef and
Kayangel Island in the north and Hatohobei Island (Tobi
Island) and Hocharihie (Helen‘s Reef) in the south and all
land areas adjacent and in between, and also consist of the
internal waters and archipelagic waters within these land
areas the territorial waters around these land areas and the
airspace above these land and water areas extending to a
two hundred (200) nautical miles exclusive economic zone,
unless otherwise delimited by bilateral agreements or as
may be limited or extended under international law.
(b) The archipelagic baselines, from which the breadths of
maritime zones are measured for the Palau Archipelago
shall be drawn from the northernmost point of Ngeruangel
Reef, thence east to the northernmost of Kayangel Island
and around the island to its easternmost point, south to the
easternmost point of the Babeldaob barrier reef, south to
the easternmost point of Angaur Island and then around the
island to its westernmost point, thence north to the reef to
the point of origin. The normal baselines, from which the
breadths of maritime zones for the Southwest Islands are
measured, shall be drawn around the islands of Fanna,
Sonsorol (Dongosaro), Pulo Anna and Merir, and the Island
of Hatohobei (Tobi Island), including Hocharihie (Helen‘s
Reef).
Section 2
(a) The Republic of Palau shall have exclusive ownership
and shall exercise its sovereign rights to conserve, develop,
exploit, explore, and manage at a sustainable manner, all
living and non-living resources within its exclusive
economic zone and its continental shelf in accordance with
710

Selected text reproduced by and on file with the author. For an official
version, consult the Singichi Ikesakes Law Library in Koror, Palau. An unamended
English version may be found on the website of the Senate of the Republic of Palau at
www.palauoek.net/senate/legislation/PalauConstitutionEnglish.pdf.
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applicable treaties, international law and practices. The
Republic of Palau shall have exclusive ownership and
sovereign jurisdiction over all mineral resources in the
seabed, subsoil, water column, and insular shelves within
its continental shelf.
(b) Each state shall have exclusive ownership of all living
and non-living resources, except highly migratory fish,
within the twelve (12) nautical mile territorial sea,
provided, however, that traditional fishing rights and
practices shall not be impaired.
Section 3
The national government shall have the power to add
territory and to extend jurisdiction.
Section 4
Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted to violate the
right of innocent passage and the internationally recognized
freedom of the high seas.
Article II (Sovereignty and Supremacy)
Section 1
This Constitution is the supreme law of the land.
Section 2
Any law, act of government, or agreement to which a
government of Palau is a party, shall not conflict with this
Constitution and shall be invalid to the extent of such
conflict.
Section 3
Major governmental powers including but not limited to
defense, security, or foreign affairs may be delegated by
treaty, compact, or other agreement between the sovereign
Republic of Palau and another sovereign nation or
international organization, provided such treaty, compact or
agreement shall be approved by not less than two-thirds
(2/3) of the members of each house of the Olbiil Era
Kelulau and by a majority of the votes cast in a nationwide
referendum conducted for such purpose, provided, that any
such agreement which authorizes use, testing, storage or
disposal of nuclear, toxic chemical, gas or biological
weapons intended for use in warfare shall require approval
of not less than three-fourths (3/4) of the votes cast in such
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referendum.
Article III (Citizenship)
Section 1
A person who is a citizen of the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands immediately prior to the effective date of
this Constitution and who has at least one parent of
recognized Palauan ancestry is a citizen of Palau.
Section 2, repealed by the Seventeenth Amendment
[A person born of parents, one or both of whom are citizens
of Palau is a citizen of Palau by birth, and shall remain a
citizen of Palau so long as the person is not or does not
become a citizen of any other nation.]
Section 3, repealed by the Seventeenth Amendment
[A citizen of Palau who is a citizen of another nation shall,
within three (3) years after his eighteenth (18) birthday, or
within three (3) years after the effective date of this
Constitution, whichever is later, renounce his citizenship of
the other nation and register his intent to remain a citizen of
Palau. If he fails to comply with this requirement, he shall
be deprived of Palauan citizenship.]
Section 4, as amended by the Seventeenth Amendment
A person born of parents, one or both of whom are citizens
of Palau or are of recognized Palauan ancestry, is a citizen
of Palau. Citizenship of other foreign nations shall not
affect a person‘s Palauan citizenship.
Section 5
The Olbiil Era Kelulau shall adopt uniform laws for
admission and exclusion of noncitizens of Palau.
Article IV (Fundamental Rights)
Section 1
The government shall take no action to deny or impair the
freedom of conscience or of philosophical or religious
belief of any person nor take any action to compel, prohibit
or hinder the exercise of religion. The government shall
not recognize or establish a national religion, but may
provide assistance to private or parochial schools on a fair
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Section 2
The government shall take no action to deny or impair the
freedom of expression or press. No bona fide reporter may
be required by the government to divulge or be jailed for
refusal to divulge information obtained in the course of a
professional investigation.
Section 3
The government shall take no action to deny or impair the
right of any person to peacefully assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances or to associate with
others for any lawful purpose including the right to
organize and to bargain collectively.
Section 4
Every person has the right to be secure in his person, house,
papers and effects against entry, search and seizure.
Section 5
Every person shall be equal under the law and shall be
entitled to equal protection. The government shall take no
action to discriminate against any person on the basis of
sex, race, place of origin, language, religion or belief, social
status or clan affiliation except for the preferential
treatment of citizens, for the protection of minors, elderly,
indigent, physically or mentally handicapped, and other
similar groups, and in matters concerning intestate
succession and domestic relations. No person shall be
treated unfairly in legislative or executive investigations.
Section 6
The government shall take no action to deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor
shall private property be taken except for a recognized
public use and for just compensation in money or in kind.
No person shall be held criminally liable for an act which
was not a legally recognized crime at the time of its
commission, nor shall the penalty for an act be increased
after the act was committed. No person shall be placed in
double jeopardy for the same offense. No person shall be
found guilty of a crime or punished by legislation.
Contracts to which a citizen is a party shall not be impaired
by legislation. No person shall be imprisoned for debt. A
warrant for search and seizure may not issue except from a

115

116

Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal

[Vol. 12:2

justice or judge on probable cause supported by an affidavit
particularly describing the place, persons, or things to be
searched, arrested, or seized.
Section 7
A person accused of a criminal offense shall be presumed
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and
shall enjoy the right to be informed of the nature of the
accusation and to a speedy, public and impartial trial. He
shall be permitted full opportunity to examine all witnesses
and shall have the right of compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses and evidence on his behalf at public
expense. He shall not be compelled to testify against
himself. At all times the accused shall have the right to
counsel. If the accused is unable to afford counsel, he shall
be assigned counsel by the government. Accused persons
lawfully detained shall be separated from convicted
criminals and on the basis of sex and age. Bail may not be
unreasonably excessive nor denied those accused and
detained before trial. The writ of habeas corpus is hereby
recognized and may not be suspended. The national
government may be held liable in a civil action for
unlawful arrest or damage to private property as prescribed
by law. Coerced or forced confessions shall not be
admitted into evidence nor may a person be convicted or
punished solely on the basis of a confession without
corroborating evidence.
Section 8
A victim of a criminal offense may be compensated by the
government as prescribed by law or at the discretion of the
court.
Section 9
A citizen of Palau may enter and leave Palau and may
migrate within Palau.
Section 10
Torture, cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or
punishment, and excessive fines are prohibited.
Section 11
Slavery or involuntary servitude is prohibited except to
punish crime. The government shall protect children from
exploitation.
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Section 12
A citizen has the right to examine any government
document and to observe the official deliberations of any
agency of government.

Section 13, as amended by the Twenty-Second Amendment
The government shall provide for marital and related
parental rights, privileges and responsibilities on the basis
or equality between men and women, mutual consent and
cooperation. All marriages contracted within the Republic
of Palau shall be between a man and a woman. Parents or
individuals acting in the capacity of parents shall be legally
responsible for the support and for the unlawful conduct of
their minor children as prescribed by law.
Section 14, as added by the Ninth Amendment
The Olbiil Era Kelulau may provide for a trial by jury in
criminal and civil cases, as prescribed by law; provided,
however, that where a criminal offense is alleged to have
been committed after December 31, 2009, and where such
criminal offense is punishable by a sentence of
imprisonment of twelve (12) years or more, the accused
shall have the right to a trial by jury, as prescribed by law.
Section 15, as added by the Sixteenth Amendment
In post secondary education and any institution of higher
learning, academic freedom is guaranteed.
Section 16, as added by the Twenty-Fourth Amendment
The national government shall provide free preventive
health care for every citizen as prescribed by law.
Article V (Traditional Rights)
Section 1
The government shall take no action to prohibit or revoke
the role or function of a traditional leader as recognized by
custom and tradition which is not inconsistent with this
Constitution, nor shall it prevent a traditional leader from
being recognized, honored, or given formal or functional
roles at any level of government.
Section 2
Statutes and traditional law shall be equally authoritative.
In case of conflict between a statute and a traditional law,
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the statute shall prevail only to the extent it is not in
conflict with the underlying principles of the traditional
law.
Section 3, as added by the Twenty-First Amendment
The national government shall take affirmative action to
assist traditional leaders in the preservation, protection, and
promotion of Palauan heritage, culture, languages, customs
and tradition.
Article VI (Responsibilities of the National Government), as amended by
the Twenty-Third Amendment
The national government shall take positive action to attain
these national objectives and implement these national
policies:
conservation of a beautiful, healthful and
resourceful natural environment; promotion of the national
economy; protection of the safety and security of persons
and property; promotion of the health and social welfare of
the citizens through the provision of free or subsidized
health care; and provision of public education for citizens
which shall be free from grades one (1) to twelve (12) and
compulsory as prescribed by law.
Article VII (Suffrage), as amended by the Eighteenth Amendment
A citizen of Palau eighteen (18) years of age or older may
vote in national and state elections. The Olbiil Era Kelulau
shall prescribe a minimum period of residence and provide
for voter registration for national elections. Each state shall
prescribe a minimum period of residence and provide for
voter registration for state elections. A citizen who is in
prison, serving a sentence for a felony, or mentally
incompetent as determined by a court may not vote. Voting
shall be by secret ballot. Voting shall only be by absentee
ballot for voters who are outside the territory of Palau
during an election.
Article IX (Olbiil Era Kelulau)
***
Section 5
The Olbiil Era Kelulau shall have the following powers:
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12) to regulate the ownership, exploration and exploitation
of natural resources;
Article XI (State Governments)
Section 1
The structure and organization of state governments shall
follow democratic principles, traditions of Palau, and shall
not be inconsistent with this Constitution. The national
government shall assist in the organization of state
government.
Section 2
All governmental powers not expressly delegated by this
Constitution to the states nor denied to the national
government are powers of the national government. The
national government may delegate powers by law to the
state governments.
Section 3
Subject to laws enacted by the Olbiil Era Kelulau, state
legislatures shall have the power to impose taxes which
shall be uniformly applied throughout the state.
Section 4
Subject to the approval of the Olbiil Era Kelulau, the state
legislatures shall have the power to borrow money to
finance public programs or to settle public debt.
Article XIII (General Provisions)
Section 1
The Palauan traditional languages shall be the national
languages. Palauan and English shall be the official
languages. The Olbiil Era Kelulau shall determine the
appropriate use of each language.
Section 2, as amended by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
The Palauan and English versions of this Constitution shall
be equally authoritative; in case of conflict the Palauan
version shall prevail.
***
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Section 4
No state may secede from Palau.
Section 5
An area which was historically or geographically part of
Palau may be admitted as a new state upon the approval of
the Olbiil Era Kelulau and not less than three-fourths (3/4)
of the states.
Section 6
Harmful substances such as nuclear, chemical, gas or
biological weapons intended for use in warfare, nuclear
power plants, and waste materials therefrom, shall not be
used, tested, stored, or disposed of within the territorial
jurisdiction of Palau without the express approval of not
less than three-fourths (3/4) of the votes cast in a
referendum submitted on this specific question.
Section 7
The national government shall have the power to take
property for public use upon payment of just compensation.
The state government shall have the power to take private
property for public use upon payment of just compensation.
No property shall be taken by the national government
without prior consultation with the government of the state
in which the property is located. This power shall not be
used for the benefit of a foreign entity. This power shall be
used sparingly and only as a final resort after all means of
good faith negotiation with the land owner have been
exhausted.
Section 8, as amended by the Nineteenth and Twentieth Amendments
Only citizens of Palau and corporations wholly owned by
citizens of Palau may acquire title to land or waters in
Palau. Foreign countries, with which Palau establishes
diplomatic relations, may acquire title to land for
diplomatic purposes pursuant to bilateral treaties or
agreements. While non-citizens may not acquire title to
land, Palauan citizens may lease land in Palau to noncitizens or corporations not wholly owned by citizens for
up to 99 Years.
Section 9
No tax shall be imposed on land.
***
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Section 11
The provisional capital shall be located in Koror; provided,
that not later than ten (10) years after the effective date of
this Constitution, the Olbiil Era Kelulau shall designate a
place in Babeldaob to be the permanent capital.
Section 12
The national government shall have exclusive power to
regulate importation of firearms and ammunition. No
persons except armed forces personnel lawfully in Palau
and law enforcement officers acting in an official capacity
shall have the right to possess firearms or ammunition
unless authorized by legislation which is approved in a
nationwide referendum by a majority of the votes cast on
the issue.
Section 13
Subject to Section 12, the Olbiil Era Kelulau shall enact
laws within one hundred and eighty (180) days after the
effective date of this Constitution:
1) providing for the purchase, confiscation
and disposal of all firearms in Palau;
2) establishing a mandatory minimum
imprisonment of fifteen (15) years for
violation of any law regarding importation,
possession, use or manufacture of firearms.
First Amendment
Section 14
(a) To avoid inconsistencies found prior to this amendment
by the Supreme Court of Palau to exist between section 324
of the Compact of Free Association and its subsidiary
agreements with the United States of America and other
sections of the Constitution of the Republic of Palau,
Article XIII, section 6 of the Constitution and the final
phrase of Article II, section 3, reading ―provided, that any
such agreement which authorizes use, testing, storage or
disposal of nuclear, toxic chemical, gas or biological
weapons intended for use in warfare shall require approval
of not less than three fourth (3/4) of the votes cast in such
referendum,‖ shall not apply to votes to approve the
Compact of Free Association and its subsidiary agreements
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(as previously agreed to and signed by the parties or as they
may hereafter be amended, so long as such amendments are
not themselves inconsistent with the Constitution) or during
the terms of such compact and agreements. However,
Article XIII, section 6 and the final phrase of Article II,
section 3 of the Constitution shall continue to apply and
remain in full force and effect for all other purposes, and
this amendment shall remain in effect only as long as such
inconsistencies continue.
(b) This amendment shall enter into force and effect
immediately upon its adoption.
Second Amendment
A person born of parents, one or both of whom are of
recognized Palauan ancestry, is a citizen of Palau by birth.
United States citizenship shall not affect a person‘s Palauan
citizenship, nor shall a person of recognized Palauan
ancestry be required to renounce United States citizenship
to become a naturalized citizen of Palau. Persons of
recognized Palauan ancestry who are citizens of other
foreign nations may retain their Palauan citizenship or
become naturalized Palauan citizens as provided by law.
Palauan citizens may renounce their Palauan citizenship.
Renouncements made prior to the effective date of this
amendment are not affected by this amendment.

